FILED
May 23 2017, 6:12 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Antoine D. Bates, May 23, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1612-CR-2896
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff Bowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D02-1409-FB-74
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] At Antoine D. Bates’s jury trial for Class B felony burglary, the State disclosed
for the first time that a wallet (which the owner had lost over two years earlier)
had been found in the area of the burglary. Bates argued that this late
disclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the
prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defendant. The trial
court found no Brady violation, and Bates was convicted as charged. Bates now
appeals, arguing a Brady violation and that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction.
[2] Because Brady does not impose a general requirement of pretrial disclosure,
Bates gives us no reason to believe that the wallet’s owner could have offered
evidence favorable to him, and Bates did not request a continuance when the
disclosure was first made at trial, we find no Brady violation. In addition,
because the victim saw Bates running away from her house carrying property
that had been inside, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support his
burglary conviction. We therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In November 2013, Nancy Medina and her husband, Manuel Torres, lived at
Nancy’s parents’ house in Harrison Ridge subdivision in Goshen along with
Nancy’s parents and three of her younger siblings. Nancy’s youngest brother
was one year old at the time.
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[4] On the night of November 9, Nancy and Manuel went with another couple to a
dance club in South Bend to celebrate Manuel’s twenty-second birthday. The
group left the club around 3 a.m., and the other couple drove Nancy and
Manuel home. Nancy was the first to enter the house and left the door open for
her husband. As Nancy headed to the bathroom, she saw a man standing in the
kitchen. Tr. Vol. II p. 227; Tr. Vol. III p. 4. The man, later identified as Bates,
said, “Don’t yell,” but Nancy yelled for her husband and ran out of the house.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 229-30. Bates followed Nancy out of the house and ran into the
street. Manuel, who was in the driveway, chased Bates for a short time but
then stopped. During this time, Nancy saw that Bates was carrying her
brother’s Winnie the Pooh diaper bag that had been sitting on the kitchen table.
It contained baby clothes and a camera.
[5] Sergeant Scott Frey with the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department responded to
a report of a burglary in progress at 3:35 a.m. After speaking with Nancy, he
walked around the house to see if he could find a point of entry. Sergeant Frey
found a screwdriver by the sliding-glass door. The locking mechanism on the
sliding-glass door was damaged, as if something had been pushed into it. The
screwdriver did not belong to Nancy or her family.
[6] Undercover Officer (UC) 1521 also responded to the report of a burglary in
progress. After receiving a description of Bates, he helped other officers set up a
1
This officer was not working undercover at the time of the burglary, but he was working undercover at the
time of trial.
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perimeter around the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, UC 152 saw a man
matching the description walk out from a wooded area in the subdivision. UC
152 eventually apprehended and arrested Bates. Officers did not find the diaper
bag.
[7] Several days later, on November 15, officers, including a K-9 officer, searched
“every inch” of the subdivision for the diaper bag but still did not find it. Id. at
191. The K-9 officer, however, found a wallet in the subdivision. He tracked
down the wallet’s owner, who said he had lost his wallet over two years earlier.
Id. at 207. The officers determined that the wallet was unrelated to this case
and did not tell Bates about its discovery.
[8] Thereafter, the State charged Bates with Class B felony burglary. At the jury
trial, one of the searching officers briefly testified about the discovery of the
wallet by the K-9 officer (who did not testify at trial). Id. at 207. Defense
counsel cross-examined the officer about the wallet but did not ask for a
continuance to pursue the matter.
[9] Instead, after the State completed its case in chief, Bates argued that the State’s
failure to disclose the existence of the wallet before trial violated Brady. The
trial court found no Brady violation, Tr. Vol. III pp. 61, 90-91, and the defense
rested without presenting any evidence. The jury found Bates guilty as charged.
[10] Bates now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[11] Bates raises two issues on appeal. First, he renews his Brady challenge.
Second, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
I. Brady Violation
[12] Bates first contends that the State’s failure to disclose the existence of the wallet
before trial violated Brady. Brady and its progeny apply to the State’s failure to
disclose favorable evidence that is material to the accused’s guilt or punishment.
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. There are three
components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to
the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence
must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) prejudice (materiality inquiry). Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82
(1999). Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Cone, 556 U.S. at 470.
[13] Although Brady itself involved a request for pretrial disclosure, most courts
agree that Brady does not impose a general requirement of pretrial disclosure of
exculpatory evidence. 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b)
(4th ed. 2015); see also Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999). For
most exculpatory evidence, the prosecution is able to satisfy its constitutional
obligation by disclosing the evidence at trial. 6 LaFave, § 24.3(b). The burden
rests with the defendant to establish that “the lateness of the disclosure so
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prejudiced defendant’s preparation or presentation of his defense that he was
prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Moreover, if the defendant fails to request a continuance
when the disclosure is first made at trial, that failure may be viewed as negating
any claim of actual prejudice. Id.; see also Braswell v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1280,
1283 (Ind. 1990) (explaining that a continuance could have been a proper
remedy when the evidence was disclosed during—and not before—trial;
however, the defendant did not request a continuance).
[14] Bates’s Brady challenge fails for two reasons. Although Bates cross-examined
the officer about the wallet, Bates claims that he was unable to question the
wallet’s owner. But Bates gives us no reason to believe that the owner could
have offered evidence that was favorable to him, either because it was
exculpatory or impeaching. This is especially so given that the evidence before
the court was that the owner had lost the wallet two years earlier. Moreover, to
the extent Bates argues that the State’s late disclosure prevented him from
making such a showing, Bates did not ask the trial court for a continuance to
pursue the matter. We therefore find no Brady violation.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Bates next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
for Class B felony burglary. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Sallee v. State, 51
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N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate
courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine
whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. It is not necessary that the
evidence “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)
(quotation omitted).
[16] In order to convict Bates of Class B felony burglary as charged here, the State
had to prove that he broke into and entered Nancy’s dwelling with intent to
commit a felony, to wit: theft, in it. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40; Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-43-2-1 (West 2012). Bates’s sole argument on appeal is that “there
was no direct evidence that [he] formed the requisite intent to commit felony
Theft at the time entry into the home was made.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13.
[17] “Burglars rarely announce their intentions at the moment of entry.” Baker v.
State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012). Accordingly, a burglar’s intent to
commit a specific felony at the time of the breaking and entering may be
inferred from the circumstances. Id. Here, when Nancy walked into the house,
she saw Bates standing in the kitchen. She did not see anything in his hands at
the time. But when Nancy saw Bates running away from the house moments
later, she saw that he was carrying her brother’s diaper bag that had been sitting
on the kitchen table. Bates does not dispute Nancy’s testimony that she saw
him carrying her brother’s diaper bag. Possession of stolen property supports
an inference of intent to commit theft at the time of the breaking and entering.
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Patterson v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1035, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); McBride v. State,
597 N.E.2d 992, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, we find that the
evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for Class B felony burglary.
[18] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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