MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 31 2017, 8:35 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Keith A. Foor, II Nathan H. Blaske
Hebron, Indiana Graydon Head & Ritchey LLP
Cincinnati, Ohio
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Keith A. Foor, II, July 31, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
64A03-1701-MF-149
v. Appeal from the Porter Superior
Court
PennyMac Loan Services, LLC, The Honorable Mary R. Harper,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
64D05-1601-MF-120
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
[1] PennyMac Loan Services, LLC filed a mortgage-foreclosure action against
Keith Foor II and then moved for summary judgment on all issues (including
on the counterclaims asserted by Foor). The trial court granted PennyMac’s
motion, and Foor appeals. Foor does not deny that he is in default for failing to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1701-MF-149 | July 31, 2017 Page 1 of 2
make mortgage payments. The only clear argument he raises on appeal is that
PennyMac failed to prove that it is in possession of the original promissory note
and that, therefore, it is not entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. We disagree.
One of PennyMac’s foreclosure-operations supervisors provided an affidavit in
which she stated that “PennyMac has been in continuous possession and/or
control of the original Note since prior to the filing of its Complaint in this
case,” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 72, and that a copy of the note was attached as
Exhibit A to the affidavit. Moreover, PennyMac’s attorney brought with him
to the summary-judgment hearing documents that he said were the original
note and mortgage. The trial court personally inspected the documents and
said, “I will tell you that the note and the mortgage that have been given to me
today appear to have original signatures on them.” Tr. p. 18. On appeal, Foor
has not directed us to any designated evidence that might have created a
genuine issue of material fact on that point, so we affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of PennyMac. See Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).1
[2] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
1
Foor’s opening and reply briefs refer to other aspects of the case, such as his counterclaims, the affidavit of
PennyMac’s foreclosure-operations supervisor, and discrepancies between certain documents relied upon by
PennyMac. To the extent Foor was attempting to raise separate arguments relating to these issues, he has
failed to develop them with cogent reasoning, citations to relevant legal authority, and/or citations to the
record on appeal, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Therefore, any such arguments are
waived. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 n.6 (Ind. 2014).
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