People v. Vara

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Appellate Court Date: 2017.02.22
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People v. Vara, 2016 IL App (2d) 140848

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption RICARDO VARA, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-14-0848

Filed December 21, 2016

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County, No. 13-CF-73;
Review the Hon. Michael P. Bald, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Jaime L. Montgomery, of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Carl H. Larson, State’s Attorney, of Freeport (Lawrence M. Bauer and
Marshall M. Stevens, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s
Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Burke and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 We once again are presented with a case in which the circuit clerk imposed certain
mandatory statutory fines, despite lacking the power to do so, and the trial court did not,
despite having both the power and the obligation to act. The parties agree that the clerk
lacked the authority to impose the fines and that the purported fines must be vacated. They
disagree on what other relief this court may provide at this time. The State requests that we
impose the fines ourselves or remand with directions for the trial court to do so. Defendant,
Ricardo Vara, disagrees. We agree with defendant that, in light of People v. Castleberry,
2015 IL 116916, the purported fines must be vacated, and we may not provide any further
relief, either by imposing the fines or by ordering the trial court to do so. If the State wishes
to hold the trial court to its statutory obligation, it must pursue relief in a new proceeding.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of child pornography (720 ILCS
5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2012)) and sentenced to three years in prison. At the August 4, 2014,
sentencing, the trial court imposed the following fines: (1) a $1000 fine, (2) a mandatory
$500 sex-offender fine (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.15(a) (West 2014)), (3) a mandatory $30
“[a]dditional fine to fund expungement of juvenile records” (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(a) (West
2014)), and (4) a mandatory $500 “[a]dditional child pornography fine[ ]” (730 ILCS
5/5-9-1.14 (West 2014)). The propriety of these fines is undisputed. Defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal on August 22, 2014.
¶3 The assessments that are at issue are listed in a document entitled “Payment Status
Information” (Payment Schedule), dated April 12, 2016, approximately 18 months after the
written final judgment. The Payment Schedule is signed by a deputy circuit clerk, on behalf
of the circuit clerk. It lists the following pertinent assessments (all shown as unpaid): (1)
“Court” ($50), (2) “Youth Diversion” ($5), (3) “Violent Crime” ($100), (4) “Lump Sum
Surcharge” ($250), (5) “Sexual Assault” ($200), (6) “Sex Offender Regis” ($500), (7)
“Medical Costs” ($10), (8) “State Police Ops” ($15), (9) “Child Pornography” ($495), and
(10) “Clerk Op Deduction” ($5).
¶4 In this direct appeal, defendant does not challenge assessment (6), the $500 sex-offender
registration charge, or assessments (9) and (10), the $500 child-pornography fine, $5 of
which must be deposited into a statutory fund (see id.). Defendant notes that the trial court
duly imposed these assessments. He contends, however, that the remaining assessments are
void because they are fines and thus the clerk lacked the authority to levy them.
¶5 Defendant concedes that all of these assessments were not only authorized by statute but
mandatory. Specifically, assessment (1) (“Court”) was required by a county ordinance or
resolution passed under section 5-1101(c)(1) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c)(1)
(West 2014)). Assessment (2) (“Youth Diversion”) was required by county action under
section 5-1101(e)(2) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(e)(2) (West 2014)). 1
Assessment (3) (“Violent Crime”) was required by section 10(b)(1) of the Violent Crime
Victims Assistance Act (725 ILCS 240/10(b)(1) (West 2014)). Assessment (4) (“Lump Sum
Surcharge”) was required by section 5-9-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified
Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2014)). Assessment (5) (“Sexual Assault”) was required

1
The record does not disclose that the county has enacted an ordinance or resolution that requires
either assessment (1) or assessment (2), but defendant does not contest that it has.

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 by section 5-9-1.7(b)(1) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.7(b)(1) (West 2014)).
Assessment (7) (“Medical Costs”) was required by section 17 of the County Jail Act (730
ILCS 125/17 (West 2014)). Assessment (8) (“State Police Ops”) was required by section
27.3a of the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/27.3a (West 2014)). Defendant’s sole
contention is that the assessments are void because the clerk levied them without any
authority. He requests that we vacate these illegal fines.
¶6 The State concedes that the assessments are void, but it disagrees with defendant on the
proper remedy. The State requests that we either impose the fines ourselves or remand with
directions for the trial court to do so. Defendant acknowledges that what the State requests
was formerly the accepted remedy in a case such as this one. But he argues that this relief
was premised on the rule, abolished by Castleberry, that a sentence that does not conform to
statutory requirements is void and may be challenged at any time. Defendant reasons that,
after Castleberry, the trial court’s nonimposition of the fines was mere trial court error (albeit
plain error) and that his appeal does not empower us to grant the State relief against the
judgment. For the reasons that follow, we agree with defendant.
¶7 First, some general principles. Because this appeal presents pure questions of law about
the propriety of the fines involved, our review is de novo. See People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d
285, 292 (2011). Also, defendant has not forfeited his claim of error by failing to raise it in
the trial court, as the erroneous imposition of a fine or a fee is cognizable as plain error. See
People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 47-49 (2009).
¶8 We agree with the parties that the assessments at issue were fines, which the circuit clerk
could not impose. A fine is a pecuniary punishment for an offense. People v. Wisotzke, 204
Ill. App. 3d 44, 50 (1990). Fines must be imposed by the trial court as part of the defendant’s
sentence. People v. Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 33. The circuit clerk may not
impose fines. People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140364, ¶ 10; Chester, 2014 IL App (4th)
120564, ¶ 33. This is because the imposition of a fine is a judicial function beyond the
authority of the clerk. Wisotzke, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 50.
¶9 Although the clerk may impose fees, which are not punitive (see People v. Wade, 2016 IL
App (3d) 150417, ¶ 15), all of the assessments at issue were not fees but fines. See People v.
Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 18 (assessment (1) (“Court”) and assessment (2) (“Youth
Diversion”)); People v. Reed, 160 Ill. App. 3d 606, 612 (1987) (assessment (3) (“Violent
Crime”)); People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 18 (assessment (4) (“Lump Sum
Surcharge”)); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.7(b)(1) (West 2014) (assessment (5) (“Sexual Assault”));
People v. Larue, 2014 IL App (4th) 120595, ¶ 57 (assessment (7) (“Medical Costs”)); People
v. Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31 (assessment (8) (“State Police Ops”)).
¶ 10 The parties agree that the foregoing fines cannot stand and must be vacated. They
disagree on what more, if anything, this court can or ought to do. The State requests that we
either impose the fines ourselves or remand with directions for the trial court to do so. The
State correctly notes that, before Castleberry, this was the standard and accepted remedy.
See, e.g., People v. Higgins, 2014 IL App (2d) 120888, ¶¶ 24, 33 (remand with directions to
impose fines); Chester, 2014 IL App (4th) 120564, ¶ 37 (remand with directions to impose
fines); People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401 (2009) (direct imposition of fines).
The State further correctly notes that, even after Castleberry, courts have held that, on a
defendant’s direct appeal, the court of review has the power to impose the fines or to order

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 the trial court to do so. See People v. Warren, 2016 IL App (4th) 120721-B, ¶ 89; People v.
Ford, 2016 IL App (3d) 130650, ¶ 35.
¶ 11 Defendant contends that, whatever the practice before Castleberry, that opinion, while
not disturbing our authority to declare the clerk’s unauthorized acts void, now bars us from
either imposing the fines ourselves or ordering the trial court to do so. He reasons that
Castleberry abrogated the basis for our authority to increase a defendant’s punishment
beyond what the trial court imposed. By abolishing the rule that an illegally low sentence is
void, it prevented an appellate court from invoking its power to correct a void judgment at
any time that a case is properly before it (see People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 308 (2003)).
Thus, defendant concludes, the mere fact that the appellate court has jurisdiction over a
defendant’s appeal does not enable it to grant the State relief by correcting, or ordering the
correction of, an illegally low sentence. Defendant urges us to reject the post-Castleberry
authority to the contrary in favor of Wade, which held that the State can obtain relief only by
filing a new action.
¶ 12 To explain why we agree with defendant, we discuss Castleberry and the conflicting
authority that it has spawned. Before Castleberry, the law was that a sentence that does not
conform to a statutory requirement is not merely voidable but void. See People v. Arna, 168
Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). However, the Castleberry court began its opinion by explicitly
abolishing that rule. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 1. The court then explained why.
¶ 13 The Castleberry defendant had been convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault, based on two separate acts. At sentencing, the State argued that each
conviction was subject to a mandatory add-on of 15 years under a statute that applied
whenever a defendant had committed certain offenses while armed with a firearm. Id. ¶ 3.
The trial court held that the add-on, though mandatory, applied only once under the
circumstances; accordingly, after sentencing the defendant to two consecutive 9-year terms,
it added 15 years to only one term, for a total of 33 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 4. On the
defendant’s appeal, the appellate court rejected his claims of error (id. ¶ 5), but it agreed with
the State that the trial court had erred in applying the 15-year add-on to only one sentence, as
the pertinent statute had required that each sentence be so enhanced (id.). In accordance with
Arna, the appellate court held that, because the sentence violated a statutory requirement, it
was void. Id. ¶ 6. It remanded the cause for resentencing.
¶ 14 The defendant appealed to the supreme court. Id. ¶ 7. He argued that the appellate court
erred insofar as it held that his sentence was void, as opposed to merely erroneous, to the
extent that it omitted the required add-on. Id. ¶ 9. This was because Arna was not valid. Id.
He contended further that, without the “void sentence rule,” the appellate court did not have
the authority to consider the State’s request to increase his sentence. Id. ¶ 10. The supreme
court agreed with the defendant in each respect.
¶ 15 The court first rejected the Arna rule as inconsistent with the principle that “ ‘[w]hether a
judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdiction.’ ” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting People v.
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155 (1993)). Essentially, if jurisdiction was lacking when the
judgment was entered, then it is void; but, if jurisdiction existed, the judgment is merely
voidable. Id.; see Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 155-56. And a court has jurisdiction as long as it has
both the power to hear the general class of cases to which the proceeding in question belongs
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the power to bring a person into its adjudicative process
(personal jurisdiction). Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 12. Arna transgressed this limitation

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 on the voidness doctrine by holding that a judgment can be void even if the trial court that
entered it had both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction at the time. Id. ¶ 13.
¶ 16 The Castleberry court thus rejected the premise of Arna, reasoning that, in general,
because jurisdiction is conferred on the trial court solely by our state constitution, a statutory
requirement cannot be jurisdictional. Id. ¶ 15; see Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335-37 (2002). And, because a nonjurisdictional defect
cannot render a judgment void, the trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory second
add-on did not render the defendant’s sentence void, even in part. Castleberry, 2015 IL
116916, ¶ 15. Indeed, the parties agreed that the void sentence rule was not valid. Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 17 In Castleberry—as here—the parties disagreed on what, if anything, the appellate court
could do to remedy the nonjurisdictional defect of an illegally low sentence. The State
contended that the appellate court had properly granted its request to increase the defendant’s
sentence. The supreme court disagreed. Id. ¶ 20. The court explained that Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006), which specifies when the State may appeal in a
criminal case, does not permit appeals from sentencing orders. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916,
¶ 21. Although the appellate court could consider any State argument in support of the
judgment from which the defendant had appealed, it could not grant the State relief against
the judgment. Id. ¶ 22. To do so would effectively allow the State to file a cross-appeal from
the judgment by seeking relief adverse to the defendant. Id. ¶ 23. Because neither Rule
604(a) nor any other supreme court rule allowed such a cross-appeal, the appellate court did
not have the authority to grant the State’s request to modify the sentencing order. Id. ¶ 26.
¶ 18 The supreme court did not hold that the State is always without recourse against an
illegally low sentence. In “appropriate circumstances,” it explained, the State can file a
mandamus action to require the trial court to follow the statutory requirement. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
In Castleberry, the State had neither filed such an action nor urged the supreme court to
depart from its rules or amend them in the course of deciding the case. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. Thus, the
court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, negating that court’s attempt to enforce the
statutory requirement on the defendant’s direct appeal. The court simply affirmed the trial
court’s judgment. Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 19 The effect of the supreme court’s decision was to leave the illegally low sentence in
place. The court recognized that the sentence violated a statutory requirement, but it
recognized as well that, because the illegality made the judgment merely voidable and not
void, it was not subject to the rule that a void order may be attacked at any time as long as the
case is properly in court. The illegality could still be challenged—but not on the defendant’s
direct appeal from the judgment. Thus, the court granted the State no relief against the
admitted trial court error.
¶ 20 Defendant argues that Castleberry controls our options in this case. He notes that, not
only did the circuit clerk purportedly impose various fines without the authority to do so, but
the trial court failed to impose these fines despite its obligation to do so. Defendant reasons
that we can vacate the clerk’s unauthorized actions, because he has requested this relief in his
direct appeal, over which we undoubtedly have jurisdiction. He concludes, however, that,
just as the appellate court in Castleberry lacked the authority to grant the State relief against
the trial court’s failure to follow the add-on statute, so we may not grant the State relief
against the trial court’s failure to follow the statutes that required imposing the specified
fines. In other words, he maintains, we may not subject him to what would really be new

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 penalties—the clerk’s purported imposition of these penalties having been merely an
imposition on the trial court’s exclusive authority, and therefore a legal nullity.
¶ 21 Defendant’s position finds persuasive support in Wade. There, the defendant pleaded
guilty to retail theft and was sentenced to 5½ years’ imprisonment. The trial court imposed
no fines. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 3. The circuit clerk’s office, however, filed a
document essentially similar to the Payment Schedule in this case, purporting to impose a
variety of assessments, some of which were fines and thus beyond the clerk’s authority to
order. Id. ¶¶ 5, 14. On appeal, the defendant contended that these fines were void. The
appellate court agreed. The court explained that, after Castleberry, the fines could not be
void merely because they failed to comply with a statutory requirement—but they were void
nonetheless, because the circuit clerk had imposed them and that officer had no authority to
do so. Id. ¶ 12. The court reasoned that Castleberry did not disturb the long-standing rule that
fines purportedly levied by the clerk are void from their inception because, as a nonjudicial
officer, the clerk lacks the authority to enter a penalty in a criminal case. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12; see
People v. Hible, 2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶ 11; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 18
(explicitly describing circuit clerk as nonjudicial officer); Hall v. Marks, 34 Ill. 358, 363
(1864) (clerk is not a judicial officer but only a ministerial officer of the court).
¶ 22 The Wade court next considered the effect of its initial holding. The circuit clerk had
purported to impose various fines but had lacked the authority to do so. The trial court did
have the authority to impose these fines but had not done so. Thus, in legal effect, the fines
had not been imposed at all. Yet they were mandatory. Therefore, the trial court had imposed
an illegally low sentence. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 13. However, under
Castleberry, the defect did not make the sentence void. Id. “So, what to do?” Id. The court’s
answer was straightforward: Nothing.
¶ 23 The court recognized that, before Castleberry, appellate courts had routinely remedied
trial courts’ failure to impose mandatory fines by either imposing the fines themselves or
remanding with directions for the trial courts to impose them. Id. However, after Castleberry,
neither remedy was a viable option, because either would require the appellate court to grant
the State relief by increasing the defendant’s sentence. Id. The State could still file a
mandamus action, although the parties there agreed that it made more sense “to vacate the
fines and move on to the next case.” Id.
¶ 24 We agree with Wade’s reasoning. Indeed, although the court found Castleberry
“instructive” on the issue of whether the court could remand the cause for the trial court to
impose fines that it had not assessed at sentencing (id. ¶ 12), we conclude that Castleberry
was controlling in Wade. Wade’s reasoning demonstrates as much. Because the mandatory
fines purportedly assessed by the circuit clerk were void from their inception and the trial
court never imposed them at all, the defendant’s sentence was illegally low, for the same
reason as was the defendant’s sentence in Castleberry. And because the jurisdiction of the
appellate court in Wade was invoked solely by the defendant’s appeal, and not by a State
cross-appeal (a legal impossibility), the appellate court had no more authority to correct the
illegality than did the appellate court in Castleberry.
¶ 25 For these reasons, we conclude, Wade was squarely controlled by Castleberry. And, for
the same reasons, so is this case. Legally speaking, the fines that the trial court did not
impose do not exist. At present, defendant’s sentence consists of his prison term, his term of
mandatory supervised release, and the fines that the trial court duly imposed. We cannot

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 remedy the trial court’s failure to impose the mandatory fines at issue any more than the
appellate court in Castleberry could have imposed the mandatory second add-on or the
appellate court in Wade could have imposed the various fines that were never assessed in the
trial court.
¶ 26 We recognize, as did the court in Wade, that, even after Castleberry, several appellate
court opinions have continued the pre-Castleberry practice of remanding with directions for
the trial courts to impose mandatory fines that they did not originally impose (although the
circuit clerks had purported to do so). Id. ¶ 16. However, to the extent that these opinions
cannot be distinguished, we do not follow them.
¶ 27 We start with two post-Castleberry opinions with which we respectfully disagree. In
Ford, the defendant, who was convicted of reckless conduct and sentenced to probation,
argued on appeal that the circuit clerk had improperly assessed certain mandatory fines
against him. The State agreed. The appellate court held that the purported fines were void
and it vacated them. Ford, 2016 IL App (3d) 130650, ¶¶ 32-33. The court also remanded the
cause with directions for the trial court to impose the fines. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35. Not only did the
court decline to discuss whether Castleberry allowed this remedy, but it did not mention
Castleberry at all. Instead, the court relied on a pre-Castleberry appellate opinion that
granted such relief. Id. ¶ 33; see People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (4th) 120313, ¶ 18.
¶ 28 In Warren, decided after Ford (but before Wade), the court purported to address the
application of Castleberry to the issue presented here. It agreed with the defendant that the
circuit clerk could not impose certain mandatory fines (too numerous to specify here) and
that the fines that the clerk had purported to assess were void. Further, it observed that
Castleberry prevented it from “order[ing] the trial court to impose additional penalties on
[the] defendant.” Warren, 2016 IL App (4th) 120721-B, ¶¶ 131, 144. However, it nonetheless
ordered the trial court to “reimpose” the fines in the amounts that the clerk had purported to
assess (id. ¶¶ 120, 123, 126, 131, 135, 139, 144) or, in accordance with the applicable statute,
in a lesser amount (id. ¶ 148). It saw itself constrained by Castleberry only to the extent that
the applicable statutes might have called for fines in greater amounts; only these were the
“additional penalties” that Castleberry precluded. Id. ¶¶ 131, 144.
¶ 29 What the Warren court failed to recognize was that, because the fines that the clerk had
purported to impose were void from the outset, the trial court’s imposition of them, in any
amount, was the “impos[ition] of additional penalties on [the] defendant.” Id. Although the
appellate court properly vacated the (legally nonexistent) fines that the clerk had purported to
assess, this action did no more than declare (and thus effectuate in practice) the existing state
of affairs: the defendant was not subject to these fines. By ordering the trial court to impose
these fines—and, in the contemplation of the law, to subject the defendant to them for the
first time—the appellate court in essence created a State cross-appeal and awarded the State
relief thereon. This is what Castleberry had just said an appellate court may not do. And it is
what Wade later held, correctly, that an appellate court may not do. See Wade, 2016 IL App
(3d) 150417, ¶ 16.2

2
Wade did not actually mention Warren, instead citing, as examples of opinions it would not
follow, only Ford and Hible. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417, ¶ 16. There can be no question,
however, that Warren is another such opinion that Wade disapproved.

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¶ 30 As did the supreme court in Castleberry and the Third District in Wade, we note that the
State is not without recourse against the trial court’s failure to impose mandatory fines
against a criminal defendant: the State may petition for mandamus. Further, we do not rule
out the possibility that the State may obtain relief through some other collateral proceeding,
even one that the defendant has brought. That occurred in Hible, in an opinion that the Wade
court found inconsistent with Castleberry and thus disapproved. Id. Hible is the third
post-Castleberry opinion that we address.
¶ 31 In Hible, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery and was sentenced to two
years in prison. The trial court imposed no fines, but the circuit clerk assessed four fines: $50
under section 1101(c)(1) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c)(1) (West 2004)), $2 for
the “ ‘Anti-Crime Fund’ ” (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(13) (West 2004)), $4 for “ ‘Youth
Diversion’ ” (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(e) (West 2004)), and $20 for the Violent Crime Victims
Assistance Fund (725 ILCS 240/10 (West 2004)). Hible, 2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶ 3.
¶ 32 Four years later, the defendant filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). The trial court dismissed the petition. Hible,
2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶¶ 1-5. On appeal, the defendant argued in part that the circuit
clerk had improperly imposed (or purported to impose) the four mandatory statutory fines.
The State conceded the claim. Id. ¶ 7. The appellate court agreed.
¶ 33 The court held first (as would Wade) that Castleberry did not change the rule that fines
imposed by the circuit clerk are void, because the imposition of fines is part of sentencing
and therefore within the sole jurisdiction of the judiciary. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Thus, because the
purported fines were void, the defendant was entitled to relief against them even though he
filed his petition outside the general two-year limit for a section 2-1401 petition (see 735
ILCS 5/2-1401(c), (f) (West 2010)). Hible, 2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶ 13.
¶ 34 The court’s choice of remedies was more complex. The court held that the Anti-Crime
Fund fine could not be imposed even by the trial court, because it applied only to defendants
who received probation (see 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(b)(13) (West 2004)). Therefore, the court
vacated it outright. Hible, 2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶ 18. However, the court remanded
with directions for the trial court to “reimpose” or “recalculate[ ]” the other three fines. Id.
¶¶ 16, 20, 22. The court did not discuss whether Castleberry allowed this relief. The court
did, however, rely on Castleberry in response to the State’s request to order the trial court on
remand to impose the mandatory lump-sum surcharge (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2004)).
The court’s rationale was that, because “[t]he lump-sum surcharge was never imposed
originally,” it could not order the imposition of the fine, as, under Castleberry, “the State’s
basis for appeal in criminal cases is now limited to those enumerated in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(a).” Hible, 2016 IL App (4th) 131096, ¶ 24.3
3
Hible’s treatment of the lump-sum surcharge is fraught with obvious difficulties. In part these are
the same as those in the Warren court’s treatment of Castleberry’s prohibition against the appellate
court’s increasing the defendant’s punishment. In effect, the court treated the legally nonexistent fines
as void yet valid, holding that the trial court could “reimpose” them on remand but could not “impose”
the lump-sum surcharge, because this fine had not been “impose[d]” at the trial court level. Thus,
although the circuit clerk had never had the power to impose any fines, the clerk’s wholly ineffectual
attempt to impose three fines enabled the trial court to impose them on remand; yet the clerk’s decision
not to assess the lump-sum surcharge barred the trial court from imposing this fine on remand. We
reject this reasoning.

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¶ 35 Although Wade considered Hible to be flatly inconsistent with Castleberry, that
conclusion is not necessarily correct. The Hible court relied on Rule 604(a), but it apparently
overlooked that it was hearing a direct appeal not in a criminal prosecution governed by Rule
604(a) but in a civil proceeding brought under a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and
governed by the rules for appeal in civil cases. That is, Hible was not governed by the
supreme court rules on which Castleberry relied to hold that the appellate court in a direct
appeal by a criminal defendant may not grant the State’s request to impose penalties that the
trial court did not impose.
¶ 36 Because there is no inherent bar to the State filing a cross-appeal from a judgment on a
section 2-1401 petition, we cannot say definitively that the State would be unable to request
relief in that context (or to do so in the trial court via a cross-petition or in response to the
defendant’s petition). We do note, however, that the State did not file any cross-appeal in
Hible, making it questionable whether the appellate court had the authority to order the trial
court to impose the three fines to which the defendant had not previously been subject.
¶ 37 In any event, the conundrums raised by Hible’s distinctive procedural posture must wait
for another day for their ultimate resolution. Suffice it to say that we agree with Wade and
defendant that the spurious fines are void and that, on this appeal, we lack the authority to
impose them or order the trial court to do so. Should the State wish to hold the trial court to
its statutory obligation, it must find some other way.
¶ 38 We vacate all of the fines assessed by the circuit clerk but not by the trial court. In all
other respects, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. As defendant has received all
the relief that he requested on appeal, we deny the State’s request that defendant be assessed
the costs for this appeal.

¶ 39 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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