NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1801-14T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HUGO RAMIREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted November 28, 2016 – Decided March 7, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino and Nugent.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No.
12-12-1741.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Al Glimis, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Jennifer E. Kmieciak,
Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Following the denial of his motion to suppress a crowbar
seized from a vehicle in which he was a passenger, defendant Hugo
Ramirez pled guilty to third-degree attempted burglary, N.J.S.A.
2C:18-2, and a judge sentenced him to a three-year term of
probation and ordered him to pay certain fines and assessments.
Defendant appeals from the denial of his suppression motion. We
affirm.
Two law enforcement officers testified at the suppression
hearing. Officer Luis Perez testified that at approximately 11:42
p.m. on June 15, 2012, he responded to a report of a burglary in
progress at a Perth Amboy address. When he arrived at the
location, a first floor resident pointed down the street and said,
"they're trying to get away." Perez looked down the street and
observed a man run toward and enter a blue Ford Explorer parked
in front of a neighboring home. Between ten and twelve additional
officers arrived moments later.
Perez and the other officers conducted a "felony stop" of the
vehicle and ordered the occupants out. Defendant and four others
exited with their hands raised. The officers then handcuffed them
and put them in squad cars. The side doors of the Ford remained
open.
Although light from the patrol cars and the officers' handheld
flashlights illuminated the Explorer, the officers could not see
2 A-1801-14T2
into the vehicle's cargo area because the rear window was tinted.1
Apprehensive that someone might be hiding in the cargo area,
several officers lined up in tactical formation while Perez opened
the vehicle's rear door. No one else was in the Explorer. When
the officers opened the vehicle's rear door, they were not looking
for physical evidence and did not observe the crowbar.
Perez returned to the location of the attempted burglary and
observed pry marks on the residence's rear basement door. He also
interviewed the resident who called the police as well as another
neighbor who witnessed the attempted break-in. The witnesses
reported they heard loud banging noises and observed three men
attempting to break into the residence. When confronted, the trio
fled and the witnesses called the police. Both witnesses
identified three arrestees, including defendant, as the
perpetrators.
Detective Brian Kelleher also testified for the State. A
crime scene investigator, he arrived at the scene of the attempted
1
The area inside the Explorer, immediately in front of the rear
door, had a seat or seats that folded down so the space could be
used to transport or store items. Hence the parties' reference
to the "cargo" area. Occasionally, a party or the court referred
to the area as the "trunk."
3 A-1801-14T2
burglary at approximately 12:19 a.m.2 Detective Kelleher
"processed" the burglary scene by photographing the exterior of
the building, the interior of an apartment, and the rear door,
which showed signs of forced entry. Specifically, the door was
broken, the jamb was ajar, and there appeared to be pry marks from
an unknown object around the doorknobs.
After photographing the building where the attempted burglary
occurred, the detective proceeded to the scene of the motor vehicle
stop. According to the detective, the scene consisted of "a car
in the middle of the street." All the doors were open, including
the rear door. Kelleher photographed the cargo area and observed,
in plain view, a crowbar, a black hat,3 and other items. Believing
the crowbar and hat might have been used in the attempted burglary,
Kelleher collected them as evidence.
Following the hearing, the motion judge issued a written
opinion granting defendant's motion as to the hat but denying it
as to the crowbar. Because all occupants had been secured at the
2
When the attorneys questioned the detective, they often referred
to the "scene" without distinguishing between the scene of the
attempted burglary and the scene of the vehicle stop.
Consequently, the record is at times ambiguous.
3
The motion judge granted defendant's motion as to the black
hat, so we need not address the discovery and seizure of that
item. The State has not cross-appealed from the order suppressing
the hat.
4 A-1801-14T2
time of the search, the judge rejected the State's argument that
the crowbar was seized as part of a search incident to a lawful
arrest. The judge determined, however, that the "automobile"
exception to the warrant requirement permitted police to open the
vehicle's rear door without a search warrant. The judge found the
stop was unexpected, an eyewitness had identified a man entering
the Explorer as the perpetrator of an attempted burglary, and the
incident unfolded at approximately midnight. These circumstances,
according to the motion judge, created an exigency justifying the
warrantless opening of the Explorer's rear door as a "means
necessary to ensure police safety." After determining the motor
vehicle exception permitted Perez and the other officers to open
the rear door, the judge concluded the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement applied to Kelleher's discovery and seizure
of the crowbar.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
BECAUSE THE POLICE LACKED A WARRANT AND THERE
WAS NEITHER PROBABLE CAUSE NOR EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT JUSTIFIED THE OPENING AND
SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF THE EXPLORER, AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE CROWBAR FROM THE AUTOMOBILE WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
5 A-1801-14T2
POINT II
BECAUSE THE CRIME SCENE DETECTIVE WAS NOT
LAWFULLY IN THE VIEWING AREA AND THE VIEWING
OF THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT INADVERTENT, THE
CROWBAR WAS NOT IN PLAIN VIEW.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, "we accord deference to
the factual findings of the trial court." State v. Scriven, 226
N.J. 20, 32 (2016). That is particularly so as "to those findings
of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his [or
her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the
'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State
v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). If satisfied that the trial
court's findings could reasonably have been reached on sufficient,
credible evidence present in the record, our task is complete and
we will not disturb the result. Id. at 162. Our review of the
trial court's legal conclusions is plenary. State v. Rockford,
213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013).
Preliminarily, we note the trial court appropriately rejected
the State's argument the search-incident-to-arrest exception to
the warrant requirement justified the search and seizure of the
crowbar. See State v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 541 (2006) ("Once the
occupant of a vehicle has been arrested, removed and secured
elsewhere, the considerations informing the search incident to
arrest exception are absent and the exception is inapplicable.").
6 A-1801-14T2
We turn to the State's argument concerning the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement. The plain view exception
has three elements:
(1) "the police officer must be lawfully in
the viewing area"; (2) "the officer has to
discover the evidence 'inadvertently,'
meaning that he did not know in advance where
evidence was located nor intend beforehand to
seize it"; and (3) "it has to be 'immediately
apparent' to the police that the items in
plain view were evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure."
[State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 535-
36 (App. Div.) (quoting State v. Bruzzese, 94
N.J. 210, 237 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695
(1984)), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 267
(2013).] 4
As Kelleher made his plain view observation after the
vehicle's rear door had been opened, we must determine whether the
State proved the plain view exception's first element, namely,
whether he was lawfully in the viewing area. Defendant argues he
was not. He asserts "the police had no indication whatsoever, and
certainly no probable cause, that there was a person secreted in
the trunk/hatchback area." Defendant emphasizes the police heard
no noises coming from that area and they had no information from
4
Our Supreme Court has since held prospectively "that an
inadvertent discovery of contraband or evidence of a crime is no
longer a predicate for a plain-view seizure." State v. Gonzales,
227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016).
7 A-1801-14T2
witnesses that more than four males were involved in the attempted
burglary. Consequently, all persons were accounted for once the
five occupants were removed from the Explorer.
Additionally, defendant argues, "[e]ven if there was probable
cause to search the passenger compartment of the car, . . . there
was no exigency that would have made it impractical for the police
to obtain a search warrant[.]" Lastly, defendant contends
Detective Kelleher was not lawfully in the viewing area of the
interior of the Explorer and his discovery of the crowbar was not
inadvertent. Rather, he was processing a scene without a warrant.
Defendant claims the police should have closed the doors of the
car and requested a search warrant before permitting Detective
Kelleher to photograph the Explorer's interior.
Concerning the motion judge's decision, the State asserts
that
[w]hile he found [the police] action
reasonable under State v. Pena-Flores, . . .
the police were not even searching for
criminal evidence and thus the automobile
exception as set forth in Pena-Flores is not
relevant. Instead, the opening of the
hatchback/trunk area was a lawful protective
sweep for hidden people who may pose a danger
to the officers on the scene.
The motion judge analyzed the State's proofs under precedent
applicable when the motion judge rendered his opinion. The
relevant law upheld warrantless searches of a vehicles "where (1)
8 A-1801-14T2
the stop [was] unexpected; (2) the police [had] probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contain[ed] contraband or evidence of a
crime; and (3) exigent circumstances exist[ed] under which it
[was] impracticable to obtain a warrant." State v. Pena-Flores,
198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009)(citations omitted).5 Defendant argues the
judge misapplied this exception to the warrant requirement. The
State argues this exception was irrelevant. We need not, however,
decide whether the facts of this case, including the concern for
the safety of the law enforcement officers, constituted exigent
circumstances. We conclude the need for a protective sweep
justified the officers' conduct.
The concept of the protective sweep was announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110
S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990), and adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 115-16
(2010). "[W]hile the protective sweeps in Buie and Davila were
aimed at protecting officers from danger that may be encountered
in a home from individuals lurking therein, this rationale applies
5
The judge analyzed the State's proofs under State v. Pena-
Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009). Defendant's case predated State v.
Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), which modified the State's required
showing to satisfy the motor vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement. The Court stated the new rule of law it announced
in Witt was to be applied "purely prospectively." Id. at 449.
9 A-1801-14T2
equally to limited protective searches of vehicles[.]" State v.
Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 433 (2014) (citing Davila, supra, 203 N.J.
at 129).
Here, the motion judge found credible Perez's testimony that
the police searched the Explorer's cargo area out of concern for
the officers' safety. The State's evidence supported the judge's
credibility determination as well as his conclusion that the
concern for the officers' safety justified opening the Explorer's
rear door.
Defendant argues that even if the officers were justified in
opening the door, when they found no one inside, they should have
closed the doors and secured the Explorer. After doing so, if
they wished to have a crime scene investigator process the
Explorer, they should have attempted to obtain a search warrant.
We are unpersuaded by this argument.
We have concluded the officers lawfully opened the Explorer's
rear door. The motion record discloses no significant delay
between the time police opened the door and the time Kelleher,
while photographing the rear cargo compartment, observed the
crowbar in plain view. See State v. O'Donnell, 408 N.J. Super.
177, 187 (App. Div. 2009) (finding a period of thirty to forty-
five minutes between the time officers secured an apartment and
an investigator arrived to process the crime scene to be a "mere
10 A-1801-14T2
continuation of the original entry"), aff'd o.b., 203 N.J. 160
(2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1094, 131 S. Ct. 803, 178 L. Ed.
2d 537 (2010).6
Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit
to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
6
Opening the Explorer's rear door and looking in is arguably a
lesser intrusion than a protective sweep. In State v. Mai, 202
N.J. 12, 23 (2010), the Supreme Court noted, "[p]lain logic demands
that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle
lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal
force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and
reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a
proper order to exit." Here, defendant does not contend the police
lacked authority to stop the Explorer and order the occupants to
exit.
11 A-1801-14T2