[Cite as State v. Swisher, 2017-Ohio-2921.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-16-35
v.
JASON G. SWISHER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 16CR0044
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 22, 2017
APPEARANCES:
W. Alex Smith for Appellant
Angela M. Boes for Appellee
Case No. 13-16-35
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Swisher (“Swisher), brings this appeal from
the November 9, 2016, judgment of the Seneca County Common Pleas Court
sentencing Swisher to a 10-year prison term after Swisher was convicted in a jury
trial of Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree. On
appeal, Swisher argues that the trial court erred in denying his request that a jury
instruction be given on the lesser-included offense of Sexual Battery, and that his
conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On March 2, 2016, Swisher was indicted for Rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree. Swisher pled not guilty to the charge
and his case proceeded to a jury trial, which was held November 7-8, 2016.
{¶3} At trial, the State presented the testimony of nine witnesses including
the alleged victim, S.B., who was 14 years old when the sexual assault occurred.
S.B. testified that Swisher was a cousin through marriage and that she had known
him since she was approximately 6 years old.1
{¶4} S.B. testified that in the late evening hours of December 3, 2015,
Swisher came to S.B.’s mother’s residence while S.B.’s mother was at work. S.B.
1
Testimony indicated that Swisher was 38 at the time of the alleged sexual assault.
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testified that Swisher was not expected, but he was invited inside. At the time, S.B.
testified and that her older sister Kimmie was present at the residence, as was S.B.’s
brother and S.B.’s little sister. S.B. testified that they were watching a movie
together in the living room.
{¶5} S.B. testified that Swisher stayed as they watched television and that he
eventually fell asleep on the couch. S.B. testified that she fell asleep on a separate
love seat and that her sister Kimmie apparently turned off the television and went
to bed in her room. S.B. testified that she awoke at one point when Swisher got up
and stepped on the dog, but she quickly fell back to sleep. Later, S.B. testified that
she was awakened when Swisher placed one hand on her leg and one hand down
her shirt under her bra.
{¶6} S.B. testified that Swisher grabbed both of her hands in one of his and
held them above her head and covered her mouth with his other hand. S.B. testified
that she tried to move her hands but Swisher squeezed them tighter. S.B. testified
that Swisher rubbed her chest and put his mouth on her chest, leaving a hickey.
{¶7} S.B. testified that Swisher then removed her shorts with the hand that
had been covering her mouth, but she did not scream because she was too scared to
make any noise. S.B. testified that Swisher pulled her shorts to her ankles and then
put his penis inside her vagina. S.B. testified that it hurt and burned and that she
was crying during the act.
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{¶8} S.B. testified that she tried to physically resist, to move her hands and
legs, but Swisher put his legs on top of hers. S.B. testified specifically that she did
not consent to the act. S.B. testified that she was too afraid to say anything, that she
was scared and shocked that it was happening. She testified that she was not sure
whether Swisher ejaculated.
{¶9} S.B. testified that shortly after the incident she went to the room she
shared with her sister Kimmie, then upstairs to her other sibling’s bedroom to try
and sleep in her little sister’s bed. S.B. testified that she told Kimmie what happened
to her the next day after school and that Kimmie encouraged her to tell S.B.’s aunt.
Afterward, they told S.B.’s mother, and then S.B.’s father was informed, who called
the police.
{¶10} S.B. was then interviewed by the police and taken to the hospital where
a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (“SANE”) examined her. During S.B.’s
examination, the SANE noted suction injuries on S.B.’s breasts and a bruise on
S.B.’s knee that S.B. claimed was from Swisher grabbing her; however, the SANE
did not report any injuries to S.B.’s hands or wrists, which S.B. testified at trial were
bruised as a result of the incident. The SANE indicated that S.B. did not sustain any
genital injuries, but the SANE testified that was not uncommon. The SANE testified
that 80-90 percent of sexual assault cases do not show “genital injuries.” (Trial Tr.
at 299). The SANE ultimately testified that S.B.’s injuries were consistent with her
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story. Finally, as part of the SANE’s examination of S.B., a swab from S.B.’s vagina
was taken and it was later compared to Swisher’s DNA. A forensic scientist testified
at trial that the swab contained DNA from S.B. and DNA that was consistent with
Swisher’s.2
{¶11} Swisher cross-examined the majority of the State’s witnesses but he
did not present any evidence. Swisher implied through his cross-examination that
the sexual act was consensual rather than forced; however, S.B. explicitly denied
this claim. In an attempt to discredit S.B., Swisher’s counsel also pointed to minor
inconsistencies in S.B.’s story from her initial disclosure through trial.
{¶12} Prior to the case being submitted to the jury, Swisher requested that
the trial court instruct the jury on lesser included offenses in addition the Rape
instructions. The trial court denied Swisher’s request after briefly citing cases on
the record.
{¶13} Ultimately the jury found Swisher guilty of Rape as indicted. The case
proceeded immediately to sentencing and Swisher was sentenced to serve 10 years
in prison. A judgment entry memorializing Swisher’s conviction was filed
November 9, 2016. It is from this judgment that Swisher appeals, asserting the
following assignments of error for our review.
2
The State presented the testimony of a number of officers involved in the investigation and involved in
handling the evidence. The State also presented the testimony of two forensic scientists and the SANE.
Reports from the SANE and the forensic scientists were introduced into evidence.
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Assignment of Error No. 1
Appellant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right[s] to due
process were violated when he was denied jury instructions on
lesser included offenses.
Assignment of Error No. 2
Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
First Assignment of Error
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Swisher argues that the trial court erred
by “not allowing jury instructions for lesser included offenses[,] * * * [s]pecifically,
[S]exual [B]attery.” (Appt.’s Br. at 5). Swisher claims that the evidence presented
in this case warranted an instruction on Sexual Battery.3
{¶15} At the outset, we note that “[a] lesser-included-offense instruction is
not warranted every time ‘some evidence’ is offered to support the lesser offense.”
State v. Bolden, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2014-L-121, 2016-Ohio-4727, ¶ 51, quoting
State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632 (1992). Rather, there must be “sufficient
evidence” to allow the jury to acquit the defendant on the indicted offense and to
find him guilty on the lesser included offense. Id., quoting Shane at 632–633; see
also R.C. 2945.74; Crim.R. 31(C).
3
At the trial court level, in addition to arguing that the trial court should have given an instruction on Sexual
Battery, Swisher argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of
Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor. Swisher only renews his argument on appeal with respect to the
instruction on Sexual Battery. He makes no argument whatsoever regarding an instruction for Unlawful
Sexual Conduct with a Minor, thus we will not address it.
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{¶16} In this case, the State charged Swisher with Rape pursuant to R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), which reads, “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force
or threat of force.” Swisher requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included
offense of Sexual Battery pursuant to R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), which reads, “No person
shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when *
* * [t]he offender knowingly coerces the other person to submit by any means that
would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.”
{¶17} Based on the statutory elements of the cited sections, Rape requires
the use of “force or threat of force” to compel the victim’s submission, while Sexual
Battery only requires coercion. State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-
6404, ¶ 268. “Because ‘force or threat of force always constitutes coercion,’ an
offender cannot commit [R]ape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) without also committing
[S]exual [B]attery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(1).” Id. quoting State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio
St.2d 382, 386 (1980). “However, the State need not prove force or the threat of
force in order to prove [S]exual [B]attery.” Johnson at ¶ 268. Therefore, according
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Sexual Battery as defined by R.C. 2907.03(A)(1),
constitutes a lesser included offense of Rape as defined by R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Id.
{¶18} Nevertheless, as noted previously, an instruction regarding a lesser
included offense must be given “ ‘only where the evidence presented at trial would
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reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the
lesser included offense.’ ” Johnson, supra, at ¶ 269, quoting State v. Thomas, 40
Ohio St.3d 213, 216 (1998). Thus, the failure to instruct on the offense of Sexual
Battery constitutes error only if the jury could reasonably have found that Swisher
compelled S.B. to submit by coercion, but not by force or the threat of force.
Johnson at ¶ 269, citing State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 139–140, 1998-Ohio-
459.
{¶19} Here, there was no “coercion” alleged other than force. S.B. did not
claim, and the State did not argue, that S.B. was coerced into the sexual act through
means other than force; rather it was claimed that Swisher held her hands together
over her head and forcibly raped her. Based on the evidence presented there is no
reasonable probability that a jury could find Swisher not guilty of Rape by force or
threat of force but find him guilty of Sexual Battery based on coercion where the
only coercion alleged was force.4 Thus we cannot find that the trial court erred by
declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of Sexual Battery.
Therefore, Swisher’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶20} In Swisher’s second assignment of error, he argues that his conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
4
We do not dispute that there could be situations where coercion is present but force is not, but that is not
the circumstance before us in this case.
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{¶21} Despite listing “manifest weight” as an assignment of error in his brief,
Swisher makes absolutely no argument in support of this assignment of error. He
does not cite to the record, does not cite any supporting legal authority, and he does
not even bother to cite the boilerplate standard of review regarding manifest weight
of the evidence. For these reasons alone we could overrule Swisher’s second
assignment of error. App.R. 12(A)(2). Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we
will address his assignment of error, though we will not manufacture his argument
for him.
{¶22} In reviewing whether a defendant’s conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and
examines the conflicting testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387
(1997). In doing so, this Court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence
and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387. Furthermore, “[t]o reverse
a judgment of a trial court on the weight of the evidence, when the judgment results
from a trial by jury, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of
appeals panel reviewing the case is required.” Thompkins at paragraph 4 of the
syllabus; Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section (B)(3).
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{¶23} In this case Swisher was convicted of Rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), which reads, “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with
another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force
or threat of force.”
{¶24} In this case, at the trial court level Swisher contended through his
cross-examination of various witnesses, especially the victim, that S.B. consented
to having sex with him. Contrary to Swisher’s contention, S.B. clearly testified at
trial that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with Swisher and she detailed
how he held her down, bruised her, and prevented her from getting up. S.B. testified
that she was afraid Swisher would hurt her worse, so she did not scream. Although
Swisher argued that S.B. was not credible, the jury was in a far better position to
judge S.B.’s credibility and we cannot find that the factfinder clearly lost its way in
this instance or that there was a manifest miscarriage of justice. Thus Swisher’s
second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶25} For the foregoing reasons Swisher’s assignments of error are overruled
and the judgment of the Seneca County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/jlr
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