MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
Jul 19 2017, 5:59 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A.S. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Erin L. Berger Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT J.M. Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Julianne L. Fox
Indianapolis, Indiana
Evansville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary July 19, 2017
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of C.S., Co.M., 82A01-1701-JT-57
Ca.M. (Minor Children), Appeal from the Vanderburgh
and Superior Court
The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
A.S. (Mother) and J.M. (Father), Judge
Appellants-Respondents, Trial Court Cause Nos.
82D04-1605-JT-826, -27, -28
v.
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
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Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.M. (“Father”) challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial
court’s order terminating his parental relationship with his children, Co.M. and
Ca.M. (collectively “his Children”). He also contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance. A.S. (“Mother”)
also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the termination of her
parental relationship with C.S., Co.M., and Ca.M. (collectively “her Children”
or “the Children”).1 Because Mother and Father share parentage to two of the
children, they are both parties in this joint appeal. Finding no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion for continuance and
concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the termination orders as to
both Mother and Father, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother has two sons with Father, Co.M. and Ca.M. Her oldest son, C.S., has
a different father.2 In April 2015, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
received a report concerning Mother’s illegal drug use and neglect of her
Children. She and her Children had been living with friends at a home without
running water, food, or beds for her Children. Mother tested positive for
1
C.S. was born February 12, 2002; Co.M. was born May 15, 2005; and Ca.M. was born November 7, 2006.
2
C.S.’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights and is not involved in this appeal.
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benzodiazepines, marijuana, oxycodone, amphetamine, and methamphetamine
(“meth”), and her Children were removed and placed with their respective
fathers. A week later, DCS filed petitions seeking to adjudicate the Children as
children in need of services (“CHINS”). The trial court ordered Father to
remain substance-free and submit to random screens. Both Mother and Father
were present for the April 22, 2015 CHINS hearing, and all three of the
Children were designated as CHINS.
[3] On May 12, 2015, DCS acted on a report that Father had neglected and
abandoned his Children by leaving them with his mother, who was an
unapproved caregiver due to her drug use. DCS removed his Children and
placed them in foster care.
[4] On May 19, 2015, the trial court held the CHINS dispositional hearing. The
trial court ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse evaluation, follow
treatment recommendations, submit to random drug screens, refrain from drug
and alcohol use, and participate in supervised visitation. On a couple
occasions, Mother began parent aide services but cancelled numerous
appointments and eventually was discharged for lack of progress. She failed to
attend the scheduled assessments and began drug court in June 2015. She was
discharged from her treatment group for failure to attend.
[5] Father failed to appear for the dispositional hearing, and DCS was unable to
locate him. At that time, DCS learned that Father was the subject of an active
arrest warrant for felony forgery and theft. A second warrant was issued in a
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previous cause involving a meth conviction for which Father was serving
probation. Father’s whereabouts were unknown until July, when he was
apprehended by authorities and eventually brought to court from jail on a writ.
At a July 15, 2015 hearing, the trial court issued a parental participation order
requiring Father to obtain a substance abuse evaluation, follow treatment
recommendations, remain drug and alcohol free, submit to random drug
screens, and participate in supervised visitation. Father remained incarcerated
for three more months and was eventually placed in a forensic diversion
program.
[6] In August 2015, DCS filed an information for contempt against Mother based
on her failure to attend various assessments and appointments and
noncompliance with drug court for failure to attend Alcoholics
Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (“AA/NA”) meetings. Mother was found
to be in contempt and served ninety days of work release. She eventually
completed the treatment group sessions in October 2015. She did not
participate in individual therapy, and her case was closed in December 2015.
Thereafter, she relapsed and used hydrocodone, alcohol, tramadol, and
oxycodone, which prompted DCS to file another contempt petition. She was
referred for more services but failed to attend the assessment. Her child C.S.
was sent to a behavioral center in Columbus. Eventually, he was placed with
his brothers Co.M. and Ca.M. in the same foster home. Mother’s supervised
visits advanced to unsupervised visits. However, her positive drug screens
caused her visitation to revert to supervised visits, which eventually were
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discontinued in May 2016 due to lack of consistency. She had brief stints of
employment and lived with a friend and then her mother during the pendency
of the CHINS proceedings.
[7] In October 2015, Father was convicted of forgery, theft, and fraud, all as level 6
felonies. He was sentenced to two years but was assigned to a county treatment
center. In November and December 2015, he tested positive for alcohol. He
was admitted for inpatient treatment but was medically discharged after he
fractured his elbow. He enrolled in an outpatient treatment program but within
three months tested positive for meth. In the ensuing two months, he tested
positive twice for meth and once for alcohol, in violation of his probation
conditions. After each positive screen, he served a few days in jail. He declined
to participate in individual therapy recommended by his substance abuse
treatment provider. His visits were changed from supervised to unsupervised,
but his Children reported that he was taking them to his own mother’s house
and leaving them with her (unsupervised) so that he could sleep. By December
2015, he was allowed only supervised visits, and his visitation was closed out in
the spring of 2016.
[8] On May 16, 2016, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption by the foster
parents. Mother’s factfinding hearing was conducted on September 12 and 13,
2016. After one continuance on Father’s motion and a couple rescheduled
dates by the trial court, the trial court held Father’s factfinding hearing on
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September 9 and October 28, 2016. Father made another request for
continuance, which the trial court denied.
[9] On December 14, 2016, the trial court issued separate orders terminating the
parental rights of Mother and Father. Both parents appeal. We will address
their claims separately where appropriate. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The trial court acted within its discretion in
denying Father’s motion for continuance.
[10] Father challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. The
decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Rowlett v.
Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court
reaches a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the
reasonable and probable deductions that may be drawn therefrom. J.P., 14
N.E.3d at 790. Where the trial court denies a motion for continuance, an abuse
of discretion will be found if the moving party has demonstrated good cause for
granting the motion. Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619; see also Ind. Trial Rule 53.5
(stating that trial court has discretion to grant continuance on motion and
continuance “shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by
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affidavit or other evidence.”). No abuse of discretion will be found where the
moving party has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his
continuance motion. J.P., 14 N.E.3d at 790.
[11] Here, the record contains no written motion or affidavit establishing good cause
for Father’s request for continuance. Our review of the chronological case
summary shows that Father had already been granted at least one continuance
and that the proceedings had been rescheduled by the trial court on at least one
other occasion. Appellant’s App. at 48-50.3 Father’s disappearance during the
first two months of the CHINS proceedings also contributed to the protracted
proceedings in this case. The transcript of Father’s factfinding hearing contains
but one brief reference by the trial court to its denial of Father’s latest request
for continuance. See Tr. Vol. 1 at 60 (“Alright, and I know you had moved to –
actually prior to this trial starting – for a continuance, which I denied.”). As
best we can discern from his appellant’s brief, Father predicated this request for
continuance on his desire for more time to demonstrate his strides toward
parental fitness. Father’s Br. at 16. Although not entered in response to
Father’s previously-denied request for continuance, the following excerpt from
Finding 414 offers insight into the trial court’s reasons for denying Father’s
request:
3
The only appendix included in the record is Mother’s “Appellant’s Appendix.” It includes documents
pertinent to Father and Mother, collectively and individually, and we cite it as captioned.
4
Where the findings include personal designations other than those used throughout this decision, we use
the latter for clarity and consistency.
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If circumstances had been different and these children were living
with close relatives (so the delay wouldn’t have a material
adverse effect) maybe delaying this case for another six months,
so more of the future could be known, could have occurred. Or
maybe, if this termination case had been filed only after six
months, the Court could justify taking a wait and see approach.
Unfortunately, the CHINS cases are already [a] year and [a] half
old. The Court must rule according to the facts and the law as
they exist now.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105.
[12] Simply put, the record is devoid of evidence to indicate that Father made any
showing of good cause for a continuance. As such, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s denial of his request for continuance.
Section 2 – The trial court did not clearly err in terminating
the parental relationships of Mother and Father with each of
their children.
[13] Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s judgments terminating their parental relationships with their children.
Where they raise separate allegations, we will address them individually.
When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon in a case
involving the termination of parental rights, we first determine whether the
evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the
judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We will set aside the trial
court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family
& Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We neither reweigh evidence nor
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judge witness credibility. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Rather, we consider only the
evidence and inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. “[I]t is not enough
that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively
require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for
reversal.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).
[14] In Bester, our supreme court stated,
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and
raise their children. A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and
control of his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests. Indeed the parent-child
relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.
We recognize of course that parental interests are not absolute
and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining
the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.
Thus, parental rights may be terminated when the parents are
unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.
839 N.E.2d at 147 (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
[15] To obtain a termination of a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to
establish in pertinent part:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
….
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
[16] In recognition of the seriousness with which we address parental termination
cases, Indiana has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard. Ind.
Code § 31-37-14-2; Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367,
377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Clear and convincing evidence need
not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the
child’s survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by
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the respondent parent’s custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind.
2013) (citation omitted).
Section 2.1 – Mother and Father have failed to demonstrate
clear error concerning the reasonable probability of
unremedied conditions.
A. Mother
[17] Mother asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to the
Children’s removal will not be remedied. Where, as here, Mother does not
challenge any of the trial court’s findings, we simply determine whether the
unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t
of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. When
assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions that led to a
child’s removal will not be remedied, we must consider not only the initial basis
for the child’s removal but also the bases for continued placement outside the
home. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Moreover, “the trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his [or her]
children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001), trans. denied. “Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court
also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the
probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. In making its case,
“DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, [it] need establish
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only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not
change.” In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In
determining reasonable probability of unremedied conditions, the court may
properly consider evidence of a parent’s substance abuse, criminal history, lack
of employment or adequate housing, history of neglect, and failure to provide
support. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[18] Here, the trial court entered extensive unchallenged findings concerning the
reasonable probability of Mother remedying the conditions that led to her
Children’s removal. With respect to treatment for substance abuse, the court
found that she completed inpatient treatment but failed to follow the
recommendations after her release. She also failed to meet with her parent aide
and failed to attend AA/NA meetings, which led to her first contempt of court
citation. When the court gave her a chance to purge herself of the contempt
finding by complying with its orders, she failed to comply and was sentenced to
ninety days incarcerated in a county work release facility. After her release, she
abused prescription drugs (without prescriptions) and continued to fail drug
screens, which resulted in a second contempt petition. Even then, she
continued her drug use and was discharged from drug court for unsatisfactory
progress. She enrolled in counseling but failed to attend appointments. “As of
the date of the termination hearing, Mother had not successfully completed
substance abuse treatment.” See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 65 (Finding 11).
Even after the permanency plan had been changed to termination, she was
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discharged from an inpatient program for “giving another patient a prescription
sleep aid.” See id. (Finding 13). She continued to snort opiates and struggled to
maintain stable housing and employment. “As of the date of the termination
trials, Mother was not employed and admitted that she was unable to provide
for the basic necessities of the children if they were returned to her
immediately.” See id. at 66 (Finding 16). The trial court ultimately found:
20. Mother has continued to struggle with sobriety during the
pending CHINS matter. Mother admits that she has struggled
with sobriety and addiction, but her actions have shown that very
little has changed since the initial removal of the Children.
Mother was actively using benzodiazepines in April, 2015; and
she continued to use opiates and benzodiazepines through June,
2016, despite receiving multiple services aimed at dealing with
her addiction, getting stable housing and becoming employed.
The Court ordered Mother to participate in the most intensive
and supportive service available – the Parents’ Drug Court, but
Mother simply refused to put in the work necessary to overcome
her addiction. Mother has simply failed to overcome her
addiction, mental health and stability issues.
Id.
[19] The Children were initially removed from Mother due to her substance abuse
and neglect in the form of living with a friend in a home without any running
water, food, or beds for the Children. Thereafter, her habitual patterns involved
persistent use of illegal drugs, brief stints of employment, and living with friends
or her mother. Although she initially made strides in her visitation with the
Children, her pattern of drug abuse was one of relapse and failed drug screens.
She had two contempt petitions filed against her based on these failed drugs
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screens. As for services, her prevailing pattern was one of initial compliance
followed by a failure to complete them. This resulted in many of the services
being closed out due to lack of progress. Other than her acquisition of a Section
8 apartment, she simply has made no positive strides. The record supports the
trial court’s conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions
that led to her Children’s removal will not be remedied. See McBride, 798
N.E.2d at 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
B. Father
[20] Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to his
Children’s removal will not be remedied.5 He correctly observes that the
Children’s initial removal was largely due to Mother’s acts and omissions.
However, as the trial court observed in its findings, just a few weeks after his
Children were placed with him, he left them with his mother, whom he knew to
be an unapproved caregiver due to her own drug abuse. Immediately
thereafter, he was the subject of felony arrest warrants for forgery and a
probation violation, and he disappeared for two months. This contributed to
the chaos surrounding his Children’s living situation and resulted in their
5
Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to his Children’s well-being. Indiana Code
Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires DCS to prove only one of the three circumstances listed. Because we find
no error concerning the reasonable probability of unremedied conditions, we need not address the threat to
the children’s well-being.
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removal and placement in foster care. The trial court emphasized the negative
effect of Father’s disappearance on his Children in Finding 22:
As previously stated, Father’s whereabouts during the first two
(2) months in the underlying CHINS matters were unknown.
Father testified at trial that he was attempting to get his financial
affairs in order and had planned on turning himself in. The
Court believes his excuse was a hallow [sic] excuse. Father was
eventually arrested and brought to Court from jail on July 15,
2015. Father’s abandonment of his Children weighs heavy with
this Court. The Court doubts whether Father ever would have
come to Court or provided any assistance to his Children, but for
him being caught and arrested.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 101.
[21] The trial court also emphasized in its findings that over the course of the
CHINS proceedings, Father failed numerous drug screens, testing positive for
meth and alcohol. For each screen that he failed, he was jailed for a few days
for violating probation. Though he recently made some strides, especially when
it comes to sobriety, he nevertheless tested positive for methamphetamine six
days after having been advised of the termination proceedings. See id. at 103
(Finding 33). Most of his “remarkable change” came shortly before the
termination factfinding hearing. Id. The trial court was within its discretion to
consider the timing of his improvements and weigh them accordingly. See
D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 181-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(in balancing parent’s recent improvements against habitual patterns of
conduct, trial court has discretion to “weigh a parent’s prior history more
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heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination”), trans. denied (2015).
Father’s historical patterns include drug relapses as well as general disrespect
for the many court orders, resulting in his being incarcerated for four probation
violations. His criminal history is not minor, and includes multiple felony
convictions, including class B felony burglary, class D felony theft, level 6
felony forgery with intent to deceive, and several level 6 felony drug-related
convictions. With respect to the reasonable probability of unremedied
conditions, the trial court ultimately found as follows:
41. After weighing all of the facts and circumstances in this case,
the Court finds that Father has failed to adequately remedy the
situation that brought about the removal and continued removal
of his Children. The Court finds that Father has at least
temporarily kept his addiction in check, but Father has simply
run out of time to cure the instability issues and show the
consistency necessary that would convince this Court that these
first steps will lead to real permanent change, which is essential
so these children[’s] well-beings are no longer threatened by their
relationship with Father. There certainly is a reasonable
probability that Father’s instability and/or drug usage which has
put us in this case has not been remedied at this moment. The
relapse rate for an addict like Father is incredibly high, [and] the
recidivism rate for a person with Father’s criminal record is also
high. A relatively new job, a new home, an old girlfriend and
sobriety for the first time in approximately a decade are a lot to
handle and there is nothing to suggest Father can handle all of
these things for any significant length of time. If circumstances
had been different and these children were living with close
relatives (so the delay wouldn’t have a material adverse effect)
maybe delaying this case for another six months, so more of the
future could be known, could have occurred. Or maybe, if this
termination case had been filed only after six months, the Court
could justify taking a wait and see approach. Unfortunately, the
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CHINS cases are already a year and a half old. The Court must
rule according to the facts and the law as they exist now.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105.
[22] In short, Father has a pervasive pattern of criminal conduct, probation
violations, and substance abuse. He also has a history of instability when it
comes to employment and housing. All these circumstances were properly
considered in determining the reasonable probability of unremedied conditions.
See McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199. Father’s arguments amount to invitations to
reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we may not and will
not do. We find no clear error here.
Section 2.2 – Mother and Father have failed to establish clear
error concerning the Children’s best interests.
[23] Mother and Father both assert that the trial court clearly erred in concluding
that termination is in the best interests of the Children. Although not
dispositive, permanency and stability are key considerations in determining the
best interests of a child. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). A
determination of a child’s best interests should be based on the totality of the
circumstances. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[24] Although Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings on best
interests, Father challenges the following:
43. The Children are strongly bonded with the foster parents;
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44. The Children are doing well in the care of the current foster
parents;
….
46. It is in the best interests of the Children to be adopted due to
the inability of Father to provide appropriate care and
supervision for the Children;
47. DCS and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA)
believe that adoption by foster parents is in the Children’s best
interest. These children need to be kept together as their bond
with each other is very strong. The Court finds that adoption by
the foster parents is in the Children’s best interest.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105-06.6
[25] Here, the totality of the circumstances shows that the parents, though making
some strides, simply could not maintain any improvement due to their deeply
ingrained patterns of drug abuse, criminal conduct (particularly in Father’s
case), and instability. Meanwhile, the Children, now reunited as a group with
the addition of C.S., are thriving in their preadoptive foster home. The foster
parents, initially willing to adopt Co.M. and Ca.M., brought C.S. into their
home and indicated their willingness to adopt all three as a group. DCS Family
Case Manager Hilary Bemis and CASA Shannon Schultz both testified that
termination followed by adoption by the foster parents is in the Children’s best
6
Father also challenges Findings 56 and 58. Finding 56 is merely a (correct) statement of the law, and
Finding 58 is simply the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 107-08.
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interests. “[T]he testimony of service providers may support a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.
[26] The trial court specifically found adoption by the foster parents to be in the
Children’s best interests, reasoning that all the Children “need to be kept
together” due to their “very strong” sibling bond. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 105-06 (Finding 47). Father posits that this amounts to a finding that sibling
rights prevail over parental rights. We disagree, believing that the strong sibling
bond is simply a component of the totality of the circumstances considered in
determining best interests, as is the fact that Father’s criminal record prohibits
him from adopting his Children’s half sibling, C.S., with whom Father has no
parental relationship. Father’s arguments amount to invitations to reweigh
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we may not and will not do.
Neither Father nor Mother has demonstrated clear error in the trial court’s
conclusion that termination and adoption are in the Children’s best interests.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[27] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.S., Co.M., Ca.M. (Minor Children), and A.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion