United States v. Verod Woodard

Case: 17-10097 Document: 00514133158 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/28/2017 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 17-10097 FILED Summary Calendar August 28, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee v. VEROD WOODARD, Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:15-CR-412-1 Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Verod Woodard pleaded guilty to one count of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and received a sentence of 283 months in prison, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The underlying “crime of violence” was carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. On appeal, Woodard contends that the enactment of § 2119 exceeded Congress’s authority under * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 17-10097 Document: 00514133158 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/28/2017 No. 17-10097 the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1996), this court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the carjacking statute. Woodard concedes that his argument is foreclosed by Coleman, although he contends that the holding has been called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). As that case did not address the constitutionality of § 2119, we are bound by our decision in Coleman. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). In addition, Woodard asserts that the firearm conviction was invalid because carjacking no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). As he concedes, his argument that the ruling in Johnson renders § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). See United States v. Jones, 854 F.3d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed (July 17, 2017) (No. 17-5285). Although in Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016), the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson, we are bound by our own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, Woodard’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 2