Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-14882
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-62793-BB
REGINALD CHATMAN,
111400591 Broward County Mail Jail
Inmate Mail/Parcels
Post Office Box 9356
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33310,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
FT. LAUDERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants,
DEPUTY WENGERT,
(ccn 13500) BSO Deputy;
individually and in their official capacities,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_______________________
(June 6, 2016)
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 2 of 11
Before HULL, MARCUS, and ROGERS, * Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, defendant Deputy Gerald Wengert appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the
benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Reginald Chatman brought this § 1983 action against defendant
Deputy Wengert, a canine officer with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office
(“BSO”), alleging that Deputy Wengert used excessive force in violation of
Chatman’s Fourth Amendment rights. Below, we discuss the summary judgment
evidence and the procedural history.
A. First Arrest Attempt and Chatman’s Flight
On November 9, 2014, BSO officers detained plaintiff Chatman on
suspicion of petit theft. When BSO officers tried to handcuff Chatman, Chatman
got up and ran. Chatman ran for a few blocks, caught “charley horses” in his legs,
and fell into a bush. Chatman stayed and hid in the bush.
*
Honorable John M. Rogers, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
2
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 3 of 11
B. Officers’ Pursuit and Apprehension of Chatman
After Chatman’s flight, defendant Deputy Wengert received a request to
help with the search for Chatman. Deputy Wengert, along with his canine partner
Diesel, spent an hour or more searching for Chatman on foot.
According to Deputy Wengert, while he and Diesel searched near a building
within the established perimeter, Deputy Wengert issued a standard BSO canine
warning. 1 After this initial warning, Deputy Wengert avers that he gave “ample
time for someone to surrender.”
Sometime after Deputy Wengert gave the initial warning, canine Diesel
alerted near a line of bushes, indicating that someone was hiding behind the
bushes. After Diesel alerted, Deputy Wengert gave a second standard BSO canine
warning. Deputy Wengert then issued a third canine warning as follows:
“Broward Sheriff’s Office. Anybody who is inside the bushes, you need to come
out with your hands up, or you will be bit by my dog.”
Having heard no response to the third warning, around 12:30 a.m., Deputy
Wengert issued a “hold the air” radio call, which was a signal to other officers that
canine Diesel had alerted and that Deputy Wengert needed everyone to be quiet.
1
When BSO canine deputies give the standard canine warning, they shout the following:
“Broward Sheriff’s Office Canine. You are under arrest. Surrender or I will release my police
dog and you will be bit.”
3
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 4 of 11
Chatman’s version of events differs materially from Deputy Wengert’s
account. Importantly at this summary judgment stage, Chatman averred that
Deputy Wengert issued no canine warning at all before releasing Diesel to bite.
C. The Dog Bite
After issuing the third warning and hearing no response from anyone inside
the bushes, Deputy Wengert released canine Diesel. Diesel located Chatman
inside the bushes and bit Chatman on the left leg. Deputy Wengert and Chatman
also disagree about what happened next.
By Deputy Wengert’s account, Chatman began yelling as soon as canine
Diesel bit his leg. Deputy Davis Acevedo, another BSO officer, heard the
commotion and ran toward Deputy Wengert. Chatman began to emerge from the
bushes with his hand on Diesel’s face and snout. Deputy Acevedo grabbed
Chatman by the leg and pulled Chatman out of the bushes. Deputy Wengert
immediately removed Diesel from Chatman’s leg while Deputy Acevedo
handcuffed Chatman. Deputy Wengert avers that Diesel bit Chatman’s leg for no
longer than five or ten seconds.
Once again, Chatman’s version of events is entirely different. According to
Chatman, Diesel first bit his lower left leg and dragged him out of the bushes.
Chatman initially tried to push Diesel off of him, but Diesel then bit Chatman on
the left thigh. Chatman states that he surrendered immediately upon being bitten
4
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 5 of 11
by Diesel, yelling: “I give up,” “I swear I’ll never run,” “[p]lease get the dog,” “I
am not going to run,” and “I surrender.” In response, Deputy Wengert told
Chatman that he never should have run.
Throughout the dog bite episode, Chatman did not hear Deputy Wengert
directing Diesel to release Chatman. Rather, Chatman averred that Deputy
Wengert allowed Diesel to continue biting his leg, despite Chatman’s full
surrender, for as long as fifteen or twenty minutes.
Once Deputy Wengert and Deputy Acevedo had Chatman in custody,
Deputy Wengert requested that Tamarac Fire Rescue respond to the scene and treat
Chatman’s injuries. Shortly after Chatman’s apprehension, around 12:34 a.m.,
Deputy Popick and Deputy Navarro positively identified Chatman as the suspect
who ran from them earlier in the night. Throughout this episode, Deputy Wengert
was not wearing a body camera.
D. Chatman’s Medical Treatment
After fire rescue workers checked Chatman’s injuries at the scene of the
arrest, Deputy Butler transported Chatman to a local hospital. The medical report
from Chatman’s treatment indicates that Chatman suffered dog bites on his left
hamstring and quadriceps. The medical report also states that Chatman could walk
and bear weight on his left leg and that Chatman was experiencing “mild”
symptoms.
5
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 6 of 11
While Chatman was being treated, Deputy Wengert arrived at the hospital
and took photographs of Chatman’s injuries. The photographs show multiple
puncture wounds and scratches on Chatman’s left thigh and multiple scratches or
bruises on Chatman’s shoulder.
The treating physicians administered medication and bandaged Chatman’s
wounds. Chatman was cleared for discharge around 1:36 a.m. 2 Chatman states
that a prison doctor later told him that he suffered nerve and muscle damage in his
left leg. Chatman also averred that, because of the incident, he suffers from a
lingering hip injury and has nightmares.
E. District Court Proceedings in Chatman’s Civil Case
On July 23, 2015, Chatman filed the operative second amended complaint
against Deputy Wengert. Chatman asserted two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force
claims against Deputy Wengert but later dismissed one of those counts. On May 2,
2016, Deputy Wengert filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. 3
2
Chatman eventually pled guilty to felony battery with a prior conviction,
resisting/obstructing without violence, and petit theft.
3
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Deputy Wengert sought to introduce the
expert report of Charlie Mesloh, Ph.D, who opined that, in light of the photographs of Chatman’s
injuries, Diesel could not have continued biting Chatman for as long as fifteen minutes.
Chatman objected to the consideration of Mesloh’s report because Deputy Wengert failed to
timely disclose Mesloh as a witness. The district court ordered that Mesloh’s report be excluded
and stated that it would not consider the report in ruling on Deputy Wengert’s motion for
summary judgment.
6
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 7 of 11
In a June 30, 2016 order, the district court denied Deputy Wengert’s motion
for summary judgment. The district court did find that Deputy Wengert acted
within his discretionary authority throughout Chatman’s apprehension and arrest
and that Deputy Wengert’s initial use of force in releasing canine Diesel was not
unreasonable or excessive. The district court ultimately determined, however, that
because there was evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that Deputy
Wengert violated a clearly-established constitutional right, Deputy Wengert was
not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
This is Deputy Wengert’s appeal. Chatman did not file a cross-appeal and
otherwise does not argue that the initial use or release of Diesel constituted
excessive force. Thus, this case is only about the parties’ disputes regarding (1) at
what point in time Chatman surrendered and (2) whether Deputy Wengert allowed
Diesel to continue biting for fifteen to twenty minutes after Chatman’s full
surrender.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Deputy Wengert does not argue that Chatman’s right to be free
from a prolonged dog bite after surrender was not clearly established under federal
law. Rather, Deputy Wengert primarily contends that, given the photographs of
Chatman’s injuries, Chatman’s testimony about the alleged twenty-minute duration
of the dog bite should be disregarded as legally incredible under Scott v. Harris,
7
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 8 of 11
550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). Alternatively, Deputy Wengert contends
that Chatman’s injuries were merely de minimis and thus show that Deputy
Wengert necessarily used only de minimis force, which is not actionable.4
First, we disagree with Deputy Wengert’s contention that Chatman’s
testimony about the length of the dog bite is legally incredible under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Scott. At issue in Scott was video evidence that depicted the
events in question and conclusively established the incredibility of the plaintiff’s
version of events. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81, 127 S. Ct. at 1775-76. In Scott, the
Supreme Court held that on a motion for summary judgment, the court need not
accept the nonmoving party’s version of events where the parties tell “different
stories” and the nonmoving party’s story “is blatantly contradicted by the record,
so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S. Ct. at
1776; see also Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir.
2013) (explaining that for evidence to be discounted at summary judgment, it must
be more than simply self-serving or unsubstantiated; it must be “blatantly
contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law,
meaning that it relates to facts that could not have possibly been observed or events
that are contrary to the laws of nature”).
4
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. Carter v. Butts Cty., 821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016).
8
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 9 of 11
Here, we cannot say that Chatman’s testimony about the duration of the dog
bite is “blatantly contradicted” by the medical and photographic evidence such that
no reasonable jury could believe that testimony. Unlike the video evidence at issue
in Scott, the medical and photographic evidence in this case does not conclusively
establish how long the dog bite continued after Chatman’s full surrender. Viewed
in the light most favorable to plaintiff Chatman, the evidence shows that Chatman
suffered at least four different punctures and bites on different areas of his upper
leg, and there is no expert testimony suggesting otherwise. Instead, all of the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Chatman creates a factual issue as
to how long the dog bite continued and how long Deputy Wengert allowed canine
Diesel to continue biting or holding Chatman’s upper leg after Chatman
surrendered. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
that, on consideration of a motion for summary judgment, “courts must construe
the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party”). Chatman’s testimony does not relate to “facts that could not have possibly
been observed” or describe “events that are contrary to the laws of nature.” See
Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1253.
Second, we reject Deputy Wengert’s argument that the injuries Chatman
suffered, and thus the force used, were de minimis. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d
1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his Circuit has established the principle that the
9
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 10 of 11
application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). Crediting Chatman’s
version of events, a twenty-minute dog attack after full surrender, which resulted in
lasting injuries, cannot be dismissed as de minimis. See Edwards v. Shanley, 666
F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was unreasonable for officers
to allow a dog to attack a suspect for five to seven minutes after surrender);
Priester v. City of Rivera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 923-24, 927 (11th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that it was unreasonable for police officers to allow a dog to attack and
bite a suspect for two minutes where the suspect was compliant and did not resist);
cf. Jones v. Fransen, __ F.3d __, __, No. 16-10715, 2017 WL 2198126, at *7 & n.5
(11th Cir. May 19, 2017) (concluding that police officers were entitled to qualified
immunity in a dog bite case where the plaintiff did not allege (1) that he
surrendered during the dog bite or (2) that police officers unnecessarily prolonged
the dog attack).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s order denying Deputy
Wengert’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.
10
Case: 16-14882 Date Filed: 06/06/2017 Page: 11 of 11
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In my view, the photographic evidence blatantly contradicts Chatman’s
claim that Diesel viciously bit and tore at him for anywhere near fifteen to twenty
minutes. I would therefore reverse the denial of qualified immunity pursuant to
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
11