J-A03027-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
SYEEN HILL
Appellee No. 1080 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005746-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2017
I depart from the Majority on one issue in this case, namely whether
the information contained in the affidavit of probable cause demonstrated a
fair probability that there was contraband in the residence in question. In
my view, the Majority incorrectly concludes that the information contained
within the four corners of the affidavit established a nexus between various
drug transactions conducted by Hill and his residence. Hence, I respectfully
dissent.
Unlike in Clark and Davis, the investigation of Hill’s residence (the
genesis of which was not a reliable confidential informant tip) was not based
upon a substantial nexus with his cocaine business. But cf.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 595 A.2d 1216 (Pa. Super. 1991) (informant
identified defendant’s residential address, observed defendant conduct
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multiple drug transactions near residence and was told defendant recently
acquired approximately two ounces of cocaine); Commonwealth v. Clark,
595 A.2d 1216 (Pa. Super. 2011) (informant identified defendant’s
residential address as place where cocaine was packaged and distributed
and participated in controlled buy with defendant). Detective Weber did not
receive intel from an informant that Hill kept drugs and/or contraband in his
residence. Rather, Detective Weber initiated an investigation into Hill’s
residence only after ascertaining his address from the Lancaster County
Probation Office.
While the majority does not rely on a comparison of Commonwealth
v. Gagliardi, 128 A.3d 790 (Pa. Super. 2015), with the instant case, I
nevertheless find it instructive. There, an informant stated to police that
Gagliardi was in the business of selling cocaine from his residence. During a
subsequent investigation, the police twice observed Gagliardi provide
cocaine to an informant during controlled buys. Additionally, police observed
Gagliardi conduct a third private cocaine transaction. Each time, Gagliardi
exited his residence, provided cocaine, and then immediately returned.
Furthermore, the police in Gagliardi received an informant tip that Gagliardi
operated his cocaine business from his residence, and the police observed
multiple drug transactions at that location. Each time, Gagliardi immediately
exited and reentered his residence.
The critical issue is whether an observation of a single drug transaction
related to an individual’s residence is sufficient to establish probable cause,
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absent a corroborative informant tip or other similar information/evidence,
that the residence may contain contraband. In concluding that it does, the
majority notes that “[Hill] was seen on multiple occasions on foot, around
his residence, meeting with unknown individuals for short period[s] of time,
an activity consistent with the sale of contraband,” and that “the
[affiant] stated that drug dealers often keep contraband in their
residences.” Majority Opinion, 4/27/17, at 6 (emphasis added); see
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170 (Pa. Super. 2016) (police
officer experience may fairly be regarded as relevant factor in determining
probable cause to support issuance of search warrant; officer, however,
cannot simply reference training and experience abstract from explanation of
specific application to circumstances at hand).
I do not agree that the mere inclusion of the phrases “an activity
consistent with the sale of contraband” and “drug dealers often keep
contraband in their residences” is sufficient to establish a nexus between
Hill’s cocaine business and his residence and therefore probable cause to
approve the search warrant. Although the affidavit included information that
Hill was once seen “exiting [his residence], meeting with [an informant], and
then going back to [his residence],” several key facts were omitted. Among
them were: (1) where the transaction took place, (2) how long the
transaction took, and (3) how long before Hill returned to his residence.
See Commonwealth v. Kline, 335 A.2d 361, 364 (Pa. Super. 1975)
(affidavit insufficient where no indication where transaction took place, how
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long it took, or how long seller was gone). Moreover, while Detective
Weber’s informants clearly corroborated the conclusion that Hill was in the
business of selling cocaine from his vehicle, they did not corroborate the
conclusion that Hill kept drugs and/or contraband in his residence. See id.
at 364 (affidavit insufficient where regular confidential informant did not
corroborate conclusion of purchasers that seller kept drugs in his apartment,
even though affidavit did tend to establish that seller was drug dealer).
In distinguishing the instant case from Kline, the majority cites
Gagliardi, stating:
In support of its rul[ing], the suppression court relied on Kline
and Way. In Gagliardi, the Court distinguished Kline and
Way[:]
Certainly, in Kline, this Court held that the affidavit
of probable cause failed to establish a nexus
between the drug dealer’s apartment and the
contraband because the affidavit omitted certain
facts concerning the single, private transaction
between the drug dealer and two girls. We held that
these omitted facts included: “where the transaction
[between the dealer and the two girls] took place,
how long it took, how long [the dealer] was gone,
[and] what led the girls to conclude that he had gone
to his apartment [to retrieve the drugs].” In the
case at bar, however, we are dealing with
[one] controlled transaction[] – that [was]
witnessed by the police and recounted, in
detail, in the affidavit of probable cause.
Further, the affidavit in the case at bar clearly recites
“where the [controlled] transaction[] took place” and
“what led [the police] to conclude’ that appellant left
his home prior to the drug sales and then return to
his home after the drug sales. Kline is thus
inapposite to the facts of this case.
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Majority Opinion, 4/27/17, at 8-9 (citing Gagliardi, 128 A.3d at 798)
(emphasis added).1
In offering a comparison of Kline and Gagliardi, the majority does
not provide proper context. Rather, the majority frames the comparison in a
vacuum, and in doing so, it misrepresents the fact that police observed
Gagliardi selling cocaine on three occasions, which I believe dilutes the
distinction between Kline and Gagliardi. Certainly, the defendant in
Gagliardi was a drug dealer – an informant corroborated as much, and
Gagliardi took part in a controlled buy. However, there, the investigating
officers did not rest on these facts in establishing probable cause; they
proceeded to conduct a second controlled buy in an effort to establish a
nexus between Gagliardi’s residence and his cocaine business.
Here, the investigating officers, after corroborating that Hill was in the
business of selling cocaine, ascertained his address from his probation office,
observed him interacting with “unknown subjects,” and then conducted a
single controlled buy, which they inadequately documented in the
subsequent affidavit. See Weber Aff. ¶ 12. Accordingly, I would affirm
the suppression court’s order.
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1
In Gagliardi, this Court originally stated the following: “In the case at
bar, however, we are dealing with two controlled transactions – that
were witnessed by the police and recounted, in detail, in the affidavit of
probable cause.” 128 A.3d at 798 (emphasis added).
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