RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3983-15T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
L.C.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
L.W.,
Defendant.
____________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP
OF A.W., a Minor.
____________________________________
Submitted March 9, 2017 – Decided April 19, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman, O'Connor, and
Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union
County, Docket No. FG-20-12-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Kylie A. Cohen, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M.
Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Ellen L. Buckwalter, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (David
Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant L.C. (mother) appeals from the May 4, 2016 Family
Part judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
A.W. (Alice), presently three and one-half years of age.1 Before
the guardianship trial, defendant L.W. (father), Alice's
biological father, executed an identified surrender of his
parental rights to his parents and did not participate in this
appeal.
The mother contends the New Jersey Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (the Division) failed to present clear
and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment terminating her
parental rights. We disagree and affirm.
1 We use the pseudonym "Alice" to protect the child's privacy.
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I
We summarize the salient evidence. In March 2014, the
mother delivered then six-month-old Alice to the police station,
reporting she was giving up the child because she was too
overwhelmed to care for her. Later in the day, the mother
regretted her decision and returned to the police station to get
the baby, but by then the Division was involved and executed an
emergent removal of Alice and placed her in a resource home. In
April 2014, Alice was placed in her paternal grandparents'
physical custody, with whom she has lived since. The paternal
grandparents want to adopt Alice. The baby's maternal
grandmother was also considered as a resource home, but she did
not have adequate space in her home. The maternal grandmother
subsequently moved to North Carolina.
The court ordered the mother to submit to various
evaluations and engage in a number of services. In 2014, the
mother submitted to psychological and psychiatric evaluations,
which revealed she is afflicted with serious mental health
problems. The psychological evaluation showed the mother had
clinically significant maladaptive personality traits, and her
overall ability to parent was compromised. The psychiatric
evaluation revealed the mother had a history of hallucinations
and exhibited symptoms of paranoia.
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The mother was ordered to participate in individual therapy
and comply with all treatment recommendations, which included
taking anti-psychotic medication. The mother attended only ten
of the forty therapy sessions scheduled. She briefly took
psychotropic medication, but ceased because it made her feel
tired. For the balance of the litigation, the mother maintained
there was nothing wrong with her and, thus, she did not need
medication or psychotherapy. She did complete parenting
classes, and she also visited Alice until March 2015, when she
moved into the maternal grandmother's home in North Carolina.
In July 2015, the mother returned to New Jersey with her
six-week-old twins. The twins' father is Alice's father. In
September 2015, the Division removed the twins from the mother's
care because she was not taking her medication or participating
in therapy and was putting the twins at risk for harm. The
twins were placed in their paternal grandparents' home, where
they have lived since.
The mother submitted to another psychological and
psychiatric evaluation in 2016, as well a bonding evaluation.
The paternal grandparents also participated in a bonding
evaluation. Carla Cooke, Ed.D., who conducted the psychological
evaluation, testified the mother did not have the capacity to
parent because of her mental health condition, which has
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produced psychotic symptoms and has resulted in a lack of
insight and compromised decision-making. Dr. Cooke opined the
mother's prognosis for change was poor.
Dr. Cooke, who also conducted the bonding evaluations,
testified the evaluation of the mother and Alice revealed no
bond existed between them. Dr. Cooke found the mother did not
know how to interact with the child, and the child was not
responsive to her at all. On the other hand, Alice had a
"strong and secure" bond with the paternal grandparents, who
were "very attentive to" and "very absorbed in" Alice. Dr.
Cooke noted the paternal grandparents have created an
environment in which she is thriving. Dr. Cooke opined it would
do more harm than good if Alice were removed from her
grandparents' care, because of her strong and healthy
relationship with them, whom she sees as her psychological
parents.
Samiris Sostre, M.D., who conducted both psychiatric
evaluations, testified the mother has a psychotic disorder. Her
disorder impairs her from interpreting emotional cues another
may signal or from recognizing another person's needs, impeding
her ability to care for a child. The mother even stated she
does not feel any connection to the child. The doctor noted:
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[The mother] would be unable to recognize
what her daughter's needs are; unable to
read through the social [cues], body [cues],
and verbal [cues] about her emotional needs
and respond to them appropriately. [The
mother] hasn't been able to respond
appropriately to other people. It would be
difficult to respond to a child. [The
mother] would be more likely to have
outbursts. And then her level of
functioning has gone down over time.
Dr. Sostre expressed concern about the mother's prognosis,
given the mother's resistance to treatment. The doctor stated:
[W]ith the course of these major psychiatric
disorders . . . compliance will always
remain an issue. That if you don't think
there's a psychiatric disorder, you're [sic]
chances of actually addressing it are going
to be very, very, very, low; that you have a
psychiatric disorder that you can't manage
independently, because the disorder itself
doesn't permit you to recognize the symptoms
or report them to the doctor that's treating
you.
The mother did not testify, call any witnesses, or
introduce any documentary evidence.
After weighing the evidence, the trial court set forth its
findings in a lengthy oral opinion, concluding the Division
established all four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), and
ordered termination of the mother's parental rights to Alice.2
2 These four prongs are:
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II
On appeal, the mother contends the Division's proofs were
insufficient to satisfy all four prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a). After perusing the evidence and considering the
applicable legal principles, we conclude the court's decision to
terminate the mother's parental rights is amply supported by the
evidence.
When terminating parental rights, the court focuses on the
child's best interests. Ibid. The State must satisfy the best-
(1) The child's safety, health, or
development has been or will continue to be
endangered by the parental relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to
eliminate the harm facing the child or is
unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that
separating the child from his resource
family parents would cause serious and
enduring emotional or psychological harm to
the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts
to provide services to help the parent
correct the circumstances which led to the
child's placement outside the home and the
court has considered alternatives to
termination of parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not
do more harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
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interests-of-the-child test by showing all four prongs in
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence, in
order to terminate parental rights. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447-48 (2012). These four prongs
require a fact-sensitive examination of the particularized
evidence presented in each case. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 280 (2007).
In reviewing a case in which termination of parental rights
has been ordered, we remain mindful of the gravity and
importance of our review. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 151 (2010) ("The process for
terminating parental rights is a difficult and intentionally
rigorous one that must be satisfied by a heightened burden of
proof . . . ."). Parents have a constitutionally protected
right to enjoy a relationship with and to raise their children
without State interference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008). This right is protected by
the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Ibid.
However, this right is not absolute, as it is limited by
the "State's parens patriae responsibility to protect children
whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been
harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive
parent." F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 447. The State has a strong
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public policy that favors placing children in a permanent, safe,
and stable home. See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.
337, 357 (1999).
Moreover, "the trial court's factual findings should be
upheld when supported by adequate, substantial, and credible
evidence." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J.
527, 552 (2014). We defer to the trial court's credibility
findings and, in particular, its fact findings because of its
expertise in family matters, see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010), unless the trial
court's findings are "so wide of the mark that the judge was
clearly mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L.,
191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).
As stated, we reject defendant's challenge the Division
failed to meet each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and
convincing evidence, and address the mother's principal
contentions.
The mother's attack on the proofs undergirding the
satisfaction of the statute's first two prongs suggests the
judgment must be reversed because the mother neither harmed nor
posed a risk of harm to the child. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(1), (2). The claim lacks merit.
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Providing proof a parent has in fact harmed a child is not
essential to showing the first prong has been satisfied. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 605
(1986). When no proven actual harm is shown, the first prong
will be satisfied by evidence showing a parent will endanger the
child's health, safety or welfare. See In re Guardianship of
D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999). A court does not have to wait
until a child is "irreparably impaired by parental inattention
or neglect" before it acts. Ibid. (quoting A.W., supra, 103
N.J. at 616 n.14).
Here, there was unrefuted evidence the mother suffers from
a major psychiatric disorder that disables her from recognizing
or ascertaining the needs of a child. There is no question such
disorder will endanger the child's safety, health, or
development. The second prong was satisfied because the mother
is unwilling to eliminate the harm facing the child. She has
spurned taking anti-psychotic medication and engaging in
therapy. Proof of the mother's limitations and her resistance
to treatment provide the requisite evidence to establish the
first and second statutory prongs were met.
The Division offered a number of services to the mother.
She completed a parenting course and visited the child when in
New Jersey, but she did not consistently participate and
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ultimately refused to engage in therapy. She also refused to
take psychotropic medication. The mother argues the Division
did not help her find housing or employment. Even if this were
true, and we do not suggest it is, the fact the mother did not
secure stable housing or employment is not what underpins the
decision to terminate her parental rights. The fact the mother
suffers from a major psychiatric disorder that impairs her
ability to care for Alice and her refusal to engage in any
treatment is what drives the decision to terminate her parental
rights.
The mother also argues that, at the time the trial
concluded, an assessment of the maternal grandmother's home as
an alternative relative placement was still pending. Thus, she
contends the third prong was not satisfied. Here, the Division
did explore both the maternal and paternal grandparents' homes
after the child's removal in its endeavor to place Alice with a
relative. The maternal grandmother's home was ruled out, but
the paternal grandparents' home was found to be acceptable.
After the maternal grandmother moved to North Carolina, the
Division did seek an evaluation of her home, but as the
Division's caseworker testified, this assessment was ordered as
a "back-up" to the paternal grandparents' home.
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By the time of trial in 2016, Alice had been living with
her paternal grandparents for over three and one-half years, and
during that time she developed a strong and secure bond to them.
There was testimony her removal from their home would cause her
harm. Further, Alice's siblings now live with the paternal
grandparents. The "value of nurturing and sustaining sibling
relationships" cannot be underestimated. N.J. Div. of Youth and
Family Servs. v. S.S., 187 N.J. 556, 561 (2006).
The Division appropriately considered and placed Alice with
relatives, see N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419
N.J. Super. 568, 579 (App. Div. 2011) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.3(a)), who now wish to adopt her and provide her permanency.
See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3 (stating that "the child's need for
permanency shall be of paramount concern to the court"). The
fact the assessment of the maternal grandmother's home had not
been completed by the time of trial is irrelevant. Even if the
maternal grandmother's home had been approved, there was no
evidence to support Alice would have or should have been removed
from the paternal grandparents' and transferred to the maternal
grandmother's home.
There is unrefuted evidence the fourth prong was met;
termination of the mother's parental rights will not do more
harm than good. Finally, to the extent we have not addressed
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any of the mother's remaining arguments, it is because we found
they lacked sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
In summary, because there was substantial credible evidence
the best interests of the child justified termination of the
mother's parental rights, we find no basis to interfere with the
trial court's conclusion to enter the judgment of guardianship.
Affirmed.
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