MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jun 20 2017, 9:15 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ashley Nicole Nelson, June 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1609-CR-2183
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela Dow
Appellee-Plaintiff. Davis, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1604-F6-12643
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Ashley Nelson appeals her conviction for Class B misdemeanor battery. We
affirm.
Issue
[2] Nelson raises one issue, which we restate as whether there was sufficient
evidence to find that the State rebutted Nelson’s self-defense claim.
Facts
[3] On April 5, 2016, Nelson was charged with Level 6 felony domestic battery and
Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, pursuant to a physical
altercation between Nelson and her husband, T.M. On August 19, 2016,
Nelson filed a motion to exclude the testimony of T.M. because he had failed
twice to appear for a recorded statement. The trial court granted that motion
on August 22, 2016. On August 26, 2016, the State filed a motion to amend the
charging information stating that, it did not have enough evidence to proceed
with counts I and II, and instead wished to amend the charge to Class B
misdemeanor battery. The trial court granted this motion on August 29, 2016.
[4] A jury trial began on August 31, 2016. During the trial, Officer Samuel
Willford testified that on the night of March 31, 2016, he responded to a
domestic disturbance call on North Olney Street in Indianapolis. Nelson later
testified that this was the address of the house where she and T.M. had been
living at the time. Officer Willford testified that he arrived about two or three
minutes after the call and that, when he arrived at the house, he saw T.M.
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running out of the house and a vacuum cleaner thrown after him. Officer
Willford then testified that he saw Nelson come out the front door and kick
T.M. in his back. Officer Willford also stated that neither Nelson nor T.M.
noticed that he was on the scene when he first arrived, but once T.M. noticed
Officer Willford’s presence, T.M. called out to him, stating that he was in pain.
Officer Willford testified that both T.M. and Nelson were yelling and screaming
as he approached the house. Officer Willford also testified that he did not see
any injuries on T.M. and did not take any pictures of injuries. Officer Willford
testified that he had spoken to Nelson the night of the incident and that she did
not inform him that T.M. physically touched her in any way.
[5] Nelson testified that the night of March 31, 2016 was “very bad.” Tr. p. 68.
Nelson stated, “[T.M.] got very rude and mad at how his life was going.” Id.
Nelson claimed they “had a physical conflict, like fussin’.” Id. at 69. She stated
that he tried to choke her and that he grabbed her head. Nelson alleged that her
eyes rolled in the back of her head when T.M. choked her and that T.M. had
pulled some of her braids out. Nelson testified that she asked T.M. to leave but
that “he turned back around and [they] was tusslin’. By the time he was
walkin’ out the door I done already threw the vacuum cleaner.” Id. at 70.
Nelson denied kicking or punching T.M. Nelson claimed that she told Officer
Willford that T.M. physically assaulted her. Nelson also testified that she
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believed T.M. was on “piff” because “his eyes were dilated and he was
sweating real bad.”1 Id. at 100.
[6] The jury found Nelson guilty of Class B misdemeanor battery. She now
appeals.
Analysis
[7] Nelson argues that the State failed to disprove her claim of self-defense beyond
a reasonable doubt. When reviewing a challenge to sufficiency of evidence to
rebut a claim of self-defense, the standard is the same for any sufficiency of
evidence claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). We neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is
sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. This court considers only the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences therefrom.
Id.
[8] “A valid claim of self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal
act.” Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011). Indiana Code
Section 35-41-3-2 (c) provides in part, “A person is justified in using reasonable
force against any other person to protect the person or third person from what
the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” In
order to prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must show: (1) he was in
1
T.M. did not testify.
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a place where he had a right to be; (2) he acted without fault; and (3) he had a
reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126,
1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “When a case does not involve deadly force, a
defendant must only show that he was protecting himself from what he
reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Dixson v. State,
22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) trans. denied. An initial aggressor or a
mutual combatant must withdraw from the encounter and communicate the
intent to do so to the other person before she may claim self-defense. Wilson,
770 N.E.2d at 801. Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(g) provides in part that “a
person is not justified in using force, if: … (3) the person has entered into
combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless the person
withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent
to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue
unlawful action.” A self-defense claim fails if a defendant continues to use
force against a retreating victim. See Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. “When a
claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State has
the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Id. at 800. “The
State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively
showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the
sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind.
1999). Whether the State has met its burden is a question of fact for the fact-
finder. Id. The force used in self-defense must be proportionate to the
requirements of the situation. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) trans. denied. A claim of self-defense will fail if the person uses more
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force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Id. Where a
person has used more force than necessary, the right to self-defense is
extinguished. Id. Even if Nelson was not the initial aggressor, self-defense
generally does not shield an accused from liability if he or she participated
willingly in the violence. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800.
[9] Nelson contends that she did not provoke the altercation that occurred between
her and T.M. Nelson argues that Officer Willford only observed “a small
portion of the altercation between Nelson and [T.M.], including [T.M.] being
injured by either the vacuum cleaner or a kick.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. Nelson
contends that because T.M. had choked her and pulled her hair, she “had a
reasonable fear of great bodily harm when she attempted to get [T.M.] to leave
the house more quickly by pushing the vacuum after him.” Appellant’s Br. p.
10. Although Nelson admits that Officer Willford’s observation was sufficient
to establish that a battery occurred, she argues, “The State did not refute [her]
claim of self-defense.” Id. The evidence presented by the State shows
otherwise.
[10] The State presented testimony from Officer Willford disputing Nelson’s
testimony. Officer Willford stated that Nelson did not tell him about the events
that occurred prior to his arrival and he only testified to what he observed.
Even if the jury accepted Nelson’s reasoning for using the vacuum to make
T.M. leave more quickly, both she and Officer Willford testified that T.M. was
leaving the house when the vacuum was used. Additionally, Officer Willford
testified that he observed Nelson kick T.M. in the back.
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[11] Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that
by throwing or pushing the vacuum after T.M., and kicking him with his back
turned after he left the house, Nelson’s privilege of self-defense had already
expired, not only because the perceived threat was no longer imminent, but
because she used more force than was reasonably necessary. The jury was not
obligated to believe Nelson’s claim of self-defense in light of evidence to the
contrary. See McCullough v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
trans. denied.
Conclusion
[12] There is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the State rebutted
Nelson’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt and to support Nelson’s
conviction for battery as a Class B misdemeanor. We affirm.
[13] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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