STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM O'ROURKE(15-04-0209, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3953-15T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM O'ROURKE, a/k/a
WILLIAM J. OROURKE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted June 21, 2017 – Decided September 5, 2017

Before Judges Fuentes and Koblitz.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No.
15-04-0209.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paul H.
Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).

PER CURIAM

A Somerset County grand jury returned Indictment No. 15-04-

209 against defendant William O'Rourke, charging him with one
count of fourth degree operating a motor vehicle during a period

of license suspension for a second or subsequent conviction for

driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). A

Montgomery Township Police Officer also issued defendant summonses

for DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; DWI in a school zone, N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50(g); driving while his license was suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40;

and driving a motor vehicle with an expired registration, N.J.S.A.

39:3-4.

Defendant applied for admission into the Pretrial

Intervention Program (PTI) in connection with the single count in

the indictment. The PTI Director in the Criminal Division

Manager's Office recommended that defendant's application be

denied because his record indicated that his present offense

"constitutes [an] ongoing pattern of anti-social behavior." The

Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO) concurred with the PTI

Director's recommendation and denied defendant's application.

Defendant thereafter submitted additional information to the SCPO

and asked the prosecutor to reconsider his decision based on the

particular hardship defendant's confinement would cause to his

wife. After reviewing defendant's supplemental presentation, the

prosecutor found no legal basis to reconsider his initial position.

Defendant appealed the prosecutor's rejection of his PTI

application to the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Part. After

2 A-3953-15T2
reviewing the parties' legal memoranda and considering the oral

argument presented by counsel, the judge upheld the SCPO's

rejection of defendant's PTI application. The judge found

defendant did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

prosecutor's decision amounted to a patent and gross abuse of

discretion. Defendant thereafter negotiated an agreement with the

State through which he pleaded guilty to one count of the fourth

degree offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) and to DWI under

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining Title

39 summonses and recommend the court sentence defendant to a term

of probation not to exceed three years, conditioned upon defendant

serving 364 days in the Somerset County Jail, 180 days of which

to be served without parole as mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).

Defendant was free to argue for a lesser sentence within the

statute's mandatory parole restriction.

The court sentenced defendant to a three-year term of

probation, conditioned upon serving 180 days without parole in the

county jail as mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). On his conviction

for his fourth DWI, the judge sentenced defendant to a term of 180

days in the county jail, to run concurrent to the term imposed for

his fourth degree criminal conviction, ordered him to pay a $1000

fine, revoked his driving privileges for ten years, and imposed

the mandatory monetary penalties under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3).

3 A-3953-15T2
 Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments:

POINT ONE

AT A MINIMUM, O'ROURKE'S PTI APPLICATION
SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR
REJECTED IT BASED UPON IMPROPER
CONSIDERATIONS.

A. The Prosecutor Applied A Non-
Existent Presumption against PTI
for the Charge of Driving While
Suspended for a Second or Subsequent
DWI Offense.

B. The Prosecutor Tendentiously
Misinterpreted Various Statutory
PTI Factors.

POINT II

O'ROURKE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED INTO PTI
BEECAUSE [SIC] THE OFFENSE WAS A FOURTH-DEGREE
DRIVING OFFENSE, HE WAS SEEKING TREATMENT FOR
HIS ROOT PROBLEM OF ALCOHOLISM, AND HIS WIFE
WAS SUFFERING FROM DEMENTIA.

We reject these arguments and affirm. We gather the

following facts from the record developed before the Criminal

Part.

At 3:25 p.m. on Wednesday, January 7, 2015, Montgomery Police

Officer Ryan Gray responded to Montgomery High School to

investigate a report of an intoxicated driver. When he arrived,

Gray found a Buick Riviera illegally parked at the curb of the

office of the Montgomery Board of Education. The car was

unoccupied with the engine running. Gray conducted a computer

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check of the vehicle's license plate number and discovered it was

registered to defendant, but the registration card had expired.

Gray entered the Board of Education Office and found defendant

seated in a chair. He immediately noticed that defendant had a

strong odor of alcohol and his face was flushed. When Gray spoke

with defendant, he noticed defendant spoke slowly and

deliberately. Based on these observations, Gray concluded

defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant told Gray

he left the car parked because he anticipated he would return

within thirty seconds. It is undisputed defendant was unable to

successfully complete the field sobriety tests Gray asked him to

perform at the scene. Defendant's blood alcohol concentration

(BAC) was .25%, or more than three times the .08% presumptive

level of intoxication under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a).

On January 30, 2012, nearly three years before this encounter

with Officer Gray, defendant was convicted on his third DWI, was

sentenced to serve 180 days in the county jail, and had his license

revoked for ten years. Defendant was also charged with DWI on

October 17, 1989, and March 16, 2005 and subsequently convicted

of both. In addition to these charges, his driver's abstract

shows that over the past thirty years, defendant has been convicted

of speeding, reckless driving, unsafe operation of a motor vehicle,

and a variety of other moving violations. Defendant was nearly

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fifty-three years old when he was arrested and convicted for his

fourth DWI charge.

In support of his PTI application, defendant submitted a

letter dated February 20, 2015 from Turning Point, a program

dedicated to the "compassionate treatment of alcoholism and drug

dependency." The author of the letter, who described himself as

a "Primary Counselor," wrote to inform the Montgomery Municipal

Court Supervisor that defendant was "presently attending Turning

Point's short-term variable length of stay treatment facility for

chemical dependency." (Emphasis added). According to the letter,

defendant entered this program on January 22, 2015, fifteen days

after his arrest for his fourth DWI charge. The program will give

defendant "an aftercare recommendation and [he] will also be

encouraged to attend daily NA/AA meetings."

The record before us includes the supplemental information

that defense counsel submitted to induce the prosecutor to

reconsider his original decision to reject defendant's PTI

application. In a letter addressed directly to the prosecutor,

defense counsel asserted that defendant is a married father of two

minor children. His fifty-three-year-old wife suffers from

Alzheimer's disease. Counsel attached a letter from a neuroscience

institute to support this claim. Counsel states: "While Mr.

O'Rourke might be an alcoholic, he is an integral part of his

6 A-3953-15T2
wife's care. Six months of incarceration will only serve to

completely destroy this family that is already teetering on the

edge."

In his response acknowledging the receipt of defendant's

application for reconsideration, the prosecutor stated:

First, allow me to express my sincere
condolences to Mr. O'Rourke and his family
regarding the horrible circumstances in which
they find themselves. However, despite the
fact that the State recognizes the additional
hardship incarceration will occasion upon
defendant and his family, given the offenses
defendant is charged with . . . both statutes[1]
require mandatory incarceration. Moreover,
while it is not the "policy" of the Somerset
County Prosecutor's Office to reject all
persons charged with N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), it
certainly [is] true that in most instances[,]
such as this case, the State will reject those
persons whose driving history demonstrates an
ongoing course of antisocial behavior,
combined with present charges that demonstrate
a lack of amenability to short term
rehabilitation.

The judge who decided defendant's appeal in the Criminal Part

ultimately accepted the State's position. The judge concluded

that the prosecutor had carefully reviewed defendant's PTI

application and found support for its rejection in the factors

codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e). The prosecutor found factor

two, which requires a fact-sensitive evaluation, supports

1
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).

7 A-3953-15T2
rejection. Defendant had a .25% BAC at the time of his arrest for

DWI; and this arrest occurred less than three years after his ten-

year suspension of his driving privileges for his third DWI

conviction. As for factor three, which addresses the motivation

and age of the defendant, the State asserts defendant's age

eliminates the possibility that this was a mere youthful

indiscretion. Instead, defendant's age reveals he has had multiple

opportunities to address his alcohol addiction and its disruptive

consequences. Factor four, which examines the desire of the

complainant or victim to forego prosecution, also favors

rejection. The Legislature's adoption of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b)

clearly shows it seeks to deter drunk driving in our State by

imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration.

The PTI Judge also found support for the State's reliance on

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors five, six, and seven. Defendant's

history of Title 39 violations speaks for itself. As this court

has made clear:

The Legislature's purpose in requiring a
mandatory period of "imprisonment" for this
offense, with no possibility of parole, is
also clear. Alternatives to jail, like the
inpatient drug rehabilitation program
involved in [State v. French, 437 N.J. Super.
333 (App. Div. 2014)], or the home detention
and community service programs at issue here,
do not protect the public in the same way as
incarceration. This public safety
consideration is especially relevant in the

8 A-3953-15T2
 case of a defendant who loses his or her
driving privileges for DWI, but then continues
to drive despite the license suspension.

[State v. Rizzitello, 447 N.J. Super. 301, 315
(App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Harris, 439
N.J. Super. 150, 160 (App. Div. 2015)).]

Defendant's argument in favor of overturning the trial

court's ruling relies heavily on defendant's attempt to seek

treatment for his alcoholism. This argument is unavailing because

it fails to comprehend what the Legislature intended when it

adopted N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). As we noted earlier, defendant has

been given the opportunity to seek treatment for his addiction on

multiple occasions. Indeed, when he was sentenced in 2012 for his

third DWI conviction, he was sentenced to 180 days in the county

"except that the court may lower such term for each day, not

exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol

inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated

Driver Resource Center[.]" N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). (Emphasis

added). The record reflects defendant served all of the 180 days

in the county jail.

Defendant's fourth DWI conviction is consistent with his

nearly life-long defiance of judicial authority and utter

disregard for the welfare of his fellow motorists and pedestrians,

whom he places in clear danger when he drives a car with a .25%

BAC. Our Supreme Court made clear that "PTI is essentially an

9 A-3953-15T2
extension of the charging decision, therefore the decision to

grant or deny PTI is a 'quintessentially prosecutorial function.'"

State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 624 (2015) (quoting State v.

Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996)). Therefore,

the prosecutor's decision to accept or reject
a defendant's PTI application is entitled to
a great deal of deference. Trial courts may
overrule a prosecutor's decision to accept or
reject a PTI application only when the
circumstances "'clearly and convincingly
establish that the prosecutor's refusal to
sanction admission into the program was based
on a patent and gross abuse of . . .
discretion.'"

[Id. at 624-25 (quoting Wallace, supra, 146
N.J. at 582).]

Here, the trial court correctly applied this enhanced

standard of review to uphold the prosecutor's rejection of

defendant's PTI application.

Affirmed.

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