16‐1271
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
16‐1271
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2016
4 (Argued: March 7, 2017 Decided: July 14, 2017)
5 Docket No. 16‐1271
6
7
8 JOANNE FRATELLO,
9 Plaintiff‐Appellant,
10 v.
11 ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK, ST. ANTHONYʹS SHRINE CHURCH,
12 AND ST. ANTHONYʹS SCHOOL,
13 Defendants‐Appellees.*
14
15 Before: SACK and LOHIER, Circuit Judges, and WOODS, District Judge.**
16 The plaintiff is a former principal of a Roman Catholic school who claims
17 that she was terminated from that position on the basis of unlawful gender
18 discrimination and retaliation. The sole question on appeal is whether the
19 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cathy Seibel,
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case to
*
conform with the caption above.
** Judge Gregory H. Woods, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Judge) erred in awarding the defendants summary judgment on the ground that
2 the plaintiffʹs employment‐discrimination claims are barred by the ʺministerial
3 exception,ʺ a doctrine based on the First Amendment that precludes such claims
4 by ʺministersʺ against the religious groups that employ them. We conclude that
5 the plaintiffʹs claims are barred because she is a minister within the meaning of
6 the exception. Although her formal title was not inherently religious, the record
7 reflects that, as part of her job responsibilities, she held herself out as a spiritual
8 leader of the school and performed many religious functions to advance its
9 religious mission. Accordingly, the district courtʹs judgment is:
10 AFFIRMED.
11 MICHAEL DAVID DIEDERICH, JR., Stony
12 Point, NY, for Plaintiff‐Appellant.
13 ERIC C. RASSBACH (Lori Halstead
14 Windham, Daniel H. Blomberg; James P.
15 McCabe, Roderick J. Cassidy, Archdiocese
16 of New York, New York, NY; Kenneth A.
17 Novikoff, Barry I. Levy, Rivkin Radler LLP,
18 Uniondale, NY, on the brief), The Becket
19 Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington,
20 D.C., for Defendants‐Appellees.
21 Leslie Griffin, UNLV William S. Boyd
22 School of Law, Las Vegas, NV (on the brief),
23 for amici curiae Call to Action, DignityUSA,
24 FutureChurch, The National Coalition of
25 American Nuns, New Ways Ministry, and
26 Voice of the Faithful.
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1 Stephen Bergstein, Bergsten & Ullrich, LLP,
2 New Paltz, NY (on the brief), for amicus
3 curiae National Employment Lawyers
4 Association/New York.
5 Victoria Dorfman, Todd Geremia, Lauren
6 Pardee Ruben, Jones Day, New York, NY
7 (on the brief), for amici curiae Douglas Laycock,
8 Michael W. McConnell, Thomas C. Berg, Carl
9 H. Esbeck, Richard W. Garnett, Paul Horwitz,
10 and John D. Inazu.
11 Paul J. Zidlicky, Sidley Austin LLP,
12 Washington, D.C. (on the brief), for amici
13 curiae Carmelite Sisters of the Most Sacred
14 Heart of Los Angeles and Sisters of the
15 Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary.
16 Erik W. Stanley, Jeremiah Galus, Alliance
17 Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, AZ (on the
18 brief), for amicus curiae Orthodox Church in
19 America.
20 SACK, Circuit Judge:
21 Plaintiff‐appellant Joanne Fratello, former principal of a Roman Catholic
22 school, alleges that she was terminated from that position on the basis of
23 unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation. The defendants—the school, the
24 church, and the archdiocese—moved for summary judgment on the ground that
25 these claims are barred by the ʺministerial exception,ʺ a doctrine that precludes,
26 on First Amendment grounds, employment‐discrimination claims by ʺministersʺ
27 against the religious organizations that employ or formerly employed them. The
3
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1 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cathy Seibel,
2 Judge) awarded the defendants summary judgment on that basis. The sole
3 question on appeal is whether Fratello is a ʺministerʺ within the meaning of the
4 exception, a conclusion that would preclude her employment‐discrimination
5 claims against the defendants.
6 Although we have previously recognized a ministerial exception for
7 employment‐discrimination claims, this is our first occasion to address the
8 doctrine since the Supreme Courtʹs unanimous decision in Hosanna‐Tabor
9 Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012)
10 (recognizing a ministerial exception for employment‐discrimination claims). In
11 light of that decision, we conclude that in determining whether the ministerial
12 exception bars an employment‐discrimination claim against a religious
13 organization, the only question is whether the employee qualifies as a ʺministerʺ
14 within the meaning of the exception. See id. at 190‐91. In this regard, Hosanna‐
15 Tabor instructs us to assess a broad array of relevant ʺconsiderations,ʺ including
16 but not limited to (1) the employeeʹs ʺformal title,ʺ (2) ʺthe substance reflected in
17 that title,ʺ (3) the employeeʹs ʺuse of th[e] title,ʺ and (4) ʺthe important religious
18 functions she performed.ʺ Id. at 192.
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1 Applying these principles here, we conclude that the ministerial exception
2 bars Fratelloʹs employment‐discrimination claims because in her role as principal
3 she was a minister within the meaning of the exception. Although her formal
4 title was not inherently religious, we think that the record clearly establishes that
5 she held herself out as a spiritual leader of the school, and that she performed
6 many significant religious functions to advance its religious mission. She was
7 thus a ʺministerʺ for purposes of the exception.
8 BACKGROUND
9 Fratello was employed by St. Anthonyʹs School (the ʺSchoolʺ), a Roman
10 Catholic elementary school located in Nanuet, New York. She served as the
11 Schoolʹs principal from 2007 until 2011, when the School declined to renew her
12 contract. She claims employment discrimination by the School, St. Anthonyʹs
13 Shrine Church (the ʺChurchʺ), and the Archdiocese of New York (the
14 ʺArchdioceseʺ), alleging that her employment was terminated on the basis of
15 gender discrimination and in retaliation for her reporting the alleged
16 discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
17 § 2000e et seq., and New York State Executive Law § 296. The defendants argue
18 as an affirmative defense that the ministerial exception bars these claims.
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 A. Mission of Archdiocese Schools
2 The Archdiocese is a constituent entity of the Roman Catholic Church
3 covering ten counties in southern New York.1 It is led by an Archbishop,
4 currently Timothy Cardinal Dolan. According to the Administrative Manual for
5 its schools (the ʺManualʺ), the Archdiocese has for more than two centuries
6 provided elementary schools for ʺethnically and economically diverse student
7 population[s] in urban and suburban settings.ʺ Manual, Chapter I: Goals,
8 Mission and Aim of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese, at Appʹx at 121.
9 The Manual sets forth the principles on which the School and others
10 within the Archdiocese are to operate.2 According to the Manual, the
11 ʺfoundation and missionʺ of these schools is ʺformation in the faith, for the lived
12 experience of Gospel values and for the preservation of Catholic culture.ʺ Id., at
13 Appʹx at 122. They seek to train students ʺto be disciples of Jesus Christ who will
Nanuet, New York, where the School is located, is in Rockland County in the
1
northern suburbs of New York City.
Because we give significant weight to the provisions of the Manual, we first caution
2
that its contents establish very little by themselves. What is significant is that the
Manual undisputedly governed the operation of the School, and that those who
operated the School regarded the Manual as authoritative and generally sought to
conform to the practices and standards that it espoused.
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1 live [by] their faith and provide intelligent, creative, and generous service to the
2 human community.ʺ Id., at Appʹx at 121.3 The schools are told to advance their
3 mission through, among other things, the ʺexplicit study of the Catholic faith.ʺ
4 Id., at Appʹx at 121; see also id. ¶ 104, at Appʹx at 123 (ʺGospel teaching . . . is the
5 fundamental element in the educative process . . . .ʺ). Indeed, religion is taught
6 in Archdiocese schools at every grade level, through eighth grade, as a distinct
7 class treated administratively in the same manner as those on other academic
8 subjects.
9 The Manual states that the Cardinal Archbishop is ʺ[u]ltimate[ly]
10 responsib[le]ʺ for meeting these goals. Id. ¶ 200, at Appʹx at 125. He ʺdelegates
11 responsibility for representing him in administrative and educational matters to
12 the Secretary for Education and the Superintendent of Schools.ʺ Id. Specific local
13 schools are entrusted to the Parish Pastor, who ʺdelegates the immediate
14 direction of the school and its instructional program to the principal.ʺ Id. ¶ 300,
15 at Appʹx at 128.
The Schoolʹs website similarly states that its mission ʺis to provide a high‐quality,
3
educational experience that enhances each childʹs spiritual, emotional, intellectual and
social growth. [Its] faculty and staff prepare [its] students to become future leaders and
responsible stewards of Godʹs creation.ʺ About Us, ST. ANTHONY SCHOOL,
http://www.stanthonyschoolnanuet.org/about‐us/ (last visited May 19, 2017).
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1 B. Principalʹs Role
2 The Manual begins with a cover letter from Edward Cardinal Egan (the
3 late former Archbishop) to principals of Archdiocese schools. It describes
4 ʺprincipals in the [Archdiocese] schoolsʺ as ʺhaving accepted the vocation and
5 challenge of leadership in Catholic education.ʺ Cover Letter from Edward
6 Cardinal Egan (Dec. 2006), at Appʹx at 110. It further states that (1) the
7 ʺprincipals . . . are providing splendid leadership to [] teachers and staff and
8 excellent academic and spiritual formation to [] studentsʺ; and (2) principals
9 ʺmust fulfillʺ ʺadministrative tasks . . . providing the structure needed to carry
10 out the vital work of Catholic education . . . infused with the Catholic Faith and
11 values that are so needed by the young people who come to [Archdiocese
12 schools].ʺ Id.
13 The Manual also explicates the principalʹs job description: ʺThe principal
14 is the Catholic leader and the administrative head of the school [who] is
15 responsible for the effective operation of the school as an educational institution
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1 within the total [P]arish educational program.ʺ Manual ¶ 320, at Appʹx at 132. 4
2 The principal provides ʺCatholic leadershipʺ by:
3 [1] cooperat[ing] with the [P]astor in recruiting and maintaining a
4 staff committed to the goals of a Catholic school; [2] cooperat[ing]
5 with the [P]astor in his religious ministry to the students; [3]
6 ensur[ing] adherence to the curriculum guidelines, Guidelines for
7 Catechesis, 1998; [4] monitor[ing] the acquisition of catechetical
8 certification for teachers of religion[;] [5] direct[ing] the
9 implementation of the religious education program[;] . . . [6]
10 commit[ing] to the mission of evangelization[;] [7] involv[ing] the
11 staff in formulating plans that enable the school to meet its religious
12 goals; [8] provid[ing] opportunities for student, faculty, and parent
13 participation in liturgical and paraliturgical services; [9] intitiat[ing]
14 programs that inculcate an attitude and foster the practice of service
15 to others; [10] motivat[ing] the students to take an active part in the
16 life of the [P]arish; [11] promot[ing] in faculty, students, and parents
17 the concept of the school as a community of faith; [12] provid[ing]
18 opportunities for the practice of this concept; [and 13] cooperat[ing]
19 with the [P]arish council by attending council meetings and by
20 keeping the council informed of school matters.
21 Id. ¶ 322, at Appʹx at 133. In fulfilling these duties, the principal is to provide
22 ʺessentialʺ instruction to new teachers on the ʺCatholic identity of the school,ʺ id.
23 ¶ 430, at Appʹx at 154, and ensure that all teachers understand that ʺ[t]he Church
The principalʹs day‐to‐day responsibilities include ʺ[p]ersonnel [m]anagement,ʺ
4
ʺ[o]ffice [m]anagement,ʺ ʺ[p]ublic and [c]ommunity [r]elations,ʺ ʺ[b]udget and [f]iscal
[m]anagement,ʺ ʺ[t]eacher [d]evelopment,ʺ and ʺ[e]valuation of [s]tudents.ʺ Manual
¶¶ 324, 326, at Appʹx at 134‐36. ʺ[T]he principal does not [typically] assume any
teaching responsibilities[,]ʺ but may do so ʺ[i]n some instances . . . provided that [it]
does not interfere with the principalʹs responsibility for administering and supervising
the total instructional program.ʺ Id. ¶ 320, at Appʹx at 132.
9
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1 puts its trust in themʺ to provide ʺfaith educationʺ and help students ʺintegrat[e]
2 . . . the Gospelʺ into daily life, id. ¶ 106, at Appʹx at 123.
3 The Manual further instructs that the principal should implement the
4 ʺCatholic Values Infusion Program[,] . . . a very conscious and collaborative way
5 for the principal to fulfill the mission of transmitting Catholic values, culture and
6 traditions to each succeeding generation, to fulfill the essential purpose of a
7 Catholic school and to assist faculties to do the same.ʺ Id. ¶ 326, at Appʹx at 136.
8 Under this program, the principal serves as: (1) a ʺ[s]piritual [l]eaderʺ who
9 ʺbear[s] the responsibility of integrating Gospel values into the vision, goals,
10 policies and practices, life, and curriculum of the school,ʺ Catholic Education
11 Community: A Values Integration Program (ʺValues Integration Programʺ) at 12,
12 at Supp. Appʹx at 56; (2) a ʺ[t]radition [b]earerʺ who ʺmodel[s] the Catholic
13 values [that are] central to the spirit of the Catholic school,ʺ id. at 13, at Supp.
14 Appʹx at 57; and (3) the ʺprime communicator of the messageʺ who ʺpromote[s]
15 the values of the Catholic school,ʺ id. at 14, at Supp. Appʹx at 58.5
According to Fratello, though, the School did not seek to proselytize or indoctrinate
5
non‐Catholic students. See Fratello Decl. ¶¶ 24‐25, at Appʹx at 294. Assuming that to be
so, it is not material to our decision here.
10
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1 Applicants for principal positions must meet several religious
2 qualifications. First, they must be ʺpracticing Catholic[s] in union with Rome,
3 with a commitment to the teachings of the Church and to the development of
4 Christian spirit and a community of faith within a school.ʺ Manual ¶ 328, at
5 Appʹx at 138. Second, applicants should ʺ[c]omplet[e] . . . Levels I and II of the
6 Catechist Certification Programʺ at least ʺby the [end] of their fourth year of
7 service.ʺ Id., at Appʹx at 138.6 Third, they ʺmust demonstrate proficiencyʺ in a
8 number of religious areas: ʺ[e]mbody[ing] Christ‐centered principles,ʺ
9 ʺ[e]ncourag[ing] the spiritual growth . . . of each and every student,ʺ
10 ʺ[e]xercis[ing] spiritual leadership to ensure a thriving Catholic school
11 community,ʺ and ʺpromot[ing] Catholic education.ʺ Official Job Summary and
12 Qualifications for Archdiocese School Principal (ʺJob Summary and
13 Qualificationsʺ), at Appʹx at 243.
Fratello asserts that the certification requirement is ʺaspirationalʺ and ʺnot strictly
6
enforcedʺ by the Archdiocese. Pl.ʹs Resp. & Counterstatement to Defs.ʹ Rule 56.1
Statement ¶ 18, at Appʹx at 307. She also asserts that, although she is Catholic, her
ʺacademic credentials are in education, and she has no formal training in religion or
theology.ʺ Pl.ʹs Rule 56.1 Statement in Support of Cross‐Motion to Strike Ministerial
Immunity Defense ¶ 4, at Appʹx at 344. We, like the district court, ʺassume . . . that [the]
certification requirement was not strictly enforced,ʺ at least with respect to Fratello.
Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 175 F. Supp. 3d 152, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
11
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1 C. Fratello as Principal
2 In March 2007, Fratello applied to be the Schoolʹs principal with a letter
3 drawing attention to her then‐job as ʺa Principal . . . at St. Joseph Schoolʺ (another
4 school in the Archdiocese) and her ʺstrong Catholic faith.ʺ Letter from Fratello to
5 the School (Mar. 23, 2007), at Appʹx at 191. She provided her references a
6 recommendation form indicating that she was applying for an ʺimportant
7 leadership roleʺ within the Archdiocese. Reference Request (July 10, 2006), at
8 Appʹx at 190.
9 In 2007, Fratello was interviewed by the Archdioceseʹs Principal Search
10 Committee (the ʺCommitteeʺ), Decl. of Cathleen Cassel7 (ʺCassel Decl.ʺ) ¶¶ 5‐13,
11 at Supp. Appʹx at 29‐31, which
12 strived to hire Principals with strong Christian values, dedicated [to]
13 providing teachers and students with instruction in religious truth
14 and value, maintaining a set of educational policies [that] are in
15 conformity with the religious beliefs and moral standards of the
16 Archdiocese[,] and further fostering an educational environment
17 [that] teaches students how to live in accordance with the teachings
18 of Jesus.
19 Id. ¶ 10, at Supp. Appʹx at 30.8
Cassel was at the relevant time ʺa member of the . . . Committee,ʺ and is now ʺthe
7
Regional Superintendent for Rockland County for the [Archdiocese].ʺ Cassel Decl. ¶¶ 1,
5, at Supp. Appʹx at 28‐29.
12
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1 Later that year, Fratello was hired and signed a one‐year ʺContract of
2 Employment for Lay Principalsʺ (the ʺLay Contractʺ) with the School, subject to
3 annual renewal. It provided, among other things, that ʺ[t]he principal recognizes
4 the religious nature of the Catholic school[,] and . . . the [School] retains the right
5 to dismiss [the] principal for immorality, scandal, disregard or disobedience of
6 the [Archdioceseʹs] polices or rules . . . , or rejection of the official teaching,
7 doctrine or laws of the Roman Catholic Church.ʺ Lay Contract ¶ 3(d), at Appʹx at
8 85.
9 1. Religious Job Functions
10 Shortly after becoming principal, Fratello implemented a new prayer
11 system within the School. Every school‐day morning, Fratello hosted an eighth‐
12 grade student to pray over a loudspeaker system heard in all the classrooms, and
13 at the end of the prayer, she proclaimed, ʺPraise to you Lord Jesus Christ.ʺ
When interviewing principal candidates, the Committee generally asked some form
8
of the following questions: (1) ʺWhat is your personal relationship with the church?ʺ
(2) ʺWhy do you want to be Principal of [a] Catholic School (as opposed to a secular
private school)?ʺ (3) ʺWhat is your relationship with the Pastor and the parents at the
current school you work in?ʺ (4) ʺWhat do you think is a good religion lesson?ʺ
(5) ʺWhat would you do at the school to implement communal prayer?ʺ Cassel Decl.
¶ 11, at Supp. Appʹx at 30.
13
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1 Declaration of AnnMarie Weber (ʺWeber Decl.ʺ) ¶ 8, at Supp. Appʹx at 82. The
9
2 student then read another prayer and concluded by reciting the ʺOur Fatherʺ
3 prayer (or the ʺLordʹs Prayerʺ). Id.10
4 Fratello also communicated religious messages over the Schoolʹs
5 loudspeaker system during various holiday seasons. On Fridays in October,
6 Fratello celebrated the Feast of Our Lady of the Rosary by reciting over the
7 loudspeaker the ʺOur Fatherʺ prayer, ten ʺHail Maryʺ prayers,11 and one ʺGlory
Weber was ʺemployed as the Administrative Assistant to the Principal of [the School]
9
. . . throughout [Fratelloʹs] entire tenure with the School,ʺ and remains employed in that
position. Weber Decl. ¶ 1, at Supp. Appʹx at 80.
10 One articulation of the prayer:
Our Father, Who art in Heaven, hallowed be Thy name; Thy Kingdom
come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven. Give us this day our
daily bread; and forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who
trespass against us; and lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from
evil. Amen.
Weber Decl. ¶ 8, at Supp. Appʹx at 82.
One articulation: ʺHail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee; Blessed art thou
11
among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb, Jesus. Holy Mary, Mother of God,
pray for us sinners, now and at the hour of death. Amen.ʺ Weber Decl. ¶ 11, at Supp.
Appʹx at 83.
14
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1 Beʺ prayer. Id. ¶ 11, at Supp. Appʹx at 83. ʺ[O]n most school days in December
12
2 during the Advent season,ʺ she ʺread [over the loudspeaker system] the story of
3 the ʹJesse Treeʹʺ to ʺhelp[] students connect the custom of decorating Christmas
4 trees to the events leading to Jesusʹ birth,ʺ and to illustrate ʺthe faithfulness of
5 God.ʺ Declaration of Sister Lynn Ann Lewis13 (ʺSister Lewis Decl.ʺ) ¶ 13, at
6 Appʹx at 97‐98.
7 Fratello also played a significant role in planning and executing religious
8 assemblies for students. She supervised and approved the selection of hymns,
9 decorations, and lay persons to recite prayers at annual special Masses held in
10 November and May. And at the end of each school year, she delivered a
11 religious message from the church pulpit to the graduating eighth‐grade class
12 and prayed for Godʹs blessing on them.
13 In a yearbook message, Fratello congratulated students on their spiritual
14 growth and adherence to Catholic teaching. She also drafted a monthly
15 newsletter that, among other things, invited School families to join her at Mass,
One articulation: ʺGlory Be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit. As
12
it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. Amen.ʺ Weber
Decl. ¶ 11, at Supp. Appʹx at 83.
Sister Lewis is a Dominican Sister who has been a first‐grade teacher at the School
13
since 1970. Sister Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4, at Appʹx at 95‐96.
15
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1 expressed her enthusiasm for studentsʹ receptiveness to the Catholic faith, and
2 encouraged studentsʹ extracurricular spiritual growth. Although she did not
3 herself act as a teacher, she frequently supervised teachers in their instruction of
4 the Catholic faith and directed the content of the religious curriculum, including
5 the selection of all instructional materials and textbooks.
6 2. Evaluations
7 In Spring 2008, at the end of her first term as principal, Fratelloʹs
8 performance was evaluated by ʺthe Superintendent, the Pastor of the Church and
9 the teachers based on the Principalʹs ability to perform as (i) a Religious Leader;
10 (ii) an Instructional Leader; (iii) a Communicator; and (iv) [an] Administrator.ʺ
11 Declaration of Mary Jane Daley14 (ʺDaley Decl.ʺ) ¶ 21, at Appʹx at 106.
12 The Pastorʹs evaluation assessed, among other things, whether Fratello:
13 (1) ʺfoster[ed] a Christian atmosphere which enable[d] staff and students to
14 achieve their potentialʺ; (2) ʺg[a]ve[] priority to a comprehensive religious
15 education program by [] implementing Archdiocesan guidelines[,] encouraging
16 communal worship,ʺ and ʺsupporting service‐oriented activitiesʺ; (3) ʺensure[d]
Daley has been ʺthe Regional Superintendentʺ since 2008, and was previously an
14
Archdiocese school principal. Daley Decl. ¶ 1, at Appʹx at 100.
16
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1 that religion classes [were] taught by knowledgeable and committed Catholicsʺ;
2 (4) ʺencourage[d] teachers to obtain Archdiocesan catechetical certificationʺ;
3 (5) ʺprovide[d] for religious growth among staff membersʺ; (6) ʺensure[d] the
4 implementation of the Catholic Values Integration Program in curriculum and all
5 other aspects of school lifeʺ; (7) ʺuph[e]ld[] and strengthen[ed] the [Schoolʹs]
6 Catholic identityʺ; (8) ʺencourage[d] and support[ed] a strong program of
7 evangelizationʺ; and (9) ʺprovide[d] a variety of opportunities for faculty to meet
8 as a Christian community.ʺ Pastorʹs Evaluation of Principal (the ʺPastor
9 Evaluationʺ) at 1‐2, at Appʹx at 198‐99. Fratello received high marks in many of
10 these categories. Id.
11 Fratelloʹs other evaluators commended her for ʺrenewing the Catholic
12 [i]dentity of St. Anthonyʹs School Officeʺ; ʺsetting a good example as a religion
13 leaderʺ; bringing ʺa renewed sense of Christian [s]piritualityʺ; ʺcreating an
14 atmosphere rich with a sense of Catholic Communityʺ; and ʺmaking religious
15 values, attitude and behavior the focus of life at the School.ʺ Daley Decl. ¶ 25, at
16 Appʹx at 107. The Schoolʹs faculty members gave her high marks as a ʺReligious
17 Leader.ʺ See, e.g., Mary Ann Driscollʹs Faculty Evaluation of Principal (the
18 ʺDriscoll Evaluationʺ) at 1, at Appʹx at 113; Sister Lynne A. Lewisʹs Faculty
17
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1 Evaluation of Principal (the ʺSister Lewis Evaluationʺ) at 1, at Appʹx 119; Sister
2 Daniel Catherine Connollyʹs Faculty Evaluation of Principal (the ʺSister Connolly
3 Evaluationʺ) at 1, at Appʹx 133; Carol McGuirkʹs Faculty Evaluation of Principal
4 (the ʺMcGuirk Evaluationʺ) at 1, at Appʹx at 143; Karen Ladolcettaʹs Faculty
5 Evaluation of Principal (the ʺLadolcetta Evaluationʺ) at 1, at Appʹx at 157;
6 Margaret Murphyʹs Faculty Evaluation of Principal (the ʺMurphy Evaluationʺ)
7 at 1, at Appʹx at 189.
8 Following these evaluations, Fratelloʹs employment was renewed for a
9 three‐year term. At the conclusion of that term in Spring 2011, however, the
10 School declined to renew her contract.15
Because of the procedural status of the case, the defendantsʹ position as to why they
15
did not renew Fratelloʹs contract is not entirely clear. See Appelleeʹs Br. at 18 n.3 (noting
that ʺ[f]or purposes of this appeal, the Court must take [Fratelloʹs gender‐discrimination
and retaliation allegations] to be true,ʺ and asserting that ʺalthough it is irrelevant to the
question before the Courtʺ regarding the ministerial exception, Fratelloʹs employment
was terminated because she ʺengaged in insubordination towards the [P]astor of St.
Anthonyʹsʺ). If, as the district court concluded, the ministerial exception applies, the
reason for her termination does not matter. Had a religious reason been proffered,
however, our precedent suggests that a foray into the ministerial exception would
perhaps not be necessary. See infra note 25.
18
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1 D. Procedural History
2 Fratello filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
3 Southern District of New York seeking reinstatement and damages on the
4 ground that the defendants terminated her employment on the basis of gender
5 discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
6 and New York State Executive Law § 296. After finding that it could not
7 determine whether the ministerial exception applied to Fratelloʹs claims on a
8 motion to dismiss, the district court appropriately ordered discovery limited to
9 whether Fratello was a minister within the meaning of the exception. At the close
10 of that limited discovery, the parties filed cross‐motions for summary judgment:
11 The defendants sought summary judgment on all of Fratelloʹs claims based on
12 the ministerial exception, an affirmative defense; Fratello sought summary
13 judgment striking that defense on the ground that she was not a minister within
14 the meaning of the exception. The district court granted the defendantsʹ motion
15 and awarded them summary judgment by opinion and order dated March 29,
19
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1 2016. Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 175 F. Supp. 3d 152, 168
2 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).16 This appeal followed.
3 DISCUSSION
4 The sole question on appeal is whether Fratelloʹs employment‐
5 discrimination claims are barred by the ministerial exception in light of the
6 Supreme Courtʹs unanimous decision in Hosanna‐Tabor, which addressed the
7 subject. We conclude that they are.
8 I. Standard of Review
9 We review a district courtʹs award of summary judgment de novo,
10 ʺconstru[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the [losing party]ʺ and
11 ʺdrawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all ambiguities in [its] favor.ʺ
12 Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
13 omitted). ʺWe affirm . . . only where ʹthere is no genuine dispute as to any
14 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.ʹʺ Id.
15 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Fratelloʹs
16
remaining state‐law claims. See Fratello, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 168.
20
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1 II. The Ministerial Exception
2 The ministerial exception bars employment‐discrimination claims brought
3 by ministers against the religious groups that employ or formerly employed
4 them. See Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (ʺWhen a minister who has been fired
5 sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, . . . [t]he
6 church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.ʺ). This doctrine
7 addresses a tension between two core values underlying much of our
8 constitutional doctrine and federal law: equal protection and religious liberty.
9 Laws that prohibit various kinds of employment discrimination are intended to
10 give effect to the equality principle. As such, they are, as the Chief Justice
11 writing for the Hosanna‐Tabor Court stated, ʺundoubtedly importantʺ to ʺsociety.ʺ
12 Id.
13 The First Amendmentʹs religion clauses are also of fundamental
14 importance. Amongst other things, they have since their inception been
15 understood to ensure the separation of church and state.17 See U.S. CONST.
Acknowledging that there are many ʺ[c]ompetingʺ conceptions of the phrase
17
ʺseparation of church and state,ʺ we use it here only ʺas a shorthand for vague notions
of religious liberty as guaranteed in the First Amendment.ʺ Douglas Laycock, The Many
Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1687 (2003).
21
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 amend. I (prohibiting any ʺlaw respecting an establishment of religion, or
2 prohibiting the free exercise thereofʺ).
3 In the context of employment disputes, these two core values sometimes
4 conflict, and a balance must be struck. Hosanna‐Tabor instructs that where a
5 defendant is able to establish that the ministerial exception applies, see Hosanna‐
6 Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (explaining that the ministerial exception is an
7 affirmative defense), the ʺFirst Amendment has struck the balance for usʺ in
8 favor of religious liberty, id. at 196.
9 A. Historical Underpinnings18
10 As the Chief Justice explained on behalf of the Court in Hosanna‐Tabor, the
11 ministerial exceptionʹs historical roots extend to the founding generation, which
12 adopted the First Amendment ʺagainst th[e] backgroundʺ of ʺlife under the
13 established Church of England.ʺ Id. at 183. Under English law, ʺthe monarch
14 [was] the supreme head of the Church of Englandʺ with authority over its clergy,
15 and the Parliament ʺset forth the doctrinal tenets of the Churchʺ and ʺprescribed
16 the liturgy for religious worship.ʺ Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and
As will become apparent, many of the following historical observations reflect those
18
that the Chief Justice made for the Supreme Court in Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182‐87.
22
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1 Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY
2 L. REV. 2105, 2112‐13 (2003). Significantly, ʺministers [were required] to conform
3 to these requirements, making the Church of England the sole institution for
4 lawful public worship.ʺ Id. at 2113.
5 ʺSeeking to escape the control of the national church, the Puritans fled to
6 New England, where they hoped to elect their own ministers and establish their
7 own modes of worship.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182. Quakers ʺsought
8 independenceʺ in Pennsylvania and Delaware. Id. at 183. Even Southern
9 colonists, who ʺbrought the Church of England with them[,] . . . sometimes
10 chafed at the control exercised by the Crown,ʺ particularly when ʺ[c]ontroversies
11 over the selection of ministers . . . arose in . . . Colonies with Anglican
12 establishments,ʺ such as Virginia and North Carolina. Id.
13 As the Chief Justice explained in Hosanna‐Tabor, by adopting the First
14 Amendment, ʺthe founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a
15 national church.ʺ Id.19 To that end, the ʺReligion Clauses ensured that the new
Disestablishment at the state level was not, however, initially apparent. ʺMost of
19
[the thirteen original] colonies had an established church,ʺ each a specific Protestant
denomination, ʺsponsored and supported by the colonial governmentʺ: ʺThe Church of
England was established in five southern colonies and in parts of New York,ʺ and ʺ[i]n
23
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Federal Government—unlike the English Crown—would have no role in filling
2 ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from
3 appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering
4 with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.ʺ Id. at 184.
5 ʺ[I]t was some time,ʺ though, before courts were required to address the
6 tension between anti‐discrimination laws and ʺa churchʹs ability to select its own
7 ministers.ʺ Id. at 185.20 Following ʺthe passage of Title VII . . . and other
three New England colonies, the established church was chosen by local elections, . . .
nearly always won by [Puritan denominations].ʺ Douglas Laycock, Church and State in
the United States: Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 503, 507 (2006). Over time, though, ʺ[t]he dominant regional position of [the
Anglicans and Puritans] was threatened by continued immigration ofʺ members of
other Protestant denominations—particularly Baptists, Presbyterians, and other
ʺancestors of the [contemporary] evangelical movementʺ—that ʺdissented from the
teachings of the established church[es].ʺ Id. at 508. As these dissenting groups grew,
they ʺinsistedʺ on constitutional guarantees prohibiting established religion. Id. They
eventually succeeded, and ʺ[b]y 1834, no state in the Union would have an established
church, and the tradition of separation between church and state would seem an
ingrained and vital part of our constitutional system.ʺ Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1437 (1990); see also id. at 1437‐43 (describing in detail the ʺevangelical movementʺ that
ʺdr[o]veʺ disestablishment in the states).
Although before Hosanna‐Tabor the Supreme Court had never explicitly recognized a
20
ministerial exception, it had, as the Hosanna‐Tabor Court pointed out, ʺtouched upon the
issue indirectly . . . in the context of disputes over church propertyʺ in a series of cases
that ʺconfirm[ed] that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a churchʹs
determination of who can act as its ministers.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 185; see also
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872) (explaining that ʺwhenever the
24
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 employment discrimination laws,ʺ id. at 188, however, ʺcourts began to develop
2 the constitutional doctrine we now call the ministerial exception,ʺ Christopher C.
3 Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20‐21 (2011)
4 (reviewing earlier cases). More than forty years ago, the Fifth Circuit held that
5 the First Amendment requires that a ministerial exception be applied to Title VII
6 claims.21 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
7 denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (reasoning that ʺ[m]atters touchingʺ ʺ[t]he relationship
8 between an organized church and its ministers . . . must necessarily be
9 recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concernʺ because a churchʹs ʺminister is the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been
decided by the highest of the[] church judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before themʺ); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952) (recognizing ʺa spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence
from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrineʺ); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724‐25 (1976) (holding
that, when ecclesiastical tribunals decide disputes related to ʺtheir own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, . . . the Constitution requires that
civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon themʺ).
A constitutionally derived ministerial exception is necessary in the context of Title
21
VII because, although that statute exempts religious entities and educational
organizations with respect to religious‐discrimination claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐1(a),
it does not exempt them from claims based on race, gender, or national origin. See
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh‐Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
25
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 chief instrument by which [it] seeks to fulfill its purposeʺ). Over the next several
2 decades, we and every other Circuit to address the issue22 concluded that the
3 First Amendment requires a ministerial exception. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520
4 F.3d 198, 204‐09 (2d Cir. 2008). Then, in Hosanna‐Tabor, the Supreme Court
5 ʺagree[d]ʺ with the Courts of Appeals that there is ʺa ʹministerial exception,ʹ
6 grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of [employment‐
7 discrimination] legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship
8 between a religious institution and its ministers.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
9 As the Court explained, because ʺ[t]he members of a religious group put
10 their faith in the hands of their ministers,ʺ it would ʺintrude[] upon more than a
11 mere employment decisionʺ to ʺ[r]equir[e] a church to accept or retain an
12 unwanted minister, or [to] punish[] a church for failing to do so.ʺ Id. Either
See, e.g., Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989);
22
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303‐07 (3d. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 2098
(2007); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800‐01 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs v.
Cent. Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345‐50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225‐27 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 857 (2007);
Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475‐76 (7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Lukeʹs
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362‐63 (8th Cir. 1991); Werft v. Desert Sw.
Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100‐04 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Bryce v. Episcopal
Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655‐57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301‐04 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455,
460‐63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
26
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 action would ʺinterefere[] with the internal governance of the church, depriving
2 [it] of control over selection of those who will personify its beliefs,ʺ23 in violation
3 of both religion clauses: ʺBy imposing an unwanted minister, the state [would]
4 infringe[] the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious groupʹs right to
5 shape its own faith and mission through its appointments,ʺ and by
6 ʺdetermin[ing] which individuals will minister to the faithful,ʺ the state would
7 ʺalso violate[] the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government
8 involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.ʺ Id. at 188‐89.
Any autonomy that religious groups have over their internal affairs is premised on
23
the ʺvoluntaryʺ decisions of individuals to engage in ʺreligious activity.ʺ Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1403 (1981) (noting
that ʺ[t]he [Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated that all who join a church do so with
the implied consent to [the churchʹs] government, to which they are bound to submitʺ
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, ʺwhat might be called institutional or
church autonomy is ultimately derived from individual rights.ʺ Richard Schragger &
Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 920 (2013); see
also id. at 957‐59 (noting that the conception of a ʺchurch as a voluntary associationʺ of
individual conscience can be traced to the philosopher John Locke (citing John Locke, A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (James H. Tully ed., 1983) (1629))); Noah Feldman,
The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 378 (2002) (ʺBy
the late eighteenth century, some version of Lockeʹs basic view of the nature of liberty of
conscience had been formally embraced by nearly every politically active American
writing on the subject of religion and the state.ʺ).
27
16‐1271
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 B. Effect of Hosanna‐Tabor
2 This is our first occasion to address the scope of the ministerial exception
3 and apply it to a specific case with the benefit of Hosanna‐Tabor.24
4 Before that decision, as noted above, we ʺformally adopt[ed] the
5 ministerial exceptionʺ in Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 207. That appeal involved a
6 Catholic priestʹs Title VII racial‐discrimination claim against his former Diocese
7 and Bishop, ʺ[a]lleging that [they] . . . misapplied canon law in denying him a
8 requested promotion and, ultimately, in terminating him.ʺ Id. at 199.
9 Addressing whether the ministerial exception barred his claims, we explained
10 that the First Amendment required consideration of both the ʺʹfunctionʹ of an
11 employee, rather than his title or the fact of his ordination,ʺ and also ʺthe type of
12 claim asserted.ʺ Id. at 208. We explained that while ʺa lay employeeʹs
13 relationship to his employer may be so pervasively religious that judicial
14 interference in the form of a discrimination inquiry could run afoul of the
We have indeed addressed Hosanna‐Tabor once before, but did so principally to
24
distinguish it from an Establishment Clause claim brought against a government
agency that barred religious services from being held at government‐owned facilities.
See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 184, 200‐04 (2d Cir. 2014). This is our
first opportunity to address the scope of the ministerial exception in light of Hosanna‐
Tabor.
28
16‐1271
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Constitution,ʺ id. (internal quotation marks omitted), an employee of any rank
25
2 ʺin the church hierarchy . . . alleging particular wrongs by the church that are
3 wholly non‐religious in natureʺ—including, for example, certain common‐law
4 tort claims—ʺis surely not forbidden his day in court.ʺ Id.
5 We concluded, though, that the particular facts of the case before us did
6 not require us then to ʺattempt to delineate the boundaries of the ministerial
7 exceptionʺ because the plaintiffʹs ʺTitle VII claim easily f[ell] within themʺ insofar
8 as he was ʺan ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church,ʺ whose ʺduties
9 [were] determined by Catholic doctrine and . . . drawn into question in [the]
10 caseʺ such that ʺimpermissible entanglement with religious doctrineʺ was
11 unavoidable. Id. at 209. Indeed, ʺin order to prevail on his Title VII claim, he
12 [would have had to] argue that the decision of the [religious authorities] was not
13 only erroneous, but also pretextual.ʺ Id. We therefore held that his ʺclaim
14 fail[ed] at its inceptionʺ ʺ[b]ecause Title VII [was] unconstitutional as applied in
15 th[at] case.ʺ Id.
We further noted that ʺeven when we permit suits by lay employees, we will not
25
subject to examination the genuineness of a proffered religious reason for an
employment action.ʺ Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 207.
29
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Our decision in Rweyemamu made clear that the question whether an
2 employee was a minister within the meaning of the exception turned principally
3 on the employeeʹs job functions, and that where such employees were found to
4 be ministers, they were barred from bringing Title VII claims against their
5 religious employers when their claims would ʺinexorably entangle [the court] in
6 doctrinal disputes.ʺ Id. at 208. But the decision seemed (at least to some district
7 courts in this Circuit) to leave open the possibility that some employment‐
8 discrimination claims by ministers might not be barred if excessive entanglement
9 could be avoided in the particular case. See, e.g., Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
10 Rochester, 557 F. Supp. 2d 387, 398 n.8 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (ʺinterpret[ing] th[e]
11 holding [of Rweyemamu] to mean that, in this Circuit, the ministerial exception
12 does not necessarily apply to claims involving the hiring or firing of a minister,
13 unless the hiring or firing involves issues of a religionʺ); Redhead v. Conference of
14 Seventh‐Day Adventists, 566 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding in
15 light of Rweyemamu that ʺan examination not just of [the] plaintiffʹs function
16 [was] required, but also of the nature of [her Title VII] claimʺ to determine
17 whether ʺthe dispute in this case is such that its resolution inevitably will . . .
18 impermissibly entangl[e] the court in matters of religious doctrineʺ).
30
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 In Hosanna‐Tabor, however, the Supreme Court made clear that those
2 properly characterized as ʺministersʺ are flatly barred from bringing
3 employment‐discrimination claims against the religious groups that employ or
4 formerly employed them. See Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194. As the Supreme
5 Court explained, the ministerial exceptionʹs purpose ʺis not to safeguard a
6 churchʹs decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason,ʺ
7 but to ʺensure[] that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
8 faithful—a matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the churchʹs alone.ʺ Id. at 194‐95
9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
10 Armed only with the law as written and the tools of judicial reasoning,
11 courts are ill‐equipped to assess whether, and to what extent, an employment
12 dispute between a minister and his or her religious group is premised on
13 religious grounds. See Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW.
14 U. L. REV. 973, 979 (2012) (asserting that Hosanna‐Tabor ʺconfirmedʺ the principle
15 that ʺjudges cannot evaluate the kinds of religious questions that come up in
16 employment discrimination cases involving ministerial employeesʺ because they
17 ʺare simply incompetent to address themʺ). Judges are not well positioned to
18 determine whether ministerial employment decisions rest on practical and
31
16‐1271
Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 secular considerations or fundamentally different ones that may lead to results
2 that, though perhaps difficult for a person not intimately familiar with the
3 religion to understand, are perfectly sensible—and perhaps even necessary—in
4 the eyes of the faithful. In the Abrahamic religious traditions, for instance, a
5 stammering Moses was chosen to lead the people, and a scrawny David to slay a
6 giant.26
7 The notion of judicial incompetence with respect to strictly ecclesiastical
8 matters can be traced at least as far back as James Madison, ʺthe leading architect
9 of the religious clauses of the First Amendment.ʺ Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
10 v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)).
11 He argued against a proposed tax bill in Virginia to aid Christian religious
12 teachers because, among other things, the proposed legislation:
13 implie[d] either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of
14 Religious truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil
26 These examples, used for illustrative purposes, are obviously arbitrary and
simplistic. Maybe, for example, there were good practical reasons for those choices.
But this is neither the time nor the place to comment on them further. That is the point:
This is not the time, because a court is virtually never the place, to analyze the grounds
for a religious groupʹs reasons for selecting its ministers. See Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at
194‐95. We say ʺvirtually neverʺ because we are unable, with necessarily limited
knowledge, to exclude entirely the possibility that there are situations in which courts
may be called upon to consider such questions.
32
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the
2 contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the
3 world[;] [t]he second an unhallowed perversion of the means of
4 salvation.
5 Walz v. Tax Commʹn of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 722 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
6 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
7 Assessments, 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183‐91 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)); see
8 also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 162‐68 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
9 (providing historical context for Madisonʹs argument).
10 In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court in Hosanna‐Tabor made clear
11 that the First Amendment does not tolerate a judicial remedy for any minister
12 claiming employment discrimination against his or her religious group,
13 regardless of the groupʹs asserted reason (if any) for the adverse employment
14 action. See Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194 (explaining that with respect to
15 ministers, the First Amendment bars an order of reinstatement, which would
16 ʺrequire[] the Church to accept a minister it did not want,ʺ and damages, which
17 ʺwould operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted
18 ministerʺ).
19 Therefore, whether the ministerial exception bars employment‐
20 discrimination claims against a religious organization depends entirely on
33
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 whether the employee qualifies as a ʺministerʺ within the meaning of the
2 exception. See id. at 190‐91.27 But that is hardly a question that admits of an easy
3 or mechanical method for deriving an answer.
4 Indeed, the Supreme Courtʹs opinion in Hosanna‐Tabor—unanimous with
5 two concurring opinions subscribed to by three Justices—is not without its
6 Delphic qualities. The Chief Justice explained that the Court was ʺreluctant . . . to
7 adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It
8 [was] enough for [it] to conclude, in [its] first case involving the ministerial
9 exception, that the exception covers [the teacher‐plaintiff in that case], given all
There may in some instances be a threshold question as to whether the employer is a
27
religious group within the meaning of the ministerial exception. See, e.g., Conlon v.
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 833‐34 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a
Christian organization could ʺassert the ministerial exceptionʺ because, though not a
church, it was nonetheless a ʺreligious groupʺ insofar as it sought ʺto advance the
understanding and practice of Christianity in colleges and universitiesʺ). We are not,
for example, called upon today—as we have been in the past—to decide whether a
chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous (ʺA.A.ʺ) is a religious group for these or similar
purposes. Cf. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that we had previously ʺheld that a county government agency violated the
Establishment Clause when it conditioned the plaintiffʹs criminal probation on his
participation in A.A.ʺ (citing Warner v. Orange Cnty. Depʹt of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1075‐
76 (2d Cir. 1997), reaffʹd after remand, 173 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1003 (1999))); see also id. at 407 (citing Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 103, 88 N.Y.2d
674, 683, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903, 908 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054 (1997) (holding that the
A.A. materials in the record ʺdemonstrate[d] beyond peradventure that doctrinally and
as actually practiced in the 12‐step methodology, adherence to the A.A. fellowship
entails engagement in religious activity and religious proselytizationʺ)).
34
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 the circumstances of her employment.ʺ Id. at 190. The Court then identified
2 various factors it considered in making that judgment with respect to a former
3 fourth‐grade teacher of a church‐run Missouri Synod Lutheran school: ʺIn light
4 of these considerations—[1] the formal title given [to the teacher‐plaintiff] by the
5 Church, [2] the substance reflected in that title, [3] her own use of that title, and
6 [4] the important religious functions she performed for the Church—we
7 conclude that [she] was a minister covered by the ministerial exception.ʺ Id. at
8 192.28 Thus, Hosanna‐Tabor instructs only as to what we might take into account
9 as relevant, including the four considerations on which it relied; it neither limits
10 the inquiry to those considerations nor requires their application in every case.
11 We thus set forth on our journey with only limited direction from the
12 Supreme Courtʹs controlling opinion in Hosanna‐Tabor. But in finding our way,
13 as will appear, we receive and accept substantial further guidance from the
14 concurrence of Justice Alito, in which Justice Kagan joined. See id. at 198‐206
15 (Alito, J., concurring). We refer to it frequently below not because we are bound
The Supreme Court in Hosanna‐Tabor concluded that: (1) the plaintiffʹs formal title
28
was ʺMinister of Religion, Commissionedʺ; (2) that title ʺreflected a significant degree of
religious training followed by a formal process of commissioningʺ; (3) she ʺheld herself
out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious serviceʺ; and (4)
ʺ[her] job duties reflected a role conveying the Churchʹs message and carrying out its
mission.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191‐92.
35
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 to follow it—of course we are not—but because we find its analysis both
2 persuasive and extremely helpful.
3 Justice Alito pointed out that a formal title indicating that the plaintiff is
4 playing a religious role, though often relevant, ʺis neither necessary nor
5 sufficient,ʺ id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring), and that ʺcourts should focus on the
6 function performed by persons who work for religious bodies,ʺ id. at 198 (Alito,
7 J., concurring). Although each of the four considerations cited in the Chief
8 Justiceʹs opinion were in that case relevant, Justice Alito explained, ʺit would be a
9 mistake if the term ʹministerʹ or the concept of ordination were viewed as central
10 to the important issue of religious autonomy that is presented inʺ ministerial‐
11 exception cases. Id. (Alito, J., concurring); see also Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 206
12 (ʺnot[ing] that the term ʹministerial exceptionʹ is judicial shorthand . . . [that] is
13 impreciseʺ because the exception covers ʺmore than just ʹministersʹʺ). ʺ[M]ost
14 faiths do not employ the term ʹminister,ʹ and some eschew the concept of formal
15 ordinationʺ; other ʺfaiths consider the ministry to consist of all or a very large
16 percentage of their members.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 202 (Alito, J.,
17 concurring).
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1 We agree. Where, as here, the four considerations are relevant in a
2 particular case, ʺcourts should focusʺ primarily ʺon the function[s] performed by
3 persons who work for religious bodies.ʺ Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring); see also
4 Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying
5 the ministerial exception to a church music director, noting that ʺit [was] enough
6 . . . that . . . [he] played an integral role in the celebration of Mass and that by
7 playing the piano during services, [he] furthered the mission of the church and
8 helped convey its messageʺ); Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Commʹn Against
9 Discrim., 975 N.E.2d 433, 443, 463 Mass. 472, 486 (2012) (applying the ministerial
10 exception to a teacher at a Jewish school because ʺshe taught religious subjects at
11 a school that functioned solely as a religious school,ʺ even though ʺshe was not a
12 rabbi, was not called a rabbi, . . . did not hold herself out as a rabbi,ʺ and the
13 record did not disclose whether she had received ʺreligious trainingʺ).29 It is the
14 relationship between the activities the employee performs for her employer, and
Fratello proposes a novel two‐prong test under which an employee is a minister only
29
if (1) ʺthe parties mutually bargained forʺ a position filled by ʺa credentialed ministerʺ
rather than simply a bona fide occupational qualification; and (2) the religious
organizationʹs adverse action is related to its internal governance or religious beliefs.
Appellantʹs Br. at 3‐4. We reject this test because it finds no basis in law. Indeed, in
some respects it directly contravenes Hosanna‐Tabor; the second prong of Fratelloʹs test,
for example, would require us to consider the nature of the employment dispute, an
inquiry foreclosed by Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194‐95.
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 the religious activities that the employer espouses and practices, that determines
2 whether employment‐discrimination laws implicate the religious groupʹs First
3 Amendment rights by interfering with its freedom to exercise its religion, or
4 establishing in that religionʹs stead other beliefs or practices.30
5 III. Application
6 Applying these principles here, we conclude that the ministerial exception
7 bars Fratelloʹs employment‐discrimination claims against the Archdiocese, the
8 Church, and the School, all of which are religious groups within the meaning of
9 the ministerial exception. Although her formal title—ʺlay principalʺ—does not
10 connote a religious role, the record makes clear that she served many religious
11 functions to advance the Schoolʹs Roman Catholic mission.
12 In so concluding, though, we do not accept the defendantsʹ argument that
13 all parochial‐school principals should be presumed to be ministers within the
30 As Justice Alito explained,
The First Amendment protects the freedom of religious groups to engage
in certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship
services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical
process of communicating the faith. Accordingly, religious groups must
be free to choose the personnel who are essential to the performance of
these functions.
Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 meaning of the exception. We think that any such categorical presumption runs
2 counter to the teaching of Hosanna‐Tabor, in which the Supreme Court looked to
3 the specific circumstances of the plaintiffʹs employment to determine whether
4 she was a minister. See Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190‐92 (refusing ʺto adopt a
5 rigid formulaʺ and considering ʺall the circumstancesʺ of the plaintiffʹs
6 employment). Although parochial‐school principals may typically qualify as
7 ʺministersʺ within the meaning of the exception, see, e.g., Dayner v. Archdiocese of
8 Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1205, 301 Conn. 759, 779 (2011) (determining that ʺthe
9 plaintiffʹs duties as a Catholic school principal render her a ministerial
10 employeeʺ), some may perform few such religious functions—some, perhaps,
11 none at all. In each case, therefore, we must assess the specific circumstances of
12 employment. We do so here in light of the four considerations articulated in
13 Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192, on which the district court relied, see Fratello, 175
14 F. Supp. 3d at 165‐68, because they are adequate to resolve the particular
15 circumstances of this case.
16 A. Formal Title
17 We first conclude that the employeeʹs ʺformal title,ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565
18 U.S. at 192, weighs against application of the ministerial exception because
39
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Fratelloʹs title, ʺlay principal,ʺ does not suggest that she was in effect a member
31
2 of the clergy or that she performed religious functions on behalf of the School.
3 The teacher‐plaintiff in Hosanna‐Tabor, by contrast, was a ʺcalledʺ teacher, as
4 distinct from a ʺlayʺ teacher. Id. at 177 (explaining that ʺ[t]he Synod classifie[d]
5 teachers into two categories: ʹcalledʹ and ʹlayʹʺ); see also id. at 191 (noting that the
6 teacher‐plaintiffʹs formal title was ʺMinister of Religion, Commissionedʺ).
7 Fratello would end the analysis here. She contends that the use of the title
8 ʺlay principalʺ—rather than ʺreligious principalʺ—reflects a clear distinction
9 between laity and clergy that precludes application of the ministerial exception.32
We derive the title ʺlay principalʺ from Fratelloʹs employment contract, which was
31
entitled ʺContract of Employment for Lay Principals.ʺ Lay Contract, at Appʹx at 84.
Beyond that contractʹs title, however, there is little evidence that she was called ʺlay
principalʺ rather than just ʺprincipal.ʺ The body of her employment contract simply
uses the term ʺprincipal,ʺ see id. ¶¶ 2‐4, at Appʹx at 84‐85, and the Manual does not
appear to distinguish between lay principals and religious principals, see e.g., Manual
¶¶ 320, 322, 324, 326 (referring simply to ʺprincipalʺ), at Appʹx at 135‐37. Nor do we
understand that the teachers or students referred to her as ʺlay principalʺ as opposed to
the ʺprincipal.ʺ Nonetheless, we assume here that her formal title was ʺlay principal.ʺ
32 The record does reflect certain distinctions between a person identified as a ʺlayʺ
principal and one identified as a ʺreligiousʺ principal. Compare Ministerial Agreement
for Religious in the Archdiocese, at Appʹx 166‐68, with Lay Contract, Appʹx at 169‐70.
The defendants assert that this distinction has nothing to do with a principalʹs job
functions, but merely reflects a difference in the recruitment pool from which particular
principals are selected: A ʺreligious principalʺ is so titled because the individual is a
member of a religious order (a nun, for example) who serves the school by agreement of
her order, whereas a ʺlay principalʺ is not a member of a religious order. True or not,
40
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 In other words, she seems to suggest that the formal use of the term ʺlayʺ eclipses
2 any religious functions she may have performed in her position. This argument
3 fails for at least two reasons.
4 First, ʺa title,ʺ though ʺsurely relevant,ʺ is not ʺby itselfʺ dispositive. Id. at
5 193; see also id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that ʺa [religious] title is
6 neither necessary nor sufficientʺ); Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 206‐07 (noting that the
7 ministerial exception has been applied to a press secretary, Jewish nursing‐home
8 staff, and a music director). We cannot accept the notion that by doing no more
9 than changing the title of an employee, a religious‐group employer can change
10 its employeeʹs rights under the federal employment‐discrimination laws. It
11 cannot insulate itself from that sort of liability by bestowing hollow ministerial
12 titles upon many or all of its employees. Nor would plainly secular titles (by
13 themselves) prevent application of the ministerial exception. We think the
14 substance of the employeesʹ responsibilities in their positions is far more
15 important.
this does not alter our conclusion that Fratelloʹs formal title, ʺlay principal,ʺ weighs
against ministerial status. That weight, though, is limited.
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Second, adopting Fratelloʹs approach would in effect penalize religious
2 groups for allowing laypersons to participate in their ministries and thus create
3 an incentive for religious organizations to bar laity from substantial ʺrole[s] in
4 conveying the [organizationʹs] message and carrying out its mission.ʺ Hosanna‐
5 Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. And it would in effect give preference to religious groups
6 that have formal ordination processes over those that do not. See id. at 198, 202 &
7 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that ʺthe concept of ordination as understood by
8 most Christian churches and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some
9 Christian denominations and some other religions,ʺ such as Islam, in which
10 ʺthere is no class or profession of ordained clergyʺ because ʺevery Muslim can
11 perform the religious ritesʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Larsen v.
12 Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (ʺThe clearest command of the Establishment
13 Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
14 another.ʺ).
15 Thus, contrary to Fratelloʹs contention, we are confident that our analysis
16 does not end because the formal title ʺlay principalʺ does not connote that she
17 was a minister.
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 B. Substance Reflected in the Title
2 We also consider in this case ʺthe substance reflected in th[e formal] title.ʺ
3 Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. Although a close question, we think this
4 consideration cuts in favor of applying the ministerial exception here.
5 On the one hand, candidates applying for a ʺlay principalʺ position at the
6 School are not required to meet any religious‐education requirements. Indeed,
7 Fratelloʹs academic credentials are in education, and she has no formal training
8 in religion or theology. Cf. id. at 191 (explaining that that the teacher‐plaintiffʹs
9 commission as a ʺMinister of Religionʺ required ʺeight college‐level courses in
10 [religious] subjectsʺ and ʺelection by the congregation, which recognized Godʹs
11 call to her to teachʺ).
12 On the other hand, the record reflects that the Schoolʹs principal must be a
13 ʺpracticing Catholic in union with Rome, with a commitment to the teachings of
14 the Church and to the development of [a] Christian spirit and a community of
15 faith within [the] school.ʺ Manual ¶ 328, at Appʹx at 138. He or she should, at
16 least in theory,33 ʺ[c]omplet[e] . . . Levels I and II of the Catechist Certification
As noted above, we assume that the certification requirement was not enforced with
33
respect to Fratello.
43
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 Program . . . by the [end] of [his or her] fourth year of service.ʺ Id. The principal
2 must also ʺ[d]emonstrate proficiencyʺ in a number of religious areas:
3 ʺ[e]mbody[ing] Christ‐centered principles,ʺ ʺ[e]ncourag[ing] the spiritual growth
4 . . . of each and every student,ʺ ʺ[e]xercis[ing] spiritual leadership to ensure a
5 thriving Catholic school community,ʺ and exhibiting a ʺ[w]illingness to promote
6 Catholic education.ʺ Job Summary and Qualifications, at Appʹx at 243. These
7 requirements help ensure that the principal is able to provide ʺCatholic
8 [l]eadershipʺ to the Schoolʹs faculty, students, and community. Manual ¶ 322, at
9 Appʹx at 133.
10 Thus, although according to the record a ʺlay principalʺ is not strictly
11 required to meet any formal religious‐education requirements, the substance
12 reflected in that title as used by the defendants and conveyed to the plaintiff
13 entails proficiency in religious leadership, which we think is evidence in favor of
14 applying the ministerial exception here.
15 C. Fratelloʹs Use of the Title
16 We also think that the employeeʹs ʺuse of th[e] titleʺ principal (ʺlayʺ or
17 otherwise), Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192, weighs in favor of applying the
18 ministerial exception here. Although Fratello did not accept a formal call to
44
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 religious service, cf. id. at 192, the record discloses that she understood that she
2 would be perceived as a religious leader. The Archdiocese describes acceptance
3 of the principal position as ʺaccept[ing] the vocation and challenge of leadership
4 in Catholic education.ʺ Cover Letter from Edward Cardinal Egan (Dec. 2006), at
5 Appʹx at 110. And when Fratello was applying for the position of principal, she
6 sent her references a recommendation form indicating that she was applying for
7 an ʺimportant leadership roleʺ with the Archdiocese. Reference Request, at
8 Appʹx at 190. Indeed, as principal, Fratello ʺpersonif[ied]ʺ the Schoolʹs ʺbeliefs,ʺ
9 Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, inasmuch as she presented herself to the School
10 community and the public as a spiritual leader. She led school prayers,
11 conveyed religious messages in speeches and writings, and expressed the
12 importance of Catholic prayer and spirituality in newsletters to parents.
13 D. Functions Performed
14 In our view, the most important consideration in this case is whether, and
15 to what extent, the plaintiff ʺperformedʺ ʺimportant religious functions . . . for
16 [her religious organization].ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192. We think the record
17 establishes beyond doubt that, as principal, Fratello ʺconvey[ed]ʺ the Schoolʹs
18 Roman Catholic ʺmessage and carr[ied] out its mission,ʺ id., insofar as she:
45
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 (1) consistently managed, evaluated, and worked closely with teachers to execute
2 the Schoolʹs religious education mission; (2) led daily prayers for students over
3 the loudspeaker, and other prayers at various ceremonies for faculty and
4 students; (3) supervised and approved the selection of hymns, decorations, and
5 lay persons chosen to recite prayer at annual special Masses; (4) encouraged and
6 supervised teachersʹ integration of Catholic saints and religious values in their
7 lessons and classrooms; (5) kept families connected to their studentsʹ religious
8 and spiritual development through the newsletter; and (6) delivered
9 commencement speeches and yearbook messages that were religious in nature.
10 Not only did Fratello perform all these functions, she was also evaluated
11 on the quality of that performance. Her supervisors and faculty commended her
12 earlier in her tenure for ʺsetting a good example as a religion leaderʺ and
13 ʺmaking religious values . . . the focus of life at the School.ʺ Daley Decl. ¶ 25, at
14 Appʹx at 107. They also praised her for ʺfoster[ing] a Christian atmosphere,ʺ
15 ʺgiv[ing] priority to a comprehensive religious education programʺ by
16 ʺencouraging communal worship,ʺ ʺensur[ing] that religion classes [were] taught
17 by knowledgeable and committed Catholics,ʺ and ʺprovid[ing] for religious
18 growth among staff members.ʺ Pastor Evaluation at 1‐2, at Appʹx at 198‐99; see
46
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 also Driscoll Evaluation at 1, at Supp. Appʹx at 113; Sister Lewis Evaluation at 1,
2 at Supp. Appʹx at 119; Sister Connolly Evaluation at 1, at Supp. Appʹx at 133;
3 McGuirk Evaluation at 1, at Supp. Appʹx at 143; Ladolcetta Evaluation at 1, at
4 Supp. Appʹx at 157; Murphy Evaluation at 1, at Supp. Appʹx at 189.
5 Thus, Fratello ʺperformedʺ several ʺimportant religious functionsʺ as the
6 Schoolʹs principal. Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.34 This fundamental
7 consideration therefore weighs strongly in favor of applying the ministerial
8 exception.
9 * * *
10 The irony is striking. We rely in part on Fratelloʹs supervisorsʹ and faculty
11 officialsʹ prior praise of her performance of her religious responsibilities as proof
12 that she could be fired for the wrong reason or without any reason at all. In our
We do not think it is material in this case that Fratello also performed many secular
34
administrative duties such as ʺ[p]ersonnel [m]anagement,ʺ ʺ[o]ffice [m]anagement,ʺ
ʺ[p]ublic and [c]ommunity [r]elations,ʺ ʺ[b]udget and [f]iscal [m]anagement,ʺ ʺ[t]eacher
[d]evelopment,ʺ and ʺ[e]valuation of [s]tudents,ʺ Manual ¶¶ 324, 326, at Appʹx at 134‐
35, because the ʺministerial exceptionʺ is not ʺlimited to those employees who perform
exclusively religious functionsʺ; even ʺ[t]he heads of congregations . . . have a mix of
duties, including secular ones.ʺ Hosanna‐Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, the majority of the Hosanna‐Tabor plaintiffʹs responsibilities
were secular. See id. (noting that her ʺreligious duties consumed only 45 minutes of
each workdayʺ).
47
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Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York
1 inquiry, the nature of her duties trumps her apparent ability to perform them.
2 This case thus lies at the center of the tension between an employerʹs right to
3 freedom of religion and an employeeʹs right not to be unlawfully discriminated
4 against. The ministerial exception, as we understand it to be interpreted by the
5 Supreme Court, resolves that tension in this case against Fratello and in favor of
6 the Archdiocese, the Church, and the School. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
7 told us that, because, as we conclude, she is a minister within the meaning of the
8 exception, the ʺFirst Amendment has struck the balance for us.ʺ Id. at 196.
9 CONCLUSION
10 In sum, then, we conclude that although Fratelloʹs formal title was not
11 inherently religious, the record makes clear that she held herself out as a spiritual
12 leader of the School and performed many important religious functions to
13 advance its Roman Catholic mission. The ministerial exception thus bars her
14 employment‐discrimination claims because she was a minister within the
15 meaning of the exception. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district
16 court.
48