People v. Brown

2017 IL App (1st) 140508-B
SECOND DIVISION
September 5, 2017

No. 1-14-0508-B

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County, Illinois.
)
v. ) No. 13 CR 14282
)
JOSEPH BROWN, ) Honorable
) Rosemary Grant Higgins,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant Joseph Brown was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to deliver and

sentenced as a Class X offender pursuant to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2012)). Brown was 20 years old at the time of the

narcotics transaction at issue but turned 21 before his conviction. In People v. Brown, 2015 IL

App (1st) 140508 (Brown I), we vacated Brown’s sentence based upon our holding that the Class

X sentencing statute required a defendant to be 21 years of age on the date of commission of the

offense, not the date of conviction. Our supreme court reached the opposite conclusion in People

v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, and directed us to vacate Brown I.

¶2 We now address additional issues raised by Brown that we did not reach in Brown I

because of our interpretation of the Class X statute. Brown argues that basing his eligibility for

Class X sentencing on his age at the time of his conviction rather than at the time of the offense

is a violation of (i) the prohibition against ex post facto laws, (ii) constitutional due process

protections, and (iii) the constitutional right to equal protection. Although we are not
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unsympathetic to Brown’s arguments, our supreme court has upheld similar sentencing schemes

against claims of arbitrariness and due process violations. Accordingly, finding no constitutional

infirmity in the statute, we affirm Brown’s sentence.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On July 3, 2013, 20-year-old Brown was arrested after an officer observed him engaging

in the sale of heroin. On July 29, 2013, Brown was charged with possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver. He turned 21 years old the next day.

¶5 Following a bench trial on November 18, 2013, Brown was found guilty of possessing

more than 1 but less than 15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver, a Class 1 felony with a

sentencing range of 4 to 15 years. Based on Brown’s two prior convictions for Class 2 felonies,

the trial court found that he was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing and sentenced him to

six years of imprisonment, the minimum term for a Class X offender. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a)

(West 2012) (sentencing range for a Class X felony is 6 to 30 years).

¶6 On appeal, Brown did not challenge his conviction, but he argued that he was ineligible

for Class X sentencing based upon his age at the time of the offense. The Class X recidivist

provision applies “[w]hen a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or

Class 2 felony” after having been convicted of two prior felonies of Class 2 or higher. 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2012). Brown argued that “over the age of 21 years” referred to a

defendant’s age at the time the offense was committed, not at the time of conviction; alternately,

he argued that measuring Class X eligibility by a defendant’s age at the time of conviction would

be unconstitutional.

¶7 In Brown I, 2015 IL App (1st) 140508, we agreed with Brown’s interpretation of the

statute and therefore did not reach the constitutional issues he raised. Following People v. Smith,

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2016 IL 119659, ¶ 31, our supreme court directed us to vacate Brown I. We now address the

constitutional issues raised by Brown, which were not raised in Smith.

¶8 ANALYSIS

¶9 Brown contends that applying the Class X recidivist provision based on a defendant’s age

on the date of conviction, rather than on the date the offense is committed, is unconstitutional

because (i) it violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws, insofar as it punishes him for an

event (his 21st birthday) occurring after the commission of the offense, (ii) it violates due

process rights since there is no rational basis to increase a defendant’s punishment based on his

age at the time of conviction, and (iii) it violates equal protection principles since similarly-

situated defendants may be subject to different sentencing ranges based upon whether they turn

21 years old before being convicted.

¶ 10 Although Brown did not raise these issues in the trial court, a party may challenge the

constitutionality of a statute at any time. People v. Carpenter, 368 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291 (2006)

(defendant had right to challenge constitutionality of statute for the first time on appeal). All

statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of

rebutting that presumption. People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003). If reasonably possible,

we will construe a statute in a way that upholds its constitutionality. Carpenter, 368 Ill. App. 3d

at 291.

¶ 11 Ex Post Facto Prohibition

¶ 12 We begin by considering Brown’s contention that section 5-4.5-95(b) is an ex post facto

law. Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit the enactment of

ex post facto laws. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16; see Hadley v. Montes,

379 Ill. App. 3d 405, 408-09 (2008) (Illinois Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws is

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coextensive with that in the federal constitution) (citing People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 207

(2004)). In determining whether a criminal law is ex post facto, courts apply a two-prong test:

“[A] criminal law will be considered ex post facto where it (1) is retrospective in that it

applies to events occurring prior to its enactment, and (2) falls into one of the traditional

categories of prohibited criminal laws. [Citation.] These traditional categories include any

statute that punishes as a crime an act previously committed and innocent when done;

laws that make the punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commission; and

statutes that deprive one charged with a crime of any defense available at the time when

the act was committed.” People v. Pena, 321 Ill. App. 3d 538, 541 (2001) (citing Collins

v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)).

See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (“To fall within the ex post facto prohibition,

a law must be retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment—and

it must disadvantage the offender affected by it [citation] by altering the definition of criminal

conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime [citation].” (Internal quotation marks

omitted)). The purpose of this prohibition is “to ensure that legislative enactments give fair

warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.”

People v. Criss, 307 Ill. App. 3d 888, 896 (1999).

¶ 13 Section 5-4.5-95(b) satisfies the second prong of the definition of an ex post facto law

since it “make[s] the punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commission” (Pena, 321

Ill. App. 3d at 541). When Brown engaged in the drug transactions at issue in this case, he was

20 years old and the sentencing range for his crime—possession of more than 1 but less than 15

grams of heroin with intent to deliver—was 4 to 15 years. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1) (West 2012);

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012). Only later did he turn 21 years old, which made him

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subject to a mandatory Class X sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West

2012).

¶ 14 But section 5-4.5-95(b) does not satisfy the first prong, that of retrospective application.

Toia v. People, 333 Ill. App. 3d 523, 529 (2002) (under Pena, whether a law has retroactive

effect is a separate prong—and, therefore, a separate inquiry—than whether the law falls into a

category of prohibited criminal laws). The courts of this state, as well as the United States

Supreme Court, have defined a retrospective law as one that applies to events occurring prior to

its enactment. Pena, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 541; Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441; People v. Kotecki, 279 Ill.

App. 3d 1006, 1010 (1996) (“A law is retroactive if it applies to events which occurred before

the law was enacted.”); People v. Caruso, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1077 (1987) (to be

ex post facto, a law “must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its

enactment”). The Class X recidivist provision does not meet this element; it was enacted on

January 1, 1977, well before Brown committed his offense. Accordingly, Brown cannot claim

that he did not have “fair warning” (Criss, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 896) of the statute’s provisions.

¶ 15 Brown argues that the element of retroactivity is established “not by the enactment date

on which the entire statute became effective, but by a second effective date contained within the

terms of the statute itself”—i.e., a defendant’s 21st birthday. If this “second effective date”

triggers after a defendant commits a crime, but before the defendant is convicted, then the

punishment for the crime is increased. But, as discussed, this after-the-fact increase in

punishment already satisfies the second prong of the test. So, in essence, Brown is asking us to

collapse the two prongs of ex post facto analysis and hold that any law that “make[s] the

punishment for a crime more burdensome after its commission” (Pena, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 541)

is automatically a prohibited ex post facto law, irrespective of the date of its enactment. We

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decline to adopt this proposed expansion of the definition of an ex post facto law. As cited above,

courts have consistently defined retrospectivity by reference to the date of the law’s enactment,

and Brown does not cite any cases to the contrary.

¶ 16 Brown additionally argues that section 5-4.5-95(b) violates the principles that undergird

the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Since a prospective defendant under the age of 21 cannot

necessarily predict whether he will be subject to Class X sentencing, Brown argues that the law

fails to provide fair notice to such individuals. On the particular facts of this case, we disagree.

Brown sold heroin on July 3, 2013, less than a month before his 21st birthday on July 30. He

could reasonably have predicted that if caught and charged, his 21st birthday would pass before

the conclusion of his trial, and a guilty verdict would subject him to Class X sentencing. Under

such circumstances, we cannot say that Brown lacked fair notice of the potential penalty for his

actions. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 219 (1991) (in addressing constitutional issue, court

“will not formulate a rule broader than that necessitated by the precise situation in question”);

In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (2004) (same). Accordingly, we find that, as applied to Brown,

section 5-4.5-95(b) is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law.

¶ 17 Due Process

¶ 18 Brown next argues that section 5-4.5-95(b) violates constitutional due process protections

because (i) it does not provide fair notice to defendants as to whether they will be subject to

Class X sentencing and (ii) it is arbitrary, in that there is no rational basis for predicating Class X

eligibility upon a defendant’s age at the time of conviction. We consider these contentions in

turn.

¶ 19 Due process requires that criminal defendants have fair warning of the criminal penalties

that will attach to their conduct. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977). Thus, “[a]

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sentencing statute may be void for vagueness if it does not state with sufficient clarity the

consequences of violating a given criminal statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Winningham, 391 Ill. App. 3d 476, 482 (2009). However, due process does not require

“ ‘mathematical certainty in language.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Ramos, 316 Ill. App. 3d 18, 26

(2000)). In cases that do not implicate the first amendment, due process requires that a statute be

sufficiently definite so that (i) a person of ordinary intelligence has fair warning as to what is

prohibited and (ii) application of the statute does not depend merely on the private conceptions

of law enforcement officers and triers of fact. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 527 (2005);

People v. Vasquez, 2012 IL App (2d) 101132, ¶ 54.

¶ 20 The State argues that section 5-4.5-95(b) provides the requisite fair warning because its

text is clear: any defendant over the age of 21 years at the time of conviction will be subject to

the Class X recidivist provision if the other conditions in the statute are met. Brown argues that

this warning is illusory since defendants under the age of 21 have no way of knowing when they

commit their offenses whether they will be subject to Class X sentencing. He points out that the

date of conviction is affected by a wide variety of factors outside a defendant’s control. Such

factors include the timing of the prosecutor’s charging decision, how crowded the court’s docket

is, and the backlog of cases handled by a defendant’s attorney or public defender. Some cases

may also be delayed due to DNA testing and/or fitness determinations. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c), (e)

(West 2012). Thus, Brown hypothesizes that a person of ordinary intelligence under the age of

21 who is contemplating criminal activity may not know the sentencing range that will attach to

his conduct.

¶ 21 Brown’s arguments are not dependent on a presumption of bad faith or intentional delay

by either trial judges or prosecutors. There is certainly no evidence of bad faith by any of the

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government actors in Brown’s case. But even in the absence of intentional foot-dragging,

unpredictable delays can and will occur. Thus, Brown argues, he did not have notice on July 3,

2013, when he committed the offense, of what his sentencing range would be.

¶ 22 Again, under the facts of this particular case, we disagree. As discussed, Brown

committed the crimes at issue less than a month before his 21st birthday. Although he might not

have known his sentencing range with “ ‘mathematical certainty’ ” (Winningham, 391 Ill. App.

3d at 482 (quoting Ramos, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 26)), a person of ordinary intelligence would have

known that if he were caught and charged and chose to proceed to trial, any conviction would

very likely occur after he turned 21. Accordingly, limiting our analysis to the facts before us (see

P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 219; J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 13), we find that Brown had the requisite fair

warning of the criminal penalties attaching to his conduct.

¶ 23 Due process additionally prohibits the arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the State’s

police power. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 402 (2005). To constitute a legitimate exercise

of the police power, a statute “ ‘must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest

intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing

the desired result.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 640 (2000)).

¶ 24 Brown argues that section 5-4.5-95(b) fails to meet this standard. If we were writing on a

clean slate, we would be inclined to agree. The Class X recidivist provision is limited to those

over 21 based on the legislature’s recognition that young defendants are both less culpable and

more amenable to rehabilitation than older offenders. People v. Williams, 358 Ill. App. 3d 363,

367 (2005); see also People v. Storms, 254 Ill. App. 3d 139, 142 (1993) (section 5-4.5-95(b)

reflects the presumption that individuals under the age of 21 have greater rehabilitative potential

than older defendants). But that determination would logically be based upon defendant’s actions

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and state of mind at the time of the offense, not at some future point in time. As discussed, the

passage of time between a defendant’s commission of an offense and his conviction is dependent

on a wide variety of factors that are entirely unrelated to the defendant’s culpability or his

potential for rehabilitation. A young defendant may effectively be penalized because the circuit

court has an overcrowded docket or his public defender has a large backlog of cases—which

does not imply any fault on the part of the court or the public defender but does highlight the

arbitrariness inherent in calculating Class X eligibility based upon the date a verdict is finally

rendered.

¶ 25 But we do not write on a clean slate. Our supreme court has upheld sentencing schemes

that are based upon a defendant’s age at the time of sentencing (In re Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d 48

(1982)) and at the time of charging (People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669), even though they result

in more severe punishment than the defendant would have been subject to when the offense was

committed.

¶ 26 In Griffin, our supreme court interpreted a provision of the Juvenile Court Act providing

that a delinquent minor could be committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections “ ‘if he is

13 years of age or older.’ ” Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d at 50 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, ¶ 705-

2(1)(a)(5)). Griffin was 12 years old when he was adjudicated a delinquent for committing armed

robbery and aggravated battery. The trial court continued the case until four days after Griffin’s

13th birthday and then committed him to the Illinois Department of Corrections. Id. Our supreme

court upheld the disposition, holding that it was the minor’s age at the time of the dispositional

hearing and not at the time of the offense that determined his eligibility for incarceration. Id. at

52. The court further stated:

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“There is no merit to the contention that our interpretation is so arbitrary that the

legislature could not have intended it. The interpretation is no more arbitrary than the

statutory declaration that a minor’s 13th birthday endows him with a ‘criminal capacity,’

or Griffin’s suggestion that eligibility for commitment should depend upon the precise

date he is found to be delinquent. Griffin’s complaint is actually against the legislature’s

plain and unambiguous language expressing the legislative intent.” Id. at 53.

¶ 27 Although Griffin did not raise any constitutional challenge to the statute, the court’s

discussion indicates that it did not view the statute as so arbitrary that it would violate principles

of due process. According to the court, basing an individual’s sentencing options on his age at

the time of sentencing is “no more arbitrary” than basing them on his age at the time of the

commission of the offense.

¶ 28 The court confronted a similar issue in Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669. In 2003, when

defendant was 14 or 15 years old, he sexually assaulted his 6-year-old cousin. Nine years later, in

April 2012, police unexpectedly uncovered information relating to the assault. The following

month, the 23-year-old defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault and, since

he was no longer a minor, was prosecuted in adult criminal court. Id. ¶ 10. Thus, his sentencing

range was effectively determined by his age when he was charged, rather than his age when he

committed the offense. Defendant argued, among other things, that this violated his due process

rights because adult criminal court could impose a much harsher sentence than could have been

imposed in juvenile court for the same offense. Id. ¶ 43.

¶ 29 Fiveash rejected this argument. The court acknowledged that “juvenile offenders tried in

adult criminal court could potentially be subjected to harsher adult punishments without proper

consideration of their unique physical and mental characteristics.” Id. ¶ 45 (citing Roper v.

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Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567

U.S. 460 (2012) (recognizing the importance of considering juveniles’ unique characteristics in

sentencing)). But the court held that due process does not require juveniles’ unique

characteristics to be taken into account when the potential punishment is a term of imprisonment,

rather than a life sentence or the death penalty. Id. ¶ 45. Thus, the court found that prosecuting

defendant in adult criminal court—and imposing an adult sentence notwithstanding his age at the

time he committed the offense—did not violate due process principles.

¶ 30 Section 5-4.5-95(b), which dictates Class X eligibility based upon a defendant’s age at

the time of conviction, is no more arbitrary than the sentencing schemes upheld in Griffin and

Fiveash, both of which allowed a defendant’s sentence to be increased based upon the passage of

time after the commission of the offense. Brown argues that he is being penalized for the length

of his trial proceedings, which was dependent on factors outside of his control and unrelated to

either his culpability or his potential for rehabilitation. And as we noted above, we are not

unsympathetic to this argument, although here the delay between Brown’s charge and his

conviction was a brief four months. But Griffin was similarly penalized for the length of his

dispositional proceedings, while Fiveash was penalized for the length of time it took for his

crime to be reported, and our supreme court found no constitutional defect in either case.

Additionally, Brown was not a juvenile when he committed the crime at issue so the

constitutional concerns raised in Fiveash about the unique characteristics of juveniles do not

apply. We must therefore reject Brown’s argument that section 5-4.5-95(b) violates his due

process rights.

¶ 31 Equal Protection

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¶ 32 Finally, Brown argues that section 5-4.5-95(b) violates equal protection principles

because it subjects similarly-situated defendants to different sentencing ranges. He invites us to

consider two defendants who are born on the same date, have the same criminal record, and

commit the same Class 1 felony on the same date, yet one is convicted before his 21st birthday

while the other is convicted afterwards. These defendants would be subject to different

sentencing ranges. Brown contends that this distinction is arbitrary and serves no rational

legislative purpose.

¶ 33 Under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S.

Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; see Rudd v. Lake County Electoral Board, 2016

IL App (2d) 160649, ¶ 13 (same standards are applied under both state and federal equal

protections clauses)), the State must treat “similarly situated” individuals in a similar manner,

rather than “lay[ing] an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same

quality of offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1992);

see also People v. J.F., 2014 IL App (1st) 123579, ¶ 14. Because classification based on age is

not a suspect classification, we apply the rational basis test, under which we will uphold the

statute as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal. Williams, 358 Ill. App.

3d at 366 (citing Reed, 148 Ill. 2d at 7-8).

¶ 34 As with the previous issue, if there were no precedent on this issue, we would be inclined

to agree with Brown. Brown is similarly situated to an individual who was born on the same day

and committed the same crime on the same date but, by happenstance, was convicted before his

21st birthday, thus escaping mandatory Class X sentencing. But under the reasoning of Griffin,

92 Ill. 2d at 50, and Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669, ¶ 45, we cannot say that Brown has met his

burden to establish an equal protection violation. As noted, the Class X recidivism provision is

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no more arbitrary than the legislative scheme upheld in Griffin, where the court specifically

rejected respondent’s arbitrariness argument, or the one upheld in Fiveash, where the court

rejected defendant’s due process argument under the rational basis test.

¶ 35 Finally, Brown argues, and the State agrees, that his mittimus should be corrected to

accurately reflect the name of his conviction. Brown was convicted of possession of heroin with

intent to deliver under section 401(c)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS

570/401(c)(1) (West 2012)). The mittimus erroneously reflects a conviction for “MFG/DEL,”

referring to manufacturing and delivery of narcotics. Therefore, we direct the clerk of the circuit

court to issue a corrected mittimus to reflect that Brown was convicted of possession of more

than 1 but less than 15 grams of a controlled substance (heroin) with intent to deliver. People v.

Magee, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1035-36 (2007) (remand unnecessary to correct mittimus because

appellate court has authority to order clerk to make the necessary correction).

¶ 36 CONCLUSION

¶ 37 The Class X recidivist provision is of questionable legislative efficacy, insofar as it

applies to defendants such as Brown, who commit offenses before the age of 21 but turn 21

before their conviction. Such defendants are essentially punished for the passage of time, caused

by factors outside their control that are unrelated to either their culpability or capacity for

rehabilitation. Nevertheless, based on controlling precedent from our supreme court, the statute

is not an ex post facto law, nor does it violate the due process and equal protection guarantees of

the United States and Illinois constitutions. Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s sentence and direct

the clerk of the circuit court to correct the mittimus to accurately reflect the offense for which he

was convicted.

¶ 38 Affirmed; mittimus corrected.

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