NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUCIANO URIARTE, No. 14-70586
Petitioner, Agency No. A076-607-998
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 11, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Luciano Uriarte, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) for,
inter alia, making a material misrepresentation, and denying his application for a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretionary waiver of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). We deny the
petition in part and dismiss in part.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) provided clear and convincing
evidence Uriarte was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A). See Nakamoto v.
Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2004). Uriarte misrepresented material facts
by repeatedly failing to disclose his 1989 marriage in Mexico, including on his
1997 California marriage certificate, his immigrant visa petition, his sworn
statement to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and his
application for adjustment of status.
2. We review de novo Uriarte’s claim that the IJ violated his due process
rights by failing to act as a neutral arbiter. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971
(9th Cir. 2000). Uriarte’s claim is without merit. Contrary to Uriarte’s contention,
the IJ did not insist that DHS file marriage fraud charges against him and said
nothing to indicate she had prejudged the case. Likewise, Uriarte’s due process
rights were not violated by the IJ’s decision to move forward with a hearing on the
merits of his waiver application under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), rather than simply
granting relief when DHS initially indicated its non-opposition. Cf. Tadevosyan
v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 2014) (agency may not deny relief based
solely on DHS’s opposition). The record demonstrates Uriarte received a full and
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fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his
behalf. See Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. Absent a colorable constitutional or legal claim, we lack jurisdiction to
review the agency’s discretionary denial of Uriarte’s application for waiver of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(D); Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey,
552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). Uriarte’s constitutional claims are not
colorable, therefore we dismiss that portion of his petition seeking review of the
agency’s discretionary determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
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