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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GEOFFREY STALEY
Appellant No. 1429 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order August 31, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000493-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 28, 2017
Geoffrey Staley appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel has
also moved to withdraw his representation. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
On September 14, 2015, Staley pled guilty to driving under the
influence and various traffic offenses. That same day, he was sentenced to
2 to 90 days of restrictive intermediate punishment (“RIP”)/house arrest,
plus one year of probation, to run concurrently to the RIP sentence. Staley
did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. On March 21, 2016,
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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he filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed and filed an
amended petition, alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel. After a hearing at
which the court heard brief argument from both parties, Staley’s PCRA
petition was dismissed by order dated August 31, 2016. On September 14,
2016, Staley’s one year probationary sentence expired. On September 26,
2016, Staley filed a notice of appeal with regard to the dismissal of his PCRA
petition, followed by a timely concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Generally, a petitioner must be currently serving a sentence for the
underlying crime in order to be entitled to relief under the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth v.
Stultz, 114 A.3d 865 (Pa. Super. 2015). In Commonwealth v. Plunkett,
151 A.3d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2016), we addressed a scenario similar to the
case at bar. There, Plunkett filed a PCRA petition during the pendency of his
probationary term. A hearing was held, the petition was dismissed, and
Plunkett filed an appeal. Thereafter, Plunkett’s probation was terminated.
This Court did not reach the merits of Plunkett’s appeal, instead finding that
“the statutory requirement that a PCRA petitioner be currently serving the
sentence is applicable . . . where the PCRA court’s order was issued while
petitioner was still serving the required sentence, but that sentence
terminated prior to the resolution of his appeal.” Id. at 1112–13.
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Similarly, here, Staley is no longer serving his sentence. Accordingly,
he is no longer entitled to relief under the PCRA. For that reason, we affirm
the trial court’s dismissal of his PCRA petition.
Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/28/2017
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