RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0585-15T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.R. and V.G.,
Defendants,
and
I.J.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
IN THE MATTER OF A.G., a
minor.
__________________________
Submitted January 24, 2017 – Decided March 8, 2017
Before Judges Reisner and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson
County, Docket No. FN-09-165-13.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Beth Anne Hahn, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Julie
B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor (Cory H. Cassar,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this Title 9 case, defendant I.J. appeals from a March 18,
2013 fact finding order. We affirm substantially for the reasons
stated by Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro in her oral opinion issued
on March 18, 2013, at the close of the hearing.
The essential facts are set forth in Judge DeCastro's opinion.
To summarize, defendant refused to provide food for her fifteen-
year-old stepdaughter, A.G., who was an insulin dependent
diabetic. Defendant admitted to a worker from the Division of
Child Protection and Permanency (Division) that she hated the
girl, thought she was a child of the devil, and refused to cook
for her. She admitted that when she cooked for the family, she
refused to give the child any of the food, and was angry when the
child ate some food from her father's plate.
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The Division also presented testimony from a school nurse
concerning her observation of the girl's weight loss and elevated
blood sugar levels. The nurse recounted the girl's statements
that her stepmother refused to let her eat meals at the home. The
nurse explained that the girl needed to eat regular meals, monitor
her blood sugar levels, and take insulin, in order to avoid going
into shock and collapsing.
According to the Division worker, the girl told her that
defendant took her house keys, which prevented her from getting
into the house in the evening and obtaining either food or her
insulin. The worker determined for herself that no one was at the
home at the time and the girl was unable to get into the house.
As a result, the worker took the girl to a pharmacy and bought her
some insulin.
Defendant did not testify or present any evidence at the fact
finding hearing.
Citing G.S. v. Department of Human Services, 157 N.J. 161,
177 (1999), Judge DeCastro concluded that defendant committed
wonton, intentional, and grossly negligent conduct by depriving
an insulin dependent diabetic child of food and locking her out
of the house. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) (defining an abused
or neglected child). After reviewing the record, we conclude that
Judge DeCastro's decision is supported by substantial credible
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evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211
N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012).
On this appeal, defendant attempts to minimize her own
conduct, arguing that the girl should have been responsible for
making her own meals with whatever food she could find in the
house, and she should have been responsible for managing her own
medical condition.1 Defendant presents the following points of
argument:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT I.J.
ABUSED OR NEGLECTED A.G.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A.G. LACKED ADEQUATE FOOD
BECAUSE SHE DID NOT HAVE A COOKED
DINNER WITH HER FAMILY
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A LACK OF A COOKED DINNER WITH
HER FAMILY HARMED A.G.
In light of the record, defendant's appellate contentions are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
1
Defendant's arguments improperly rely on self-serving statements
she made to a psychologist in May 2013. The psychologist's report
was not introduced at the March 2013 fact finding hearing.
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