MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Aug 07 2017, 8:40 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ball Eggleston, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Monika P. Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mitchell R. Fontaine, August 7, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A05-1612-CR-2851
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court.
The Honorable Laura W. Zeman,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
79D04-1607-F6-625
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Appellant Mitchell R. Fontaine was found guilty of possession of paraphernalia
1
with intent to introduce a controlled substance into his body, among other
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) (2015).
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charges. Concluding the evidence was sufficient to support Fontaine’s
conviction of possession of paraphernalia, we affirm it. On the other hand, his
sentence is longer than the law permits. We therefore reverse his sentence and
remand so that the trial court can fashion a new sentence.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Fontaine and fourteen-year-old A.H. were found by sheriff’s deputies asleep in
a vehicle at the end of a dead-end road. In A.H.’s purse were marijuana and a
metal pipe, both of which A.H. admitted belonged to her. Her purse also
contained pills and a bag containing drug paraphernalia, all of which Fontaine
had asked her to hold for him.
[3] Based upon this incident, Fontaine was charged with maintaining a common
2
nuisance, a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Level 6
3
felony; possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and contributing
4
to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. A jury found Fontaine
guilty as charged, and the court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of six
years.
2
Ind. Code § 35-45-1-5(c) (2016).
3
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7(a) (2014).
4
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2014).
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Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[4] Fontaine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence about his conviction for
possession of paraphernalia. In reviewing such challenges, we neither reweigh
the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29
N.E.3d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a
reasonable fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d
501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
[5] To convict Fontaine of possession of paraphernalia, the State must have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Fontaine knowingly or intentionally (2)
possessed an instrument, a device, or another object (3) that he intended to use
for introducing a controlled substance into his body. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-
8.3(b)(1). Fontaine challenges the evidence about his intent to introduce a
controlled substance into his body.
[6] Fontaine cites Taylor v. State, 256 Ind. 170, 267 N.E.2d 383 (1971), Bradley v.
State, 153 Ind. App. 421, 287 N.E.2d 759 (1972), and Sluder v. State, 997 N.E.2d
1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In Taylor, a search of the defendant’s purse revealed
a hypodermic type needle, an eye dropper covered with an unknown sticky
substance, a bottle cap that had been burned on the bottom, and an empty
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Excedrin bottle. Noting there was no evidence of flight or other behavior
indicating consciousness of guilt, previous convictions related to narcotic drug
use, or current narcotics use by the defendant, our Supreme Court held the
evidence was insufficient to show intent to administer narcotic drugs.
[7] The defendant in Bradley argued the State’s evidence showed only that he
possessed instruments adapted for the injection of narcotics into the body
without proof of his intent to do so. Bradley initially fled from police and, in
doing so, threw an object to the ground. In the discarded object, police found
an eye dropper with a needle attached. A search of Bradley produced a bottle
cap with burns on the bottom. This Court reversed, saying that Bradley’s flight,
possession of the adapted instruments, and attempted concealment were no
more than consciousness of guilt or a suspicious circumstance.
[8] Fontaine also relies on Sluder, a more recent decision in which we reversed for
lack of evidence of intent to use the syringe found in his back pocket to
introduce a controlled substance into his body. The panel stated that although
intent to introduce a controlled substance may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence – – like track marks on the defendant’s arms, past drug use, previous
drug convictions, or the presence of drugs – – the State had presented no such
evidence.
[9] Here, A.H. testified that Fontaine gave her his pills and told her to keep them in
her purse. He also gave her a bag that contained lighters, a spoon, hypodermic
needles, razor blades, and a belt. One of the officers testified that, based on his
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training and experience, a spoon and lighters are used to cook drugs, the belt is
used as a tourniquet on the arm to restrict the blood flow and make it easier to
see the veins, and needles are used for injecting drugs into the veins. The officer
also testified that Fontaine identified the pills as being Klonopin, a brand name
for the generic drug clonazepam. In addition, the parties entered an Agreed
Stipulation at trial showing that the pills tested positive as clonazepam, a
controlled substance. Another officer testified at trial that when A.H. was being
questioned about the items in the bag Fontaine had given her, Fontaine
commented, “I thought you guys couldn’t search juveniles.” Tr. p. 92.
[10] In Perkins v. State, 57 N.E.3d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), the defendant was found
to have syringe needles and a bottle cap containing heroin residue hidden in a
cigarette pack. He fled from officers and, when apprehended, stated, “[I]t’s not
mine, it’s not mine.” Id. at 863. A panel of this Court determined that the
evidence of intent, consisting of possession of narcotics and instruments with
which to introduce a controlled substance into his body, was sufficient to
sustain Perkins’ conviction. The Court also held that his flight and statement to
police were evidence of consciousness of guilt.
[11] The assemblage of facts in this case pointing toward intent to inject are, if
anything, more comprehensive than those in Perkins, and much more
compelling than the evidence in Taylor, Bradley, and Sluder. Fontaine had in his
possession instruments used to introduce drugs into the body as well as a
controlled substance. Whereas Perkins had merely residue, a trace amount of
narcotics, Fontaine had the actual controlled substance contained in the pills.
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He also had needles, lighters, a spoon, and a belt — everything needed to cook
the drugs and introduce them into the body. In addition, the State presented
clear evidence of Fontaine’s consciousness of guilt in his attempt to conceal
both the paraphernalia and the drugs with A.H. because he believed the police
could not search juveniles.
II. Sentence
[12] Fontaine also argues that his aggregate six-year sentence violates Indiana Code
section 35-50-1-2 (2016), which provides, in pertinent part:
(b) As used in this section, “episode of criminal conduct” means
offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related
in time, place, and circumstance.
...
(d) Except [in circumstances not relevant here], the total of the
consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is
sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of
criminal conduct may not exceed the following:
(1) If the most serious crime for which the defendant is
sentenced is a Level 6 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of
imprisonment may not exceed four (4) years.
[13] Fontaine was sentenced to two years on each of his two Level 6 felony
convictions and to one year on each of his two Class A misdemeanor
convictions, all of which the court ordered to be served consecutively for an
aggregate sentence of six years. As this statute applies to consecutive sentences
that involve misdemeanor convictions as well as sentences that include
suspended time in the calculation, Fontaine’s sentence violates the limits in
Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d). See Purdy v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1091 (Ind. Ct.
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App. 2000) (determining that consecutive sentencing limitation applies to
misdemeanors), trans. denied; Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932 (Ind. 2005) (holding
that period of suspended sentence must be included when calculating maximum
aggregate sentence under section 35-50-1-2).
Conclusion
[14] For the reasons stated, we conclude the State presented evidence sufficient to
support Fontaine’s conviction of possession of paraphernalia. We further
conclude that Fontaine’s sentence violates Indiana Code section 35-50-1-
2(d)(1).
[15] Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part with instructions to
resentence Fontaine within the statutory limits.
Baker, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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Mitchell R. Fontaine v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion