FILED
Jun 13 2017, 11:05 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Thomas Jordan, June 13, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1608-CR-1730
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Christina R.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Klineman, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1604-CM-14330
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Thomas Jordan appeals his conviction for invasion of privacy, as a Class A
misdemeanor, following a bench trial. Jordan presents two issues for our
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review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Jordan and Myra Price met in 2009, and they had a child together out of
wedlock, Z.P. Jordan established his paternity, and, in July 2015, he and Price
submitted to the trial court an agreed entry as to parenting time (“parenting
time order”). On April 11, 2016, Price petitioned the trial court for an ex parte
order for protection (“protective order”) against Jordan, and the court granted
the order the same day. The protective order “enjoined” Jordan from:
“threatening to commit or committing acts of domestic or family violence, [or]
stalking or a sex offense against [Price]”; and harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with Price. State’s Ex. 1.
The protective order also stated that it was “not intended to interfere with any
parenting time/child visitation orders issued by any other court.” Id.
[3] On April 12, an officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(“IMPD”) went to Jordan’s house and told him that Price had obtained the
protective order against him, that he would “no longer be permitted to contact”
Price, and that he would receive the protective order by mail. Tr. Vol. 2 at 33.
Nonetheless, on April 13, Jordan called Price’s telephone number and left her a
voicemail message. In that four-minute-long message, Jordan acknowledged
that he had been notified about the protective order; offered Price a “one time
only deal” to renegotiate the parenting time agreement to involve third parties
in custody exchanges; told her that, “against [his] better judgment,” he would
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let her choose the third party, but that it could not be a boyfriend; told her to
“take some time and be a grownup”; and told her that if she did not agree, it
was going to be “one nasty battle” and that the judge was going to “hear
everything.” State’s Ex. 2.
[4] The State charged Jordan with two counts of invasion of privacy, as Class A
misdemeanors, for violation of the protective order.1 Following a bench trial,
the trial court found Jordan guilty of one count, but not guilty of the second
count. The court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Jordan
accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Jordan contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed
to support a criminal conviction is as follows:
First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of
witnesses. Second, we only consider the evidence supporting the
[judgment] and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the
job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a
particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and
1
The second count was based on a text message Jordan had sent to Price.
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we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial
court’s ruling.
Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
[6] To prove invasion of privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required
to show that Jordan knowingly or intentionally violated the protective order
against him. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1 (2015). Jordan first contends that the
voicemail “did not violate the ex parte protective order because what he said in it
only related to parenting time and child custody with his daughter[.]”
Appellant’s Br. at 15. He maintains that, in his voicemail, he “sought to
accomplish only one goal: to respect and acquiesce to Price’s desire for a
protective order against him while still maintaining his right to see his child.”
Id. at 16-17. Jordan also contends that his conviction cannot stand because he
had insufficient notice of the terms of the protective order. We address each
contention in turn.
[7] Initially, we note that this appeal illustrates the conflict inherent in a court order
prohibiting contact between parents who have to communicate about parenting
time issues. As Jordan points out, the trial court explicitly included in the
protective order a provision stating that it was “not intended to interfere with
any parenting time/child visitation orders[.]”2 State’s Ex. 1. Thus, Jordan
2
To the extent Jordan contends that the trial court did not “defer” to the parenting time agreement, we
reject that contention. Appellant’s Br. at 17. First, Jordan’s reliance on the trial court’s vague comments in
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maintains, and we agree, that the protective order permitted him to contact
Price regarding parenting time issues. But the evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Jordan’s voicemail exceeded the scope of what was
necessary to communicate with Price about parenting time.
[8] Jordan’s voicemail message was not merely an attempt to arrange his next visit
with Z.P. or discuss issues related to the parenting time agreement. Rather,
Jordan used aggressive words, including ad hominem attacks on Price, in the
course of asking her to renegotiate the parenting time agreement. In particular,
Jordan: offered Price a “one time only deal”; said that if they tried to coparent
without a third party to handle custody exchanges “it’s gonna get ugly”; said
that the third parties “can’t be boyfriends and all that other sh**”; accused Price
of “want[ing] to be the boss of everybody”; told her to “take some time and be a
grownup”; said that if she did not agree, there would be “one nasty battle” that
would “really tear [her] ass up in court” and he would tell the judge “everything
that has went on [sic].” State’s Ex. 2. We reject Jordan’s contention that “what
he said in [the voicemail] only related to parenting time and child custody[.]”
Appellant’s Br. at 15. Jordan’s right to parent Z.P. does not include the right to
harass Price, and a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded from the
evidence that Jordan’s communication with Price by voicemail went beyond
merely discussing parenting time.
denying his motion for involuntary dismissal is misplaced. And, second, the trial court’s finding that
Jordan’s voicemail “went far beyond any discussion of the child” indicates that the court was well aware that
the protective order was “not intended to interfere with any parenting time/child visitation orders issued by
any other court.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 6; State’s Ex. 1.
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[9] Still, Jordan asserts that, because he was only told about the protective order
and did not have a copy of the written order when he left the voicemail
message, he “had insufficient notice of the protective order’s terms.” Id. at 19.
Jordan acknowledges that proper service of an ex parte order is not required to
prove that a respondent has knowledge of the order. As Jordan points out, oral
notice of a protective order may be sufficient if it includes an “adequate
indication of the order’s terms.” Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ind.
2011). But the oral notice need not include notice of every specific action
prohibited by the protective order. Smith v. State, 999 N.E.2d 914, 916 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied. Still, Jordan maintains that oral notice must give
some indication of the order’s terms.
[10] Jordan testified that, on April 12, 2016, an IMPD officer told him that Price
had obtained a protective order against him and that he would receive it in the
mail. The officer also told him that when he got the order, he would no longer
be able to contact Price.3 On appeal, Jordan maintains only that that notice was
inadequate because he was not told “of any specific action prohibited by the
protective order.” Appellant’s Br. at 24 (emphasis original). But, again, Jordan
testified that the officer told him that he could not contact Price, which is
exactly what he did when he left her the voicemail message.
3
Jordan makes no contention on appeal that he thought that he would only be prohibited from contacting
Price after he received the protective order in the mail. In other words, he makes no contention that he was
not aware that the protective order was in effect when the officer told him about it.
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[11] In Smith, where a police officer told the defendant that a court had issued a
protective order against him and that he could not have any contact with the
protected person, we rejected the defendant’s argument on appeal that he did
not have actual knowledge of the order because the officer did not inform him
of each of the specific terms of the order. 999 N.E.2d at 917. We likewise
reject Jordan’s contention on this issue here. The State presented sufficient
evidence to support Jordan’s conviction.
[12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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Thomas Jordan v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion