NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3015-15T2
LOUISE DERUVO, f/k/a LOUISE
DEMEO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL DEMEO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted May 23, 2017 — Decided June 15, 2017
Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FM-09-881-10.
Paul N. Mirabelli, attorney for appellant.
Law Offices of Jef Henninger, attorneys for
respondent (Morgan Rice, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a February 12, 2016 post-judgment
matrimonial order denying his application to require plaintiff to
forfeit her interest in certain property because she failed to pay
him $2325. The court required plaintiff to pay $2325 plus $4200
in counsel fees, but did not enforce the parties' settlement
provision calling for forfeiture. Because the Family Part is a
court of equity, and we defer to the reasoned decisions of that
court, we now affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by
the motion judge in her oral opinion on the same date as she signed
the order.
The parties were married in 2001 and divorced in 2010
incorporating a property settlement agreement that included the
provision that after divorce plaintiff would obtain ownership of
the parties' business, Quality Trans Parts, Inc., including the
property where it was located. Defendant received other properties
and plaintiff agreed to pay him $200,000 in $6000 monthly payments.
The parties continued to dispute equitable distribution post-
judgment, until they finally entered into an April 27, 2015 consent
order, requiring plaintiff to pay defendant $30,000 by May 15,
2015, $20,000 by July 20, 2015, and a final $30,000 by September
15, 2015. The consent order included a provision requiring
plaintiff to forfeit the property if she "misse[d] any of the
above payments by more than 30 days." The order also called for
a $25 per diem penalty for defendant's failure to comply with the
transfer of properties. Plaintiff was to deduct this penalty from
her payments.
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Plaintiff unilaterally deducted $1422 for title insurance and
$2325 in per diem penalties. After the lawyers discussed the
issue, plaintiff paid the title insurance fee. An impasse occurred
with regard to the $2325 per diem deduction.
The motion judge explained her decision, stating:
the remedy here to actually forfeit, I
believe, based on the monies that were paid,
would be Draconian. I know that counsel has
said this was their bargained for relief. The
[c]ourt noticed . . . however, for purposes
of the record . . . that there was substantial
compliance and this issue of $2,000 plus
dollars is what we're talking about.
In the global scheme of things, the [c]ourt
finds that it would be overkill to allow
$77,000 plus of payments being made and then
to forfeit all interest in the property
because of what is considered a $2,300 plus
dispute.
I recognize that the terms of the contract do,
indeed, call for forfeiture, but I also
recognize that that remedy, given the
situation here, is somewhat more than . . .
fairness would dictate to be done and the
[c]ourt is not going to have her forfeit the
properties.
The court found plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights
and ordered her to pay significant counsel fees of $4200.
"Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord
deference to family court factfinding," and the conclusions that
flow logically from those findings of fact. Cesare v. Cesare,
3 A-3015-15T2
154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). The resolution of this protracted
dispute over equitable distribution was resolved by the motion
judge, who understood and evaluated the equities of the situation
in light of the hostile feelings frequently engendered by post-
judgment matrimonial litigation.
Plaintiff paid substantially what she owed to defendant. She
was appropriately punished for her unreasonable position regarding
a comparatively small amount of money by having to pay counsel
fees, which were significantly higher than the sum she wrongly
withheld.
Affirmed.
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