NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3395-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHANNON WHOOLEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________________________
Argued January 18, 2017 – Decided August 8, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa, Suter, and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County,
Docket Nos. W-2015-1201-475, S-2015-1201-476
and W-2015-1337-524.
Monica Lucinda do Outeiro, Assistant
Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant
(Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. do Outeiro, of
counsel and on the brief).
Leslie B. Posnock argued the cause for
respondent (Schwartz & Posnock, attorneys;
Ms. Posnock, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By our leave granted, the Monmouth County Prosecutor's
Office (MCPO) appeals from the March 4, 2016 order entered by
Monmouth County Assignment Judge Lisa P. Thornton, granting
defendant Shannon Whooley's motion to consolidate two disorderly
persons offenses involving marijuana possession pending in
municipal courts in Carteret, Middlesex County, and Ocean
Township, Monmouth County. Defendant sought consolidation in
order to apply for a conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:36A-1, a disposition which would be precluded if the two
offenses were prosecuted separately.
Defendant's motion for consolidation was unopposed by both
municipal court judges, both municipal prosecutors, the
Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office, and the Middlesex County
Assignment Judge. The MCPO was the only party to object to
consolidation.
Rule 7:8-4 addresses consolidation of municipal court
matters:
The court may order two or more complaints to
be tried together if the offenses arose out
of the same facts and circumstances,
regardless of the number of defendants. In
all other matters, the court may consolidate
complaints for trial with the consent of the
persons charged. Complaints originating in
two or more municipalities may be consolidated
for trial only with the approval of the
appropriate Assignment Judge, who shall
designate the municipal court in which trial
is to proceed. A party seeking consolidation
of complaints originating in different
municipalities shall file a written motion for
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that relief directly with the Assignment
Judge.
MCPO argues consolidation is not appropriate as the two
matters did not arise "out of the same facts and circumstances."
MCPO also urges a strictly literal interpretation of the "for
trial only" provision, and maintains consolidation is not
available for negotiated dispositions such as a guilty plea, or
for a diversion to conditional discharge.
We begin by noting that "[a] trial court's interpretations
of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995). Our review of the motion judge's interpretation of a
court rule is de novo. Wash. Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey
City, 416 N.J. Super. 555, 560 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied,
205 N.J. 318 (2011). We must "ascribe to the [words of the
rule] their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read
them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to
the [court rules] as a whole[.]" DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.
477, 492 (2005) (citations omitted).
While the first sentence of Rule 7:8-4 appears to limit
consolidation to matters arising "out of the same facts and
circumstances," when read in conjunction with the next sentence,
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it is apparent that the restriction is limited to instances
where the persons charged do not consent to consolidation. The
second sentence refers to "all other matters" and suggests that
complaints may be consolidated "with the consent of the persons
charged." R. 7:8-4. When read in context, the Rule allows for
consolidation of municipal complaints when the offenses do not
arise from the same facts and circumstances, as long as the
defendant consents. Because defendant not only consented but
sought consolidation here, we reject MCPO's argument that
consolidation is precluded because the two matters did not arise
out of the same facts and circumstances.
MCPO's second argument, that a court may only consolidate
complaints "for trial," has a superficial appeal but does not
withstand close scrutiny. Applying this interpretation would,
for example, preclude the parties from resolving a consolidated
matter with a negotiated plea agreement. "[W]here a literal
interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary
to public policy, the spirit of the law should control." Turner
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 N.J. 75, 84 (1999) (citing Watt
v. Mayor & Council of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274, 278 (1956)).
"[W]hen a 'literal interpretation of individual statutory terms
or provisions' would lead to results 'inconsistent with the
overall purpose of the statute,' that interpretation should be
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rejected." Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001) (quoting
Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998)).
In addition, and as Judge Thornton noted, her order
granting consolidation only permits defendant to seek a
conditional discharge. If the municipal judge determines that
granting a conditional discharge under N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1 is
inappropriate, the case would, in fact, be consolidated for
trial.
Consolidation comports with the "goals of uniformity and
proportionality" in sentencing. State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558,
573 (1989). Denial of consolidation here could result in
"disparate [treatment] for very similar crimes committed within
a relatively brief period of time." Id. at 577. The rules for
consolidation seek to avoid this kind of "idiosyncratic
sentencing." Ibid.
Affirmed.
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