RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2424-15T1
A.C.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
M.P.C.,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________________
Argued May 9, 2017 – Decided June 14, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Passaic County, Docket No. FV-16-0154-16.
Douglas J. Kinz argued the cause for
appellant.
Janet L. Porro argued the cause for respondent
(Porro Law Group, LLC, attorneys; Ms. Porro
and Kristen M. Porro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, M.P.C., appeals the entry of a final restraining
order (FRO) in favor of his wife, A.C. Defendant contends the
trial court failed to make factual findings that defendant intended
to cause bodily injury to A.C. and, incongruously, that the trial
court's finding that defendant intended to cause bodily injury to
A.C. "was based on rank speculation rather than any credible
facts." We disagree with both arguments and affirm for the sound
reasons expressed by Judge Adrianzen in her oral opinion.
Our review of the trial court's conclusions is limited. We
are bound by the court's factual findings if they are "supported
by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citation omitted). We defer to the
trial judge's assessment of witnesses' credibility because of the
perspective the judge gains from seeing and hearing testimony.
Id. at 412.
Judge Adrianzen gave detailed reasons why she found A.C.
credible and M.P.C. incredible.1 She observed the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand and the manner in which they testified,
considered how they allegedly gained knowledge of the events about
which they testified, evaluated the plausibility of their versions
of events, and examined their motives and biases. Her well-
grounded findings deserve our full deference.
1
Contrary to defendant's argument, the judge's credibility
findings were not based only on the finding that A.C.'s "demeanor
was consistent with that of a victim of domestic violence," a
reason decried by defendant.
2 A-2424-15T1
Based on the credible testimony of A.C., the judge found that
the dual-element test set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.
Super. 112, 125-28 (App. Div. 2006) was met, justifying the
issuance of the FRO.
The judge concluded that defendant committed the predicate
act of assault, satisfying the first prong of Silver. Id. at 125.
Judge Adrianzen found that, after A.C. threw a pot of his tools
into his office/storage room, defendant picked up a heavy fruit
bowl, ran toward A.C., and threw it directly at her "with full
force" from a close distance. These circumstances presented
evidence of motive and intent sufficient to prove that it was
defendant's conscious object to cause A.C. bodily injury,
establishing the elements of the predicate offense. N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1a(1); 2C:2-2b(1).
The second prong of the Silver test was also supported by the
evidence. Silver, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-28. Although the
determination of the second prong may be "perfunctory and self-
evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is
necessary . . . to protect the victim from immediate danger or to
prevent further abuse," considering the factors set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1) to -29a(6). Id. at 127. A.C's credible
testimony regarding the history of domestic violence between the
parties, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1), and the existence of immediate
3 A-2424-15T1
danger to A.C., N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(2), substantiated the judge's
determination that an FRO was necessary to prevent future acts of
domestic violence. Judge Adrianzen credited A.C.'s description,
"in convincing detail," of defendant chasing her around the house
on November 7, 2014, and grabbing her by the arm with such force
that it caused visible bruising. Photographs evidenced the injury.
A second act of domestic violence was proved by A.C.'s testimony
that defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse in May 2015.
The judge also found that defendant's massive cache of weapons,
and the manner in which they were stored,2 contributed to the
reasonable belief that A.C. feared for her safety. The judge
found a FRO was necessary to prevent further abuse based on "all
of the foregoing circumstances."
Defendant argues the introduction of evidence regarding his
weapons, and the manner in which they were stored, was improper
because there was no mention of same in the complaint. When asked
if defendant engaged in any other conduct that raised concerns for
her safety and that of her daughter, A.C. testified about the
weapons. Defendant's counsel objected that the testimony was
"beyond the scope." A.C.'s counsel countered that the evidence
2
The weapons were stored in a "bunker", the entrance to which was
"guarded" by two mannequins. A.C. expressed her long-standing
fear of dolls and claustrophobia as reasons why the weapons were
so kept.
4 A-2424-15T1
went to A.C.'s fear of defendant; the judge overruled the
objection.
At no time did defendant contend that he was not prepared to
meet the evidence regarding the weapons. His counsel never asked
for a continuance. This was not an issue about which defendant
lacked knowledge; he never indicated it needed further
investigation. Further, he did not deny the existence of the
weapons. This was one of those instances foretold by our Supreme
Court in J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 480 (2011), when it held,
"To be sure, some defendants will know full well the history that
plaintiff recites and some parties will be well-prepared
regardless of whether the testimony technically expands upon the
allegations of the complaint."
This was not a case where one predicate act of domestic
violence, unaccompanied by any threat or violent act, was set
forth in the complaint and defendant was forced to defend against
multiple other prior acts of which he had no notice until the day
of the hearing. J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div.
1998). This was not a case where "much of the testimony" about
prior acts of domestic violence involved incidents not mentioned
in the complaint. L.D. v. W.D., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div.
1999). Judge Adrianzen found that a restraining order was
necessary to protect the victim based on two other prior acts that
5 A-2424-15T1
were set forth in the complaint, not only on the weapons possessed
by defendant.
Defendant also contends that the trial court made no specific
findings with regard to the two other prior incidents of domestic
violence. We find no merit in this argument. Judge Adrianzen made
credibility findings and commented on the quality of the evidence
presented regarding those prior acts. The restraining order was
properly granted.
Affirmed.
6 A-2424-15T1