NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 10 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSLYN DARLING, AKA Robin Hughes, No. 16-55132
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-07086-RGK-SP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 8, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Rosyln Darling, aka Robin Hughes, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging civil rights violations in
connection with her arrest and detention related to a domestic dispute with her
roommate. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. See
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir. 2002) (summary judgment); Lee v. City
of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
1. The district court properly dismissed Darling’s claims for inadequate
medical care and unconstitutional conditions of confinement because under any
potentially applicable standard, Darling failed to allege facts sufficient to show that
defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to her health or safety. See
Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To establish a prison official’s
deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that the official was aware of a risk to
the inmate’s health or safety and that the official deliberately disregarded the risk.”);
Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee’s
claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth
Amendment, but same standards apply); cf. Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833
F.3d 1060, 1067-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (elements of Fourteenth Amendment
pretrial detainee failure-to-protect claim).
2. The district court properly dismissed Darling’s equal protection claim
because Darling failed to allege facts sufficient to show intentional discrimination
on the basis of gender. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686 (a § 1983 equal protection claim
requires showing “that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate
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against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. The district court properly dismissed Darling’s excessive force claim
because Darling failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants used
force that was objectively unreasonable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.
2466, 2473 (2015) (elements of excessive force claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
4. The district court properly dismissed Darling’s Fourth Amendment claims
related to her June 2010 arrest because she failed to allege facts sufficient to show
that the officers did not have probable cause for the arrest. See United States v.
Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining probable cause and explaining
that it is an objective standard); Dubner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964
(9th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff must allege there is no probable cause in order to prevail
on a § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest).
5. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Darling’s false
arrest and malicious prosecution claims related to her August 2010 arrest because
Darling failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants
had probable cause for the arrest. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 919
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (setting forth elements of malicious prosecution claim
under § 1983); Dubner, 266 F.3d at 964 (a plaintiff must show there is no probable
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cause in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest); see also Smith v.
Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 937-39 (9th Cir. 2011) (probable cause constitutes a defense
to false arrest and malicious prosecution under federal law).
6. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Darling’s
excessive bail claim because Darling failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants “deliberately or recklessly misled” a judicial officer in
connection with Darling’s bail. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
663-64 (9th Cir. 2007).
7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Darling’s motion
for a discovery cut-off extension and postponement of the litigation because Darling
failed to demonstrate good cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and “good cause”
requirement to modify a scheduling order).
8. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Darling’s request
for recusal because Darling failed to establish any ground for recusal. See United
States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for recusal).
9. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
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We reject as unsupported Darling’s contentions regarding judicial misconduct
and corruption.
Darling’s request for mediation, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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