IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROY A. DAY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) C.A. No.: N16C-10-088 EMD
v. )
)
WILLIAM LOUCKS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING THIS
CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff Roy A. Day. Mr. Day contends that Defendants
William Loucks, Anthony J. DeSantis, and 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company (“21st
Century”) breached a contract between Mr. Day and the Defendants. Mr. Day also asserts
various tort claims. Mr. Day seeks over $125,000,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000,000 in punitive damages. The contract dispute purports to arise out of the claims
handling process between 21st Century and Mr. Day over damages to a 2010 Hyundai Accent
and a 2015 Chevrolet Spark.
Mr. Day filed the Complaint in this civil action on October 13, 2016. On October 31,
2016, Mr. Day filed an Amended Complaint. According to the docket in this civil action, the
Sheriff for New Castle County filed a notice of service of the Complaint on 21st Century on
December 28, 2016. The docket also reflects that Mr. Loucks and Mr. DeSantis have not been
served with either the Complaint or the Amended Complaint. Mr. Day does not appear to have
properly served 21st Century with a copy of the Amended Complaint. 21st Century moved to
dismiss the Complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss”) on February 1, 2017. Mr. Day responded (the
“Response”) to the Motion to Dismiss on May 4, 2017.
Through the Motion to Dismiss, 21st Century makes two basic arguments for dismissal.
First, 21st Century contends that the Court should dismiss the Complaint because Mr. Day has
been enjoined from filing any such complaint by Federal and state courts in Delaware and
Florida. Second, 21st Century claims, under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) and 10 Del. C. § 8803, that the
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Mr. Day opposes the relief sought in the Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Day argues that the
Court does not have “competent jurisdiction” over the Motion to Dismiss because that motion
seeks dismissal of the Complaint, but the Amended Complaint is the controlling pleading. Mr.
Day contends that the Court is the correct venue of this civil action as he believes that 21st
Century, Mr. Loucks and Mr. DeSantis all reside in Delaware. Mr. Day next addresses 21st
Century’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6) arguments, claiming that he has stated causes of action upon
which relief can be granted. Finally, Mr. Day argues that he has not been enjoined from filing
legal actions in “forty-eight contiguous States, and the two non-contiguous State and Federal
Court.” Mr. Day also seeks sanctions against 21st Century with those sanctions as follows:
$10,000 to the Delaware Environmental Protection Agency (because of the use of “dead-tree”
paper); $10,000 to the Prothonotary (because Defendants have made this civil action more
litigious); and $10,000 to the New Castle County Sheriff’s Office for service of process issues.
PREVIOUS LITIGATIONS OVER SAME OR SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS
After receiving the Motion to Dismiss, the Court proceeded to review the various
lawsuits involving both Mr. Day and 21st Century, including those cases appellate history.
Specifically, the Court reviewed the following civil actions: Roy Day v. Loucks, et al., Civ. No.
2
15-541—LPS (D. Del.); Roy Day v. 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company, Civ. No. 12-
1096—LPS (D. Del); Day v. 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company, Civ. No. 8:13-2048-
T-36AEP (M.D. Fla.).1 For purposes of this decision, these cases will be referred to as the Day
v. Loucks action and the Day v. 21st Century action.
The Court arrived at important conclusions from reviewing these cases. First, Mr. Day
has unsuccessfully sought relief on claims substantially similar to the claims asserted in the
Complaint and the Amended Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware (the “Delaware District Court”) and the United States District Court for the District of
Florida (the “Florida District Court”). There are differences—e.g., the claim relating to the 2015
Chevrolet Spark—but, overall, the Complaint and Amended Complaint are substantially similar
to the claims made in the Day v. Loucks action and the Day v. 21st Century action. Second, Mr.
Day is subject to orders imposing litigation injunctions and procedures regarding the filing of
claims that arise out of the facts plead in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint. In order to
proceed on the types of claims raised in the Complaint and the Amended Complaint (at least in
Federal Court), Mr. Day must provide proof and documentation that Mr. Day had paid the
monetary sanctions imposed upon him under In re Day, Case No. 95-mc-143 (M.D. Fla.).2
1
See Day v. Loucks, 636 Fed. Appx. 830 (3rd Cir. 2016); Day v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., No. 14-14999-E
(11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) (a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to the Motion to Dismiss); Day v. Toner, 549
Fed. Appx 66 (3rd Cir. 2014); Day v. Loucks, Civ. No. 15-541—LPS, 2016 WL 3129618 (D. Del. June 1, 2016);
Day v. Loucks, Civ. No. 15-541—LPS, 2015 WL 12868205 (D. Del. Aug. 6, 2015); Day v. 21st Century Centennial
Ins. Co., Civ. No. 8:14-2048-T-36AEP (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2014) (a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to the
Motion to Dismiss); Day v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., Civ. No. 12—1096—LPS, 2014 WL 3909533 (D. Del.
Aug. 11, 2014); Day v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., Civ. No. 12—1096—LPS, 2014 WL 1125418 (D. Del.
Mar. 17, 2014).
2
See Day v. Loucks, 636 Fed. Appx. at 830-31; Day v. Loucks, Civ. No. 15-541—LPS, 2015 WL 12868205, at *2.
3
Third, Mr. Day continues to file complaints in various courts, including this Court, in an effort to
avoid the conditions and sanctions imposed upon him by the Florida District Court.3
DISCUSSION
Delaware courts recognize the principle of comity. The Court may follow the doctrine of
comity, which applies when two courts have “concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter.”4
The doctrine is not a legal rule but “an expression of one state's entirely voluntary decision to
defer to the policy of another, especially in the face of a strong assertion of interest by the other
jurisdiction.”5 A court may use its discretion to stay or dismiss a matter if the same matter is
pending in a different court because a court “should not assume to disturb another court's
disposition of a controversy unless there are good reasons for doing so.”6
The Delaware Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of comity in two related
cases, First Health Settlement Class v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Company and Corvel
Corporation v. Homeland Insurance Company of New York.7 First Health depended on whether
the Delaware Supreme Court should defer to an interpretation of a Louisiana statute by the
Louisiana Court of Appeals from collateral litigation.8 In a 3-2 decision with a dissent, the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Louisiana court’s interpretation, instead of using Delaware
law.9 Both the majority and the dissent addressed the doctrine of comity. The Court
acknowledged that “[c]omity permits one state to give effect to the laws of a sister state, not out
3
Two opinions have noted that Mr. Day is continuing to file actions in jurisdictions other than Florida in order to
avoid the sanctions imposed by the Florida District Court. Day v. Loucks, 636 Fed. Appx. at 831; Day v. Loucks,
Civ. No. 15-541—LPS, 2015 WL 12868205, at *2
4
16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 11 (2015).
5
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
6
Id.
7
Corvel Corp. v. Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2015 WL 1021459 (Del. Mar. 6, 2015); First Health Settlement Class
v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1021443 (Del. Mar. 6, 2015).
8
First Health, 2015 WL 1021443, at *3-6.
9
Id. at *4-5.
4
of obligation, but out of respect and deference.”10 The dissent agreed that comity is important
and that courts should try to avoid conflicting rulings.11 The dissent disagreed with the majority
because the Louisiana court should have shown comity to Delaware courts12 and because
following what the Louisiana court decided would be “demonstrably unfair” to the parties.13 The
Corvel decision is nearly identical to the First Health decision.14
The Court is dismissing this civil action without prejudice under the principle of comity.
The Delaware District Court and the Florida District Court have strongly asserted an interest in
Mr. Day’s conduct in vexatious litigation, especially against 21st Century, Mr. Loucks, and Mr.
DeSantis. The Court understands that this is not a situation where it is deferring to the state law
of another jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court is not adopting the entire litigation injunction
imposed in the Federal Courts. The Court is instead giving effect to the procedures implemented
by the Delaware District Court and the Florida District Court, not out of obligation, but out of
respect and deference. The Court cannot allow Mr. Day to avoid the procedures implemented in
Federal Court by merely bringing the same claim here that he could not pursue in Roy Day v.
Loucks, et al., Civ. No. 15-541—LPS (D. Del.); Roy Day v. 21st Century Centennial Insurance
Company, Civ. No. 12-1096—LPS (D. Del); and Day v. 21st Century Centennial Insurance
Company, Civ. No. 8:13-2048-T-36AEP (M.D. Fla.).
The Court’s decision does not leave Mr. Day without a right or a remedy. Mr. Day can
bring his suit—here, in the Delaware District Court or in the Florida District Court—if he
follows the instructions provided to him by Chief District Court Judge Stark: when filing the
10
Id. at *4.
11
Id. at *6.
12
“Had the Louisiana trial court itself showed comity by staying its hand after the Delaware Superior Court made
the first ruling in the coverage issue and letting this case run its course to finality, the conflict the Majority Opinion
is trying to avoid would not have arisen in the first instance.” Id. at *12.
13
Id.
14
Corvel, 2015 WL 1021459.
5
action, provide proof and documentation that Mr. Day paid the monetary sanctions imposed
upon him pursuant to In re Day, Case No. 95-mc-143 (M.D. Fla.). The Court cannot, however,
let this civil action proceed here when it is clear that Mr. Day is trying to avoid the rulings of
other courts of competent jurisdictions whose decisions were upheld on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Court is DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE this civil action. Mr. Day can
reinstitute this civil action by providing proof and documentation that Mr. Day paid the monetary
sanctions imposed upon him pursuant to In re Day, Case No. 95-mc-143 (M.D. Fla.).
The Prothonotary is directed to provide any new complaints filed by Roy Day to this
judicial officer so that the Court can review whether Mr. Day is in compliance with the dictates
of this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: July 28, 2017
Wilmington, Delaware
/s/ Eric M. Davis
Eric M. Davis, Judge
cc: The Prothonotary
Roy A. Day
Tracy A. Burleigh, Esq.
6