J-S35045-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: X.M. AND K.J. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: B.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 334 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): JV 72 of 2014, Ocrt 3039 of 2016,
JV 91 of 2016, Ocrt 3040 of 2016
IN RE: X.M. AND K.J. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: B.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 335 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): Orphans Ct. 3040 of 2016 & 3039 of 2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 1, 2017
Appellant, B.T. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the order entered by
the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County terminating Mother’s parental
rights to two of her sons, X.M. (born in March 2006) and K.J. (born in July
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35045-17
2013), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following summary of the factual
background of the case:
X.M. and K.J. were placed by Beaver County Children and
Youth Services (CYS) in foster care on June 1, 2015. K.J. was
two years old and nonverbal at the time of his placement; X.M.
was ten years old at the time of his placement.1 CYS was
involved with the family since 2012 due to reports of mental
health issues involving their Mother, B.T. Although there were
multiple reports made to CYS since as early as January 12,
2012, and although CYS was monitoring the situation, Mother
repeatedly refused services from 2012 through June 2015. The
Court is unsure why a dependency action was not filed sooner.
Ultimately, following an incident on June 1, 2015, CYS filed a
dependency action, and the two boys, along with a brother, were
formally placed with a foster family. The brother was later
placed with his father and is not subject to this case.
Mother’s mental health issues have a long history, and
apparently stem from multiple traumatic events, starting in
childhood. She was raped, which resulted in a pregnancy; this is
how X.M. was conceived. Mother has four children total. The
two who are not subject of these termination actions are living
with their fathers.
On June 1, 2015, Mother had been living at the Women’s
Center in Beaver with three of her children. She left two of the
children at the Center, unsupervised, and took a taxi to a
wooded area with K.J. and a sledgehammer. After dropping
Mother off near the woods, the taxi driver called the Women’s
Center to let them know that Mother had a sledgehammer. A
counselor from the Women’s Center found Mother in the woods
trying to open a safe with the sledgehammer, with the child
____________________________________________
1
We observe that X.M., who was born in March 2006, was nine years old
when he was removed from Mother’s care.
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nearby. Mother advised the counselor not to come near her,
because her thoughts were hurting her. The counselor called the
police, and they took Mother to Heritage Valley Beaver Hospital.
Mother refused to allow K.J. to return to the Women’s Center so
he went with her to the hospital. All three children were placed
in a foster home pending a search for relatives.
K.J.’s father has not been identified. X.M.’s father is
incarcerated for 40 years at SCI Hunting[d]on. The third child’s
father was located, and again, that child went to live with his
father.
On June 22, 2015, CYS was notified that Mother had
sexually inappropriate with X.M. and the third child; Mother
confirmed that the allegations were true. X.M. later disclosed
that Mother had been abusing him since he was 6 years old. He
was hit on numerous occasions with a variety of items, including
a belt, hanger, and a skillet. Mother would pull his pants down
and hit him very hard. On one occasion, prior to placement,
Mother hit X.M. with a water gun so hard that it caused bruising
to his face.
Mother remained hospitalized on a long-term involuntary
commitment from June 1, 2015 to August 2015, at which time
she was transferred to Friendship Ridge’s Long Term Structured
Residential Program (LTSR), in Beaver, Pennsylvania. From
there, she moved to Cornerstone Rehabilitation Residence in
Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, in December 2015. She currently
resides at this facility. She will need to be told by supportive
housing when it will be appropriate for her to move to a less
structured living environment. She does not have appropriate
housing for the children to live with her and is on a waiting list
for public housing.
Mother was following all recommendations of the family
service plan for the last several months, which prompted her
lawyer to file a motion seeking additional visitation with the
children. The motion was filed in March 2016, and was
continued until April 2016, but the court has unable to
determine, from the evidence presented, whether increased
visits would be appropriate. CYS relied on a report that was
more than six months old. This Court ordered an evaluation of
Mother and the children by an independent evaluator to
determine whether visits should be increased, or whether they
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would be detrimental to the children, given all they had been
through. The evaluation did not occur until late 2016, and a
report followed on October 11, 2016.
Dr. Patricia Pepe, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist at
Allegheny Forensic Associates, met with Mother and the children
and the foster parents in August 2016. She performed individual
evaluations of each child and of Mother, and she did an
interactional evaluation of the children with Mother and the
foster parents. She issued a 23 page psychological evaluation
report, detailing the history of the case, her observations, and
conclusions.
Based on the results of the evaluation and the history of
the case, CYS moved to change the goal from reunification to
adoption and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. The hearing to change the goal was held on September
2, 2016, at which time Mother withdrew her request for
increased visitation[.]
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 1/31/17, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).
On November 11, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights. CYS presented the testimony of Dr.
Pepe and caseworker Jodi Pavlinch. Mother chose not to call any witnesses.
In a final decree filed on January 30, 2017, the trial court terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). 2
On February 22, 2016, Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a notice of
appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises four issues for our review:
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2
CYS also filed for termination of the children's fathers' parental rights,
which the trial court granted. The fathers chose not to appeal those orders.
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I. Whether the Honorable Court erred or abused its discretion
by terminating Mother’s parental rights with regards to
both children when the evidence presented was insufficient
to support a finding by the Honorable Court that [CYS]
established by clear and convincing evidence that
[Mother’s] parental rights should be terminated under 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (8)?
II. Whether the Honorable Court erred or abused its discretion
by terminating Mother’s parental rights with regards to
both children when the evidence presented clearly showed
the Mother, using all available and reasonable services,
had remedied the conditions which led to the removal in a
sufficient amount of time?
III. Whether the Honorable Court erred or abused its discretion
by terminating Mother’s parental rights with regard to K.J.
based solely upon the insufficient evidence that was
presented regarding X.M.?
IV. Whether the Honorable Court abused its discretion in
terminate [sic] the rights of Mother with regard to both
children when the evidence presented by [CYS] was
insufficient to support a finding by the Honorable Court
that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the children under 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) in that the Honorable Court did not
assess the needs of the children individually?
Mother’s Brief at 6.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47
A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
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Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.
at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In
re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite
result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of
the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). Clear
and convincing evidence is defined as that which is so “clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of Adoption
of Charles E.D.M. II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and (8), as well as (b), which
provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions
within a reasonable period of time, the services or
assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely
to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency,
12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal
or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child.
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***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8), (b).
This Court has discussed the grounds for termination of parental rights
under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8):
Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires
that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at
least six months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and
placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5). “[T]o terminate parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), the following factors
must be demonstrated: (1) the child has been removed from
parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal;
(2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” In re
Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275–76 (Pa.Super.2003);
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–
month time frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led
to the children's removal by the court.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d
560, 564 (Pa.Super.2003). Once the 12–month period has been
established, the court must next determine whether the
conditions that led to the child's removal continue to exist,
despite the reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied
over a realistic time period. Id. Termination under Section
2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's
current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency
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services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396
(Pa.Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Moreover, this Court has emphasized that:
The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents
must provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will
not meet the requirements within a reasonable time following
intervention by the state may properly be considered unfit and
have his parental rights terminated. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001).
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118.
Our review of the record shows that the children were taken into
custody by CYS on June 1, 2015. Prior to the children’s placement, Mother
admittedly subjected X.M. to physical and sexual abuse and neglected both
children’s physical and emotional needs. The Orphans’ Court relied on the
testimony of Dr. Pepe who conducted in-depth evaluations of the children
and Mother:
Dr. Pepe stated in her report, and testified, that she did
not believe the children should have increased visits with their
Mother. Instead, she concluded that the children were suffering
from severe trauma and should not return to Mother.
With respect to X.M., Dr. Pepe observed that he was
credible in his description of multiple events that included being
beat with a belt, hanger, and skillet. He was hit with a water
gun so hard, that he got a black eye. X.M. believed his Mother
was going to set him on fire and that his Mother sexually abused
him. He stated that he was so scared of her that he has had
repeated nightmares and he has many symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder [(PTSD)]. He suffers from anxiety,
child abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect. With respect to neglect,
the children did not have enough food on many occasions.
When the children were first placed, they would go through the
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garbage to look for food, and would take frozen food out of the
freezer to the bathroom to eat it.
***
Dr. Pepe also [found] the results of Mother’s personality
test were concerning… The combination of scores indicated that
she had a lack of concern for social or aggressive behaviors, and
continues to suffer from psychosis that can lead to aggressive
behavior. … These are deep seeded personality issues that will
take her a long time to address. For this reason, there are
ongoing safety concerns. Mother was psychotic when she was
touching herself (in the genital area) and then putting her hand
in X.M.’s mouth. If she is not compliant with her medication,
she will likely continue to suffer from this psychosis. Her mental
health is very fragile. The trauma she sustained as a child
continues to impact her. She has been found to be a perpetrator
of physical abuse of these children.
T.C.O. at 4-6. Mother has been specifically diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and schizoaffective disorder.
Notwithstanding the fact that the children have been in placement for
nearly two years, the record supports the notion that Mother’s mental health
issues continue to exist. The trial court emphasized that as Mother had
caused the children to suffer great trauma through her abuse and neglect,
there is no evidence that Mother’s efforts to remedy the circumstances that
led to the removal of her children have been or can be successful.
We agree that Mother’s mental health issues will prevent her from
being able to meet the needs of the children within a reasonable period of
time. Although the trial court acknowledged that Mother sought mental
health treatment upon the children’s placement and Appellant has not had a
psychotic episode since that point, Dr. Pepe noted that Mother has deep-
seated personality issues that will take an extended period of time to
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address. As Mother “continues to exhibit significant symptoms of psychosis”
and shows a lack of concern for social and moral standards of behavior, Dr.
Pepe felt “there’s a very great risk of [her] continued ability to harm the
children.” N.T. 11/11/16, at 36. Moreover, the trial court recognized that
Mother must remain compliant with her medication to avoid a relapse;
Mother’s ability to consistently regulate herself with the medication is
untested as she had been unmedicated for the previous nineteen years.
Moreover, since the children’s placement, Mother has been unable to
care for them due to her long-term involuntary commitment in a psychiatric
hospital and her subsequent stay in a residential program. While Mother
appears to be seeking public housing, it is unclear whether her counselors at
her current treatment program have found it appropriate for her to move to
a less structured environment in which she will be solely responsible for
consistently continuing her medication and her therapy. While Mother has
complied with the objectives in her family service plan, her attempt to
remedy the circumstances that led to the children’s placement has been
unsuccessful.
The record also supports the trial court’s finding that termination of
Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and the welfare of the
boys. As noted above, although Dr. Pepe had been asked to evaluate
Mother and the children determine whether Mother could have increased
visitation with the children, Dr. Pepe instead concluded that the children
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should never return to their mother’s care based on the trauma that Mother
had inflicted.
In comparison, the children now live in a foster home together where
they are thriving. Dr. Pepe noted the dramatic differences in the children’s
behavior when they are with their foster parents. We agree with the trial
court that the children’s best interest is served by their placement with this
foster family that provides them with permanency and safety. Thus, as the
trial court’s determinations regarding sections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8) are
supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record, we
find no abuse of discretion. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at
267; In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d at 394.
After concluding that the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental
rights under Section 2511(a) are met, we now must analyze whether
termination is proper under Section 2511(b), which requires courts to “give
primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012).
Moreover,
As this Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not
explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not
defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that
analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child
is a factor to be considered” as part of our analysis. In re
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K.K.R.–S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008). “While a
parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of
the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless
only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citing K.K.R.–S.,
958 A.2d at 533–36).
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have with
the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond
can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010));
see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920–23 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 601 Pa. 684, 970 A.2d 1148 (2009) (affirming
the termination of parental rights where “obvious emotional ties
exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either unwilling
or unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of
parenthood,” and where preserving the Parents' rights would
prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining permanency).
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Our courts have recognized that “pathological” emotional bonds may
exist between children and parents who have proven incapable of parenting.
In In re T.S.M., our Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of a
petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to five of her seven children,
finding that the trauma caused by breaking their unhealthy, “pathological”
bond was outweighed by the benefit of moving the children toward
permanent homes. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 634, 71 A.3d at 270-71.
Evidence in that case showed the children were bonded to Mother even
though two of the children experienced life-threatening incidents due to her
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neglect, the children admitted that their mother hit them with belts and
hangers, and the children witnessed their mother smoking marijuana and
having sexual relations with her paramour. The Supreme Court discussed
this Court’s precedent analyzing termination cases where pathological bonds
exist between children and their parents:
The Superior Court has emphasized that the mere
existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not
necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.
Instead, as Judge Tamilia eloquently observed while speaking for
the court, it is “an immutable psychological truth” that “[e]ven
the most abused of children will often harbor some positive
emotion towards the abusive parent.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d
529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008). Thus, Judge Tamilia cautioned
against denying termination of parental rights based solely on
the fact that a child has an attachment to the parent: “The
continued attachment to the natural parents, despite serious
parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to
correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the
children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id. at 535
(quoting In re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839
A.2d 410, 418 (Pa.Super. 2003)) (Tamilia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 629, 71 A.3d at 267 (footnote omitted).
In this case, although the orphans’ court found that the children have
a bond with Mother, it recognized that “this bond is deeply affected by the
trauma they have endured at the hands of their Mother.” T.C.O. at 6. The
trial court and Dr. Pepe focused on the severe psychological trauma and
possible permanent damage X.M. sustained through Mother’s physical
beatings, sexual abuse, and neglect. The trial court could not ignore X.M.’s
expressed fear of Mother and his adamant request to never again have
unsupervised visitation with her. Specifically, the trial court noted that:
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[Dr. Pepe noted that] X.M. remains extremely fearful of
Mother and insists that any visits be supervised. He does not
want visits to be increased; he is fearful that his Mother will want
him to come and live with her again. He understands that his
Mother is “mentally sick.” His PTSD symptoms interfere with his
ability to engage in age appropriate activities on a daily basis.
He often becomes tearful at school and needs time to leave the
classroom to gather his composure. The psychologist opined
that if X.M.’s visits were not increased, and, if he were able to
remain in the current placement permanently while continuing to
engage with both mobile therapy and trauma based therapy,
then X.M. may have a chance to survive and succeed. Dr. Pepe
noted that she could not underscore the amount of psychological
pain the child has endured and the level of psychological pain he
continues to experience on a daily basis.
T.C.O. at 4-5. With regard to healing from these traumatic experiences, Dr.
Pepe opined that X.M., given his level of psychological and social
impairment, will need years to reach age appropriate functioning and will
likely have permanent psychological scars.
The trial court recognized that K.J. will likely be more resilient given
that he was only two years old when removed from Mother’s care and the
fact that he was not physically abused by her. While K.J. could not verbalize
any concerns due to his age, Dr. Pepe observed that K.J. displays
developmental delay that is likely due to his experience of neglect. The trial
court emphasized Dr. Pepe’s finding that “[n]either child is functioning [in]
an age appropriate manner due to trauma and neglect.” T.C.O. at 5. The
trial court expressed concern about the children’s safety, comfort, and
stability in the face of doubt about whether Mother is capable of caring for
them, given her mental health condition.
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Moreover, the trial court emphasized that the children are doing well in
their foster home and have bonded with their foster parents. The trial court
highlighted Dr. Pepe’s observation of notable differences of the children’s
behavior while with Mother or their foster parents. During an evaluation
with Mother, X.M. exhibited fear of her, as he tried to move closer to Dr.
Pepe and away from Mother. When with his foster parents, X.M.’s demeanor
was radically different as he became relaxed and enjoyed himself. In the
same manner, K.J. was much more “engaging and animated with his foster
parents.” T.C.O. at 6.
Based on the foregoing evidence, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that “[a]ny trauma caused by breaking the bond [X.M. and K.J.
have] with their natural Mother is outweighed by the benefit of moving the
children toward a permanent home.” T.C.O. at 7. See In re T.S.M.,
supra. We conclude that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves
the children’s needs and welfare to allow them to move towards permanency
in their foster home. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s
parental rights.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/1/2017
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In Re: X.M. and K.J., Appeal of: B.T., Mother
Combined Opinion