Brian Claros-Bey v. J. Shartle

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIAN CLAROS-BEY, No. 16-16872 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:15-cv-00501-BGM v. MEMORANDUM* J. T. SHARTLE, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Bruce G. Macdonald, Magistrate Judge, Presiding** Submitted July 11, 2017*** Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges. Brian Claros-Bey appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We review the denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2008), and we affirm. Claros-Bey was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. He was assessed $500 pursuant to the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996 (“VVCCA”) and designated to serve his custodial sentence with United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Claros-Bey contends that the BOP lacks authority to collect, through its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”), the $500 VVCCA assessment. This claim is belied by the language of the applicable statutes and regulations. Regardless of how the VVCA assessment is categorized under 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a), the BOP is authorized to collect Claros- Bey’s VVCCA assessment from wages earned during his period of incarceration. See D.C. Code § 24-101(a) (any person incarcerated pursuant to the District of Columbia Official Code is in BOP custody and subject to BOP regulations); id. at § 4-516(a) (assessments made pursuant to the VVCCA shall be paid from wages subsequently earned, including “in a facility of the Department of Corrections or elsewhere”). Moreover, contrary to Claros-Bey’s contention, his participation in the IFRP is voluntary and “does not implicate [his] constitutional rights.” See Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1049. AFFIRMED. 2 16-16872