IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0976
Filed June 21, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DALON LAMONT JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Timothy T.
Jarman, District Associate Judge.
Dalon Johnson appeals his sentences, contending his right to personal
presence and allocution at sentencing were violated. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Zachary S. Hindman of Mayne, Arneson, Hindman, Hisey & Daane, Sioux
City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
2
DOYLE, Judge.
Dalon Johnson appeals his sentences following his guilty pleas to serious
assault and third-degree theft. Claiming that his rights of personal presence and
allocution at the sentencing hearing were violated, Johnson requests his
sentences be vacated and his case remanded for resentencing. Because
Johnson has completely discharged his sentences, we dismiss his appeal as
moot.
Johnson was charged by trial information with one count of serious
assault, in violation of Iowa Code §§ 708.1 and 708.2(2) (2016), a serious
misdemeanor, and one count of theft in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code
§ 714.1(4) and 714.2(3), an aggravated misdemeanor. Johnson pled guilty to
each count in separate undated written pleas of guilty. Each written plea
indicated the prosecutor would recommend, among other things, that Johnson be
committed to jail for a period of thirty days. In each plea agreement, Johnson
acknowledged:
This is a bargained plea and is based on the recommendations to
be made by the prosecuting attorney, but I know that those
recommendations are not binding on the Court and no one has
guaranteed to me any specific sentence. I understand that the
Judge is not bound by any plea bargain that I have entered into
with the prosecuting attorney. I also know that the Judge may not
follow the recommendation in the Plea Agreement and that my
sentence may be either less or more severe than that called for in
the Plea Agreement.
Johnson waived his right to a fifteen-day delay between the time of entry of his
plea and the date of his sentencing, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(1), and he asked
“that judgment and sentence be pronounced now and without delay.” The written
pleas were filed on May 13, 2016. Three days later, the district court entered an
3
order of disposition accepting Johnson’s pleas and sentencing him to thirty days
in jail on each count to be to be served concurrently. In this paper-plea
proceeding, Johnson was not present when the court accepted his pleas and
imposed the sentences.1 He filed his notice of appeal on June 8, 2016. On
February 2, 2017, the State moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. Johnson
resisted. The supreme court denied the motion on March 30, 2017, and allowed
the parties to address the mootness matter in their appellate briefs. The appeal
was transferred to this court on May 12, 2017.
On appeal, Johnson argues his sentences should be vacated and the
case remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to afford him his
rights of personal presence and allocution at sentencing. A defendant has the
right to be present at sentencing. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.27(1); State v. Ezell,
No. 11-1530, 2012 WL 5954592, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012). Iowa Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d), provides, in part, that before the court
pronounces sentence “counsel for the defendant, and the defendant personally,
shall be allowed to address the court where either wishes to make a statement in
mitigation of punishment.” A defendant can waive both the right to be present at
sentencing and the right of allocution. See State v. Shadlow, Nos. 11-2047, 11-
2048, 2013 WL 263340, at *1, *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2013). Our cases state
the waiver of the right to be present at sentencing is necessarily a waiver of the
right of allocution. See id. at *3.
1
It is not clear from the order of disposition whether the prosecutor or defense attorney
were present when the pleas were presented to the court, and there is no record of the
proceeding, if there was in fact a proceeding.
4
In each case in which this court has concluded the defendant waived the
right of allocution, the defendant signed an express waiver of the right to be
present at sentencing and/or the right of allocution. See id. at *1, *3; State v.
Estlund, No. 15-1151, 2016 WL 1359056, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2016) (“I
waive the proceeding rights and my right to have the court address me
personally . . . I understand that I have the right to allocution which allows me to
address the Court personally and make a statement in mitigation of my
punishment in this case, as provided by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.23(3)(d).”); State v. Culberson, No. 13-2049, 2015 WL 6509754, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 2015) (“I expressly waive my right to personally address the court
at the time of sentencing. I further agree that the court may impose sentence
without my being present.”); State v. Verbeek, No. 14-0534, 2015 WL 4936397,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2015) (“[The defendant’s] written guilty plea
requested immediate sentencing, waived personal presence, waived filing a
motion in arrest of judgment, and acknowledged and waived his right of
allocution.”). The written guilty plea forms signed by Johnson are devoid of any
such waivers.2 Consequently, we conclude Johnson did not waive his right to be
present at sentencing.
The State does not respond to the merits of the waiver issue but instead
contends that Johnson’s claim is moot because he has discharged his
sentences. Johnson does not dispute that he has discharged his jail sentences.
“A case is moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect
2
Waiver of the fifteen-day delay between the plea and sentencing is not a waiver of the
right to be present at sentencing. State v. Daniels, No. 15-1601, 2016 WL 4803782, at
*1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2016).
5
upon the existing controversy.” Toomer v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d
594, 598 (Iowa 1983) (internal citation omitted). Generally, discharge of a
sentence renders a challenge to the sentence moot. See Lane v. Williams, 455
U.S. 624, 631, (1982) (“Since respondents elected only to attack their sentences,
and since those sentences expired during the course of these proceedings, this
case is moot.”); Rarey v. State, 616 N.W.2d 531, 532 (Iowa 2000) (finding that a
challenge to a prison disciplinary action was rendered moot by absolute
discharge of prison sentence); State v. Wilson, 234 N.W.2d 140, 141 (Iowa 1975)
(finding challenge to propriety of work release revocation moot since defendant
completed his one-year jail term and was released); Cordova v. State, No. 10-
1458, 2013 WL 988898, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) (holding that even if
district court lacked authority to order defendant to complete assaultive behavior
class, defendant’s discharge of sentence rendered the challenge moot); State v.
Ennenga, No. 10-1490, 2011 WL 3480963, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011)
(expiration of prison term rendered challenge to illegal sentence moot).
Johnson counters with the “collateral consequences” exception to the
mootness doctrine. This exception applies “if a judgment left standing will cause
the appellant to suffer continuing adverse collateral consequences.” In re B.B.,
826 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 2013) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-57
(1968)). He asserts he faces adverse collateral consequences that are sufficient
to warrant exception from the mootness doctrine. Specifically, he speculates that
had he been present at sentencing he might have persuaded the court to grant
6
him a deferred judgment.3 The written guilty pleas make no suggestion nor even
hint of any request for a deferred judgment. Furthermore, Johnson makes no
effort to show he may have been eligible for a deferred judgment. Deferred
judgment is not available under many circumstances. See Iowa Code
§ 907.3(1)(a). That given the opportunity to exercise his right of allocution, “the
district court might have been persuaded to grant [Johnson] a deferred judgment”
is pure conjecture on Johnson’s part, and simply not the kind of showing required
to invoke the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.
Johnson also claims potential adverse collateral consequences under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines concerning calculation of “criminal history
points”—should he ever be convicted of a federal crime in the future. However,
while this consequence may be within the realm of possibilities, we find it to be
too attenuated and speculative to trigger the collateral-consequences exception
to the mootness doctrine.
3
This court has held that discharge of a defendant’s sentence did not render moot his
claim the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing rather than deferring
judgment and sentence. State v. Risius, No. 15-1365, 2016 WL 4543787, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016). Risius is distinguishable from the case at hand. There, as a
part of the plea agreement, the parties presented a joint recommendation that Risius
would receive a deferred judgment. Id. The court rejected the recommendation and
sentenced Risius to jail. Id. On appeal, she raised her claim, among others, that the
district court abused its discretion in not granting her a deferred judgment. Id. After the
appeal had been briefed and transferred to this court, the State filed a motion claiming
the appeal was moot since Risius had already discharged her sentence. Id. Risius
responded that her claim was not moot in light of the sentencing option of a deferred
judgment. Id. A panel of this court agreed. Id.
Here, the facts are significantly different. There is nothing in this record to
indicate a deferred judgment was even available to Johnson. No presentence
investigation (PSI) report was prepared. He made no request for a deferred judgment.
The prosecutor did not recommend a deferred judgment. Johnson has not suggested
the sentencing court abused its discretion in failing to grant him a deferred judgment.
Johnson did not raise the deferred judgment issue on appeal. He raised the issue for
the first time in responding to the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.
Because of the significant differences in the two cases, we do not find Risius controlling
here.
7
Because Johnson has discharged his sentence, his appeal is moot. The
collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here.
Consequently, we dismiss the appeal. See In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702, 704
(Iowa 2001) (stating as a general rule, an appeal will be dismissed when it is
moot).
APPEAL DISMISSED.