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Appellate Court Date: 2017.08.02
09:39:41 -05'00'
People v. Martin, 2017 IL App (4th) 150021
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption TRANCE N. MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-15-0021
Filed June 21, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 14-CF-86;
Review the Hon. Richard P. Klaus, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Michael Gomez, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino, David J.
Robinson, and Luke McNeill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Turner and Justice Appleton concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Trance N. Martin, appeals his September 2014 conviction of aggravated
driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(H) (West 2014)). On appeal, defendant argues (1) the
trial court committed plain error by admitting improper lay opinion testimony and (2) defense
counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object to Illinois State Police trooper Tyler
Vandeventer’s testimony on improper lay opinion grounds and (b) preserve the relevance
objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony in his posttrial motion to reconsider his
sentence. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In January 2014, defendant was charged by information with aggravated DUI in violation
of section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(H) (West 2014)). In
September 2014, a jury found defendant guilty. In November 2014, the trial court sentenced
defendant to three years in prison. Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence and our analysis does not require us to consider the totality of the evidence, we limit
our statement of facts to those necessary to resolve defendant’s issues on appeal.
¶4 At defendant’s September 2014 jury trial, Trooper Vandeventer gave the following
testimony. In January 2014, Trooper Vandeventer was dispatched to a vehicle off the road on
Interstate 74 in Champaign County, Illinois. Upon arriving at the scene, Trooper Vandeventer
discovered a black car in the ditch and two men standing outside the vehicle. Trooper
Vandeventer approached the men, who identified themselves as Trance Martin (defendant) and
Gaston Woodland. Trooper Vandeventer asked if the men were all right, and they responded
they were. Trooper Vandeventer then asked who had been driving the vehicle, and defendant
stated his wife, Virginia Latimore-Martin, had been driving. Defendant explained his wife
accepted a ride from someone on the interstate to get a tow truck. Woodland initially agreed
with this account and stated he had been seated in the back passenger seat. It had snowed
earlier in the day, but Trooper Vandeventer noted there were no footprints in the snow walking
away from the vehicle or walking along the interstate. Trooper Vandeventer also noted a strong
smell of alcohol on defendant’s breath.
¶5 Trooper Vandeventer returned to his squad car to run a check on defendant’s and
Woodland’s licenses and discovered defendant’s license had been revoked. Trooper
Vandeventer reapproached the men and again asked who had been driving the vehicle.
Woodland then indicated defendant had been driving and he had been sitting in the front
passenger seat, not the back. Illinois State Police trooper Matthew Hedges then arrived on the
scene and took over the investigation because Trooper Vandeventer had been dispatched to
another crash scene. After establishing the above facts, Trooper Vandeventer gave the
following testimony:
“Q. And based on your training and experience and everything you learned at the
scene, obviously Trooper Hedges arrested the defendant for driving while license
revoked. Who did you think was driving?
[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
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A. I believe [defendant] was driving.
Q. How did you come to that conclusion?
A. Just his story didn’t seem to make sense to me, and the fact that I don’t know
why he would send his wife to get help with some stranger off the interstate. And it just,
with what Mr. Woodland said, also the fact that he was actually sitting in the front
passenger seat, made me not believe [defendant].”
¶6 Trooper Hedges testified to the following facts. When he arrived on the scene, he observed
Trooper Vandeventer talking to two men. Trooper Hedges approached, and Trooper
Vandeventer indicated he believed defendant had been driving. Trooper Hedges noticed
defendant appeared disoriented, his eyes were red and glassed-over, and his breath smelled of
alcohol. Trooper Hedges asked defendant how many alcoholic beverages he had consumed,
and defendant responded he had consumed “four beers approximately.” Defendant reiterated
his statement his wife had been driving the vehicle and left for help with someone driving
down the interstate. Trooper Hedges administered a field sobriety test, but the test was
inconclusive. Trooper Hedges arrested defendant for driving with a revoked license. Trooper
Hedges transported defendant to the jail and administered the “walk-and-turn” field sobriety
test and the “one-legged stand” field sobriety test, both of which indicated defendant was
impaired. Defendant was then charged with DUI.
¶7 Woodland testified he and defendant had been at a friend’s house on the day of the
accident. Defendant drove Woodland to the friend’s house, and the two stayed there for about
an hour and a half. While they were there, they drank “a lot” of alcoholic beverages, according
to Woodland. They later left the house, and defendant drove. While defendant was driving, he
slid off the road. Woodland stated Virginia Latimore-Martin was not with them on the date of
the accident.
¶8 Defendant testified in his defense and reiterated his statement his wife had been driving the
vehicle and left the scene after the accident to get help. William Grier, who had also been at the
gathering with defendant and Woodland, testified he saw Virginia Latimore-Martin pick
defendant and Woodland up from the house. Virginia Latimore-Martin testified she drove
defendant to the friend’s house on the day of the accident and then picked defendant and
Woodland up later in the evening. She testified she was driving the vehicle when it slid off the
road. According to Latimore-Martin, defendant and Woodland bickered about how to handle
the situation after the car had slid off the road, so she walked up the road. While she was
walking, a woman stopped and asked if she needed help. Latimore-Martin testified she asked
for a ride to a towing company, and the woman complied with the request. Latimore-Martin
testified she called defendant on his cellular phone when she got to the towing company, and
Trooper Vandeventer answered defendant’s phone and stated defendant had been arrested for
DUI. She testified she did not tell Trooper Vandeventer she had been the driver but, rather,
asked what would happen to her car.
¶9 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced defendant to three years in
prison. Defendant timely filed a posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
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¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court committed plain error by admitting
improper lay opinion testimony and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to (a) object
to Illinois State Police Trooper Tyler Vandeventer’s testimony on improper lay opinion
grounds and (b) preserve the relevance objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony in his
posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence.
¶ 13 A. Plain Error
¶ 14 Defendant concedes he forfeited his argument the trial court erred by overruling his
objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony, but he requests plain-error review, arguing the
evidence at trial was closely balanced. The State maintains the issue is forfeited because the
testimony was proper lay opinion testimony and any error was harmless. We review a court’s
evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23, 47
N.E.3d 985. “An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court’s decision is ‘arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.’ ” Id.
(quoting People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37, 986 N.E.2d 634).
¶ 15 Initially, we note the proper inquiry when considering a forfeited claim is whether plain
error occurred, not whether harmless error occurred. People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363,
786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (2003). The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to bypass
forfeiture rules and consider a clear or obvious error that occurred during the trial. People v.
Shaw, 2016 IL App (4th) 150444, ¶ 69, 52 N.E.3d 728; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1,
1967) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the trial court.”). The plain-error doctrine may be invoked where
the evidence is closely balanced or where the error deprived the defendant of a fair hearing.
People v. Baker, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1090, 794 N.E.2d 353, 359 (2003). “As a matter of
convention, our court typically undertakes plain-error analysis by first determining whether
error occurred at all.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1059 (2010).
¶ 16 As defendant notes, “[w]hen a party has stated no basis for an objection and the trial court
has [overruled] the objection but provided no reason for its ruling, this court presumes that the
trial court ruled on the grounds of relevancy.” People v. Boston, 2016 IL App (1st) 133497,
¶ 61, 54 N.E.3d 217; see also People v. Potter, 41 Ill. 80, 84 (1866) (“The objection, however,
was general, and we must presume it was intended to apply to its relevancy to the issue.”).
Here, defense counsel stated no basis for the objection, and the trial court stated no basis for its
ruling. We presume the objection and ruling applied to relevance.
¶ 17 Because we presume the objection related to relevance—not improper lay opinion—the
trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to defendant’s argument raised on appeal,
i.e., Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was improper lay opinion testimony. Logically, a court
cannot have abused its discretion where it had no opportunity to exercise such discretion.
Accordingly, defendant’s argument the court erred by allowing improper lay witness
testimony is misplaced. See Shaw, 2016 IL App (4th) 150444, ¶ 63, 52 N.E.3d 728 (“Initially,
we note that the objections advanced by defense counsel at trial were based on relevance rather
than improper lay opinion testimony. Thus, we limit our review of the issue to defendant’s
argument related to relevance.”).
¶ 18 Defense counsel objected to the State’s question of who Trooper Vandeventer believed
was driving. Defendant argues Trooper Vandeventer’s belief defendant was driving was
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irrelevant because it did not make this fact of consequence more or less probable. Defendant
further argues Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was “so prejudicial that [it] outweighed
whatever probative value [it] might have had.” However, defendant’s prejudice argument also
relates to testimony to which defense counsel did not object. As stated, without an objection,
the trial court does not exercise discretion for us to review. We limit our inquiry to whether the
trial court committed plain error by admitting over defense counsel’s objection Trooper
Vandeventer’s testimony he believed defendant was driving.
¶ 19 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Relevant evidence is generally
admissible. Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). However, relevant evidence is inadmissible “if
the prejudicial effect of admitting that evidence substantially outweighs any probative value.”
(Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Shaw, 2016 IL App (4th) 150444,
¶ 63, 52 N.E.3d 728; see also Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (relevant evidence is
inadmissible if it is unfairly prejudicial). “In this context, prejudice means ‘an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy,
hatred, contempt, or horror.’ ” People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 218, 549 N.E.2d 268, 288
(1989) (quoting Michael H. Graham, Cleary and Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence
§ 403.1 (4th ed. 1984)).
¶ 20 The State did not respond to defendant’s relevance argument, and defendant argues the
State forfeited any argument to the contrary, citing People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347,
739 N.E.2d 455, 477 (2000) (“The rules of [forfeiture] are applicable to the State as well as the
defendant in criminal proceedings, and the State may [forfeit] an argument ***.”). However,
the State’s forfeiture in this instance does not prevent us from considering whether the trial
court abused its discretion with respect to relevance. See In re Charles H., 409 Ill. App. 3d
1047, 1055, 950 N.E.2d 710, 716 (2011).
¶ 21 We disagree with defendant’s position. Our review of Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony
shows the question to which defendant objected was asked during a line of questions about
how Trooper Vandeventer investigated the scene and why defendant was placed under arrest.
Testimony about the investigation and circumstances of defendant’s arrest was relevant, as it
was likely to assist the jury in determining whether defendant was driving.
¶ 22 Defendant argues Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial because the
jury was likely to believe him due to his role as a state trooper, citing People v. Crump, 319 Ill.
App. 3d 538, 542, 544, 745 N.E.2d 692, 698 (2001). Defendant also makes much of the fact
Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony related to “the only issue for the jury to decide” (emphasis in
original) and complains this testimony “usurped the province of the jury to judge the
credibility of witnesses and decide the facts.” We reject these arguments. Our court recently
stated:
“Illinois courts have rejected the so-called ‘ultimate fact’ doctrine, which held that a
witness may not express his opinion as to the ultimate issue in a case. Instead, ‘it is now
well settled that a witness, whether expert or lay, may provide an opinion on the
ultimate issue in a case. [Citation.] This is so because the trier of fact is not required to
accept the witness’ conclusion and, therefore, such testimony cannot be said to usurp
the province of the jury.’ ” People v. Willett, 2015 IL App (4th) 130702, ¶ 98, 37
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N.E.3d 469 (quoting People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 496-97, 708 N.E.2d 309, 324
(1998)).
See also Ill. R. Evid. 704 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact.”).
¶ 23 The fact defendant was arrested for driving with a revoked license necessarily means
Trooper Vandeventer believed defendant was driving. Put another way, if Trooper
Vandeventer did not believe defendant was driving, Trooper Hedges would not have arrested
defendant. Accordingly, Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony did not encourage the jury to make
its decision on an improper basis but, rather, pointed to an obvious inference based upon the
facts already in evidence. We find no unfair prejudice in Trooper Vandeventer’s statement he
believed defendant was driving. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or
commit plain error by overruling defendant’s objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony,
and we honor defendant’s forfeiture.
¶ 24 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 25 Defendant raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to (1) object to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony on improper lay
opinion grounds and (2) preserve the relevance objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony
in his posttrial motion to reconsider his sentence. The United States Constitution and the
Illinois Constitution guarantee the right to counsel in criminal trials. U.S. Const., amend. VI;
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must demonstrate (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant such
that, but for counsel’s errors, a different result would have been reached. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We recognize a strong presumption counsel’s conduct
was reasonable and effective. Id. at 689. Our supreme court has “made it clear that a reviewing
court will be highly deferential to trial counsel on matters of trial strategy, making every effort
to evaluate counsel’s performance from his perspective at the time, rather than through the lens
of hindsight.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344, 864 N.E.2d 196, 216 (2007).
¶ 26 1. Lay Opinion Issue
¶ 27 First, defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Trooper
Vandeventer’s testimony as an improper lay opinion. The State asserts trial counsel was not
ineffective because Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was proper lay opinion testimony and
the decision not to object was reasonable trial strategy.
¶ 28 Illinois Rule of Evidence 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) states:
“If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”
¶ 29 At the outset, we note Trooper Vandeventer’s opinion was rationally based upon his
perceptions of the scene and his conversations with defendant and Woodland, and it was not
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based upon specialized knowledge. Defendant primarily rejects the notion Trooper
Vandeventer’s testimony was “helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony” because it
usurped the province of the jury to decide the facts at issue, relying on Crump. In Crump, the
investigating officer was asked at trial, “ ‘Through the course of your investigation, Officer,
did you have reason to believe that the defendant in this case committed this offense?’ ”
Crump, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 540, 745 N.E.2d at 695. The officer responded affirmatively. Id.
The First District concluded the testimony was an improper lay opinion and the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting it. Id. at 543-44, 745 N.E.2d at 697-98; but see id. at 545,
745 N.E.2d at 698 (Homer, P.J., dissenting) (“In this context, I do not think the testimony can
be fairly construed as opinion testimony in the first place.”).
¶ 30 Like the court in People v. Degorski, 2013 IL App (1st) 100580, ¶ 85, 998 N.E.2d 637,
which agreed with Presiding Justice Homer’s dissent in Crump, we note Crump predates the
supreme court’s decision in People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 939 N.E.2d 238 (2010), which
we find instructive. In Hanson, the supreme court drew a line between past and present
opinions, concluding statements of past opinions were not improper lay opinions and were
admissible. Id. at 101, 939 N.E.2d at 254. The testimony at issue was investigating officer
Detective Nilles’s statement, “ ‘Jennifer thinks you did this’ ” and the witness Jennifer’s
testimony she in fact made that statement to Detective Nilles. Id. The defendant argued this
testimony was an improper lay opinion because it implied Detective Nilles believed he was
guilty of the crime. Id. The supreme court held:
“Detective Nilles did not testify that he believed defendant was guilty. Nor did Jennifer
testify that she believed defendant was guilty. Rather, both Nilles and Jennifer testified
to a statement which indicated, at the time the statement was made, that Jennifer
thought defendant had caused the victims’ deaths. At no time was any testimony
offered as to Jennifer’s present opinion of defendant’s guilt or innocence. Thus, while
defendant may arguably challenge the testimony as to relevance and hearsay concerns,
we reject defendant’s argument that this testimony constituted improper opinion
testimony.” Id.
¶ 31 The First District examined Hanson in Degorski. The Degorski court explained the Hanson
court drew a distinction between past and present opinion testimony, concluding “present
opinion testimony is improper” while “previous opinion testimony is permissible.” Degorski,
2013 IL App (1st) 100580, ¶ 84, 998 N.E.2d 637. Citing People v. Moore, 2012 IL App (1st)
100857, 964 N.E.2d 1276, the Degorski court concluded the Hanson principle applied to
authority figures’ prior opinions as well as general lay witnesses’, meaning the fact Trooper
Vandeventer is an authority figure is of no import to our Rule 701 analysis. See Degorski, 2013
IL App (1st) 100580, ¶ 80, 998 N.E.2d 637. The Degorski court noted, “ ‘[w]here the
testimony is not a current comment on the defendant’s credibility *** the police accusations
may be seen as a standard interrogation tactic, rather than an improper opinion on [the
defendant’s] credibility.’ ” Id. ¶ 79 (quoting Moore, 2012 IL App (1st) 100857, ¶ 52, 964
N.E.2d 1276). The Degorski court concluded the officer’s testimony reflecting his prior
opinion about the defendant’s credibility during an interrogation was not improper opinion
testimony because it was a past—not present—opinion. In support, the court stated:
“This case[ ] resembles Hanson and [People v.] Chaban [2013 IL App (1st)
112588, 994 N.E.2d 1057]. [The officer] expressed an opinion regarding defendant’s
guilt, but like the witnesses in Hanson and Chaban, it was not his present opinion.
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Rather, he testified in the past tense in both his solicited and unsolicited testimony: ‘his
statement to me was reliable’; ‘I believed him, Counsel’; and ‘I told you why I believed
it was reliable.’ [The officer] was referring to his belief at the time of the interrogation,
not his belief at the time of trial.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 78.
We agree with the application of Hanson in Degorski and Moore.
¶ 32 Here, the State’s questions with respect to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony were phrased
in the past tense. The State asked, “Who did you think was driving?” and “How did you come
to that conclusion?” (Emphases added.) Though Trooper Vandeventer’s answer to the first
question was phrased in the present tense, his answer to the second question clarified the fact
he was testifying about his prior beliefs. Pursuant to the Hanson principle, this testimony was
not an improper lay opinion because it was not offered as a present opinion on defendant’s
credibility but, rather, was a statement of past belief offered to explain the course of
investigation, i.e., why defendant was ultimately arrested. See Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 101, 939
N.E.2d at 254 (concluding testimony of a past opinion is not improper opinion testimony); see
also Degorski, 2013 IL App (1st) 100580, ¶ 84, 998 N.E.2d 637 (noting prior opinions are
admissible “on the basis that they were part of a sequential account of the detective’s
[interrogation]” (citing People v. Munoz, 398 Ill. App. 3d 455, 488, 923 N.E.2d 898, 925
(2010))). We conclude Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony about his past opinion was outside
the purview of Rule 701.
¶ 33 “Counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make or pursue what would have
been a meritless objection.” People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 165, 745 N.E.2d 1212, 1225
(2001). Because we conclude Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was not barred by Rule 701,
defense counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to object on Rule 701 grounds.
¶ 34 Even if Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was barred by Rule 701, defendant was not
prejudiced such that, but for counsel’s failure to object on improper opinion grounds, a
different result would have been reached. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We recognize the
Strickland prejudice prong does not require merely omitting the tainted evidence and
conducting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis. See People v. Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d 152,
161, 663 N.E.2d 490, 497-98 (1996) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “A
‘reasonable probability’ is defined as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35, 25 N.E.3d 601 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). With this principle in mind, we must still examine the evidence presented at trial
to consider whether Trooper Vandeventer’s statements undermined the outcome of the trial.
¶ 35 We have already determined Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial
so as to require its exclusion per Rule 403, chiefly because it was an obvious inference to be
drawn from the evidence; if Trooper Vandeventer believed defendant’s statement his wife was
driving, defendant would not have been arrested. Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony was not a
flagrant statement informing the jury defendant was guilty and it should disregard his defense;
rather, it was a statement of his belief at the time of the incident—a belief which guided his
investigation. Cf. Munoz, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 488-89, 923 N.E.2d at 926 (finding unfair
prejudice where the officer’s lay opinion “invade[d] the province of the jury” by telling it
whom to believe).
¶ 36 Trooper Hedges also testified Trooper Vandeventer indicated he believed defendant was
driving the vehicle, meaning even if defense counsel successfully excluded Trooper
Vandeventer’s testimony on improper opinion grounds, the jury would have nonetheless heard
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Trooper Hedges’s testimony about Trooper Vandeventer’s belief defendant was driving. See
Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 102, 939 N.E.2d at 255 (out-of-court statements are admissible to prove
something other than the truth of the matter asserted, such as the course of investigation, state
of mind, or effect on the listener). The jury would have also heard Woodland’s testimony
indicating defendant was indeed driving the vehicle. Given the cumulative nature of the
evidence and the context in which the testimony was given, we find no reasonable probability
Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony tainted the jury to the extent a different result would have
been reached had defense counsel successfully moved to exclude the statement. Our
confidence in the outcome is not undermined based on the admission of the allegedly
inadmissible testimony.
¶ 37 Though defendant lumps together Trooper Vandeventer’s two statements (i.e., (1) he
believed defendant was driving and (2) the reasons why) and argues they are unfairly
prejudicial throughout his brief, he does not specifically argue defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise an objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s second statement on either relevancy
or unfair prejudice grounds. Nevertheless, we conclude Trooper Vandeventer’s second
statement was not unfairly prejudicial.
¶ 38 As previously stated, the facts of Trooper Vandeventer being an authority figure and his
testimony relating to an ultimate issue of fact are of no import here. Trooper Vandeventer did
not phrase his testimony in such a way as to imply the jury should believe the State’s case as
opposed to defendant’s. Compare Munoz, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 488-89, 923 N.E.2d at 926
(finding unfair prejudice where the officer’s lay opinion “invade[d] the province of the jury”
by telling it whom to believe), with Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d at 101, 939 N.E.2d at 254 (concluding
a statement of past opinion was not unfairly prejudicial where the testimony explained the
course of investigation and was not a present opinion of the defendant’s guilt or credibility).
Trooper Vandeventer merely stated why he believed defendant was driving, which explained
why and how defendant was investigated and ultimately arrested. His belief was supported by
his observations of the scene and Woodland’s confession. This was not a “human lie detector”
situation (cf. People v. O’Donnell, 2015 IL App (4th) 130358, ¶ 32, 28 N.E.3d 1026), and
Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony did not encourage the jury to base its decision on improper
factors; rather, his testimony encouraged the jury to make its decision based on the evidence.
¶ 39 We conclude this testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, as the probative value in
explaining the course of the investigation and arrest was not substantially outweighed by any
prejudicial effect. See Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Despite the fact defendant failed to
clearly assign error to defense counsel with respect to Trooper Vandeventer’s second
statement, we conclude any such argument would have been groundless, and we reject his
argument Trooper Vandeventer’s second statement was unfairly prejudicial.
¶ 40 2. Preservation Issue
¶ 41 Defendant next argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the relevance
objection to Trooper Vandeventer’s testimony. Having determined the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by ruling the testimony was relevant, the question of whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to preserve the issue is moot. We decline to address defendant’s
argument.
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¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 We affirm the trial court’s judgment and award the State its $50 statutory assessment
against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002 (West 2014).
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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