FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 20 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DORORTHY DALE WRIGHT, No. 15-55282
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01893-SP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Sheri Pym, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 10, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, RAWLINSON, and MARQUEZ***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, District Judge for the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
1
Dorothy Dale Wright (Wright) appeals from an order affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits.
Wright contends that the ALJ erred in accepting testimony from a vocational
expert (VE) that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that she could perform given her age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity. We review the district court’s order affirming the
ALJ’s denial of disability benefits de novo and disturb the Commissioner’s
decision only if it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.
See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony regarding the number of jobs
in the national economy that Wright could perform given her functional
limitations. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (approving the use of VEs to determine whether a
claimant’s “skills can be used in other work”). In determining the number of jobs
Wright could perform, the VE consulted reliable sources—the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and her own
professional experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1) (referencing the
reliability of the DOT), (d)(5) (including the BLS as a reliable source), (e)
2
(permitting the use of VEs); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218 (“A VE’s
recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her
testimony. . . .”).
We afford the ALJ a presumption of regularity, subject to rebuttal. See id. at
1215. Wright failed to successfully rebut the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s
testimony. Wright’s counsel elected not to cross-examine the VE or to submit
interrogatories regarding the VE’s proffered job numbers. Instead, Wright’s
counsel submitted a motion to alter or amend the judgment, providing alternative
job numbers and criticism of the VE’s sources. Absent a persuasive challenge to
the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s proffered job numbers, Wright cannot establish that
the ALJ’s acceptance of the VE’s testimony constituted reversible error. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1566.
AFFIRMED.
3