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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-15887
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cr-80053-DMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DONALD MARGUS YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 24, 2017)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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After pleading guilty, Donald Young appeals his 84-month sentence for
conspiracy with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846. On appeal, Young argues that: (1) the
district court clearly erred in denying him a mitigating role adjustment because the
conspiracy for which he was convicted only involved 84 grams of cocaine, while a
larger, related conspiracy involved a much greater quantity; and (2) his 84-month
sentence, at the low end of the advisory guidelines range of 84 to 105 months’
imprisonment, was substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.
I. MINOR OR MITIGATING ROLE
The district court did not clearly err in denying Young’s request for a role
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 1 In calculating Young’s offense level, the
district court held Young accountable for only the 84-gram amount of cocaine base
that he admitted he was personally involved with, and not the much larger amount
of drugs from the related Latin Kings gang’s drug conspiracy. In other words,
Young’s relevant conduct was the same as his actual conduct in the drug
conspiracy. See United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (instructing courts to consider the defendant’s role in relation to the relevant
conduct attributed to the defendant at sentencing). Thus, Young “cannot prove that
1
A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is a finding of fact
that we review for clear error. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999)
(en banc).
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he is entitled to a minor-role adjustment simply by pointing to [the larger Latin
Kings drug conspiracy] for which he was not held accountable.” See United States
v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006).
Second, Young did not have a minor or minimal role compared to other
participants in his relevant conduct. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at 945 (explaining
that courts may also compare the defendant’s conduct against that of the other
participants in the relevant conduct). The undisputed record established that
Young purchased powder cocaine from Joseph O’Connor and Samuel Alvarado on
several occasions, which he converted into crack and prepared for distribution.
According to intercepted telephone calls about these drug deals, Young was
particular about the quality of the cocaine he received and also about “cooking” the
cocaine himself, that he had taken a $30,000 loss on one transaction, and that he
had paid up to $1,300 an ounce for cocaine.
These facts do not show that Young was substantially less culpable than
either O’Connor or Alvarado, the only other two identified participants in the drug
deals. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); see also De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944
(explaining that it is possible to have no minor or minimal participant). Rather,
these facts show that Young understood the scope and structure of the criminal
activity in which he was involved, exercised some degree of authority over it, and
stood to gain from it, undermining Young’s argument that he was only a minor or
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minimal participant in his own relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C)
(listing factors the district court considers in assessing the defendant’s role). Given
the undisputed facts, the district court’s finding that Young played more than a
minor role in the drug conspiracy was not clear error.
II. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a sentence for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014).
We look first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural
error. Id. 2 Then, we consider whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable
in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing
factors. Id. 3 We will reverse only “if we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 893 (quotation marks
omitted). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
2
Apart from Young’s meritless claim that he should have received a role reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, he does not identify any procedural error at his sentencing or argue that his
sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
3
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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substantively unreasonable. United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 648 (11th Cir.
2015).
Young has not carried his burden to show his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. First, Young’s 84-month sentence is at the low end of the advisory
guidelines range of 84 to 105 months and well below the 40-year statutory
maximum for his offense, two indications of reasonableness. See Cubero, 754
F.3d at 898. Furthermore, Young, at age 29, already had a lengthy prior criminal
history that included multiple convictions for violence and firearms, resulting in
the highest criminal history category of VI. In fact, two of Young’s convictions,
for which he would have acquired two additional criminal history points, were not
counted toward his criminal history score because he had already reached the
maximum number of points under § 4A1.1(c). While Young argues that many of
his convictions were for “minor” driving offenses, such as driving without a
license, most of these offenses, as well as many of his drug possession offenses,
did not receive any criminal history points. Young’s 84-month sentence properly
accounts for his extensive criminal history.
Young’s sentence also reflects the seriousness of his offense, given his
involvement with the Latin Kings drug trafficking organization run by Alvarado,
and Young’s role in converting and preparing to distribute crack cocaine on the
street. The district court was within its discretion in declining to assign greater
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weight to other considerations, such as Young’s history of substance abuse, his
family situation, and his reasons for initially withdrawing his guilty plea. See
United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he weight to
be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the district court.”) (quotation marks omitted). In sum, we cannot say
the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Young’s request for
a downward variance.
AFFIRMED.
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