IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
JEREMIAH BUTLER, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D16-5779
JULIE L. JONES, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed August 14, 2017.
An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Charles W. Dodson, Judge.
Jeremiah Butler, pro se, Appellant.
Kenneth Steely, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Pamela Jo
Bondi, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges the denial of his “Petition for Writ of Mandamus And
Or Alternative Habeas Corpus.” The circuit court dismissed the Petition because it
found it had no jurisdiction to consider what it deemed a collateral challenge to a
judgment and sentence. The Petition is not a collateral challenge to a judgment
and sentence, and we are therefore constrained to reverse for the circuit court’s
further consideration.
Where a prisoner challenges the Department’s calculation or interpretation
of his or her sentence, the prisoner must first exhaust administrative remedies
through the Department. See Massey v. Crosby, 860 So. 2d 529, 529 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2003) (mem.) (citing Bedford v. State, 775 So. 2d 402, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000)); Brown v. State, 13 So. 3d 1087, 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (mem.). After,
the prisoner may seek review of that administrative decision via extraordinary
writ—mandamus if the prisoner is not seeking entitlement to immediate release.
Head v. McNeil, 975 So. 2d 583, 584-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see Bush v. State,
945 So. 2d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2006). The prisoner has one year from the date of
exhausting administrative remedies to file the petition and venue is proper in Leon
County—where the Department is located. Bush, 945 So. 2d at 1213-14; Head,
975 So. 2d at 584-85.
Appellant filed a Petition replete with references to how the Department
calculated his gain time, forfeited gain time, and arrived at a tentative release date
(TRD). Appellant further suggested the Department erred in failing to restore
forfeited gain time due to an errant sexual offender classification. Appellant
attached various administrative grievances and Department responses to the
Petition—all discussing gain time and TRD calculations. Appellant calculated a
2
2036 TRD, the Department calculated 2058. Appellant was not collaterally
challenging his judgment or sentence. He raised no issue as to the court, its
rulings, or the legality of his thirteen and fifty year sentences. His claims were
directed at the Department and its implementation of sentences he agrees he has
and does not challenge.
However inartful the Petition 1 and whatever the merits may be, 2 Appellant
challenged the Department’s calculation of his TRD. The circuit court dismissed
the Petition on the sole ground it was not the sentencing court and therefore lacked
jurisdiction to hear a collateral challenge. This was error, and it requires our
reversal.
Accordingly, the court’s dismissal order is REVERSED, and the cause is
REMANDED for the circuit court’s further consideration.
WOLF and ROWE, JJ., and GRIFFIS III, STANLEY H., ASSOCIATE JUDGE,
CONCUR.
1
For example, the first page of the Petition asserts Appellant is seeking review of
orders entered in criminal cases and cites separation of powers and the ex post
facto prohibition.
2
We express no opinion as to the merits of Appellant’s Petition. That is entirely
for the circuit court.
3