NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 15 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
M.C., a minor, by and through his parent No. 16-35828
D.C.,
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-00627-HZ
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
M.C., a minor, by and through his parent D.C., appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010)
(dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364 F.3d 1088,
1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (decisions regarding issue preclusion). We may affirm on any
basis supported by the record. United States v. Wash., 969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir.
1992). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed M.C.’s claims relating to the due
process hearing because M.C. failed to allege a legal theory or facts sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief against the Oregon Department of Education
(“ODE”). See Or. Admin. R. 581-015-2345(1)(a)(A) (“A parent may request a due
process hearing if the parent does not agree with the identification, evaluation,
educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free appropriate education to
a child who may be disabled.”); see also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,
534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based
on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts
alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Dismissal of M.C.’s claims relating to the complaint resolution procedure
matter was proper because M.C.’s claims were previously litigated against ODE to
a final judgment in state court, both actions involve the same factual transaction,
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the claims could have been joined in the first action, and the remedy sought in the
instant action is additional or alternative to that sought in the state court case. See
Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir.
2005) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment federal courts
look to state law.” (citation omitted)); Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 136
P.3d 1, 3-4 (Or. 2006) (elements of claim preclusion under Oregon state law).
The motions to take judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 19, 31) are denied.
M.C.’s motion to extend the time to file a reply brief (Docket Entry Nos. 32
and 34) is granted. The clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry
No. 30.
AFFIRMED.
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