J-S46018-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.J., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.J.J., A MINOR
No. 183 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Dispositional Order January 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-59-JV-0000025-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 06, 2017
Appellant, A.J.J., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered
in the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County,
following his adjudication of delinquency on two counts of aggravated
indecent assault.1 We affirm.
The juvenile court accurately set forth the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case in its opinion filed March 23, 2017.
Therefore, we adopt the court’s uncontested recitation as our own and shall
not restate them. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17, at 1-3.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(1).
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Did the [juvenile c]ourt err in finding that the Commonwealth
met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of the offense of [a]ggravated [i]ndecent [a]ssault[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7.
The issue included in Appellant’s brief expressly contests the
sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth. After a
thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law,
and the well-reasoned opinion of the juvenile court, we conclude Appellant's
sufficiency challenge merits no relief. The court’s opinion adequately and
accurately addresses the issue. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17, at 4-5
(crediting the victim’s testimony from the adjudicatory hearing that, on two
separate occasions, Appellant penetrated her vagina with his penis without
consent and without a good faith medical, hygienic, or law enforcement
purpose and further concluding that the victim’s testimony alone constituted
adequate grounds to sustain a conviction in a sexual assault case). Because
the juvenile court has prepared a precise and thorough assessment of
Appellant’s sufficiency claim, we adopt the court’s analysis as our own and
deny relief for the reason stated therein.
Our review on this matter does not end here, however, as we turn now
to Appellant’s assertion that his delinquency adjudications were contrary to
the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant argues that the court
relied solely on the victim’s testimony and improperly overlooked that there
was an ongoing sexual relationship between himself and the victim, that the
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victim’s testimony expressed only her isolated recollection of relevant
events, that both Appellant and the victim continued their relationship after
the assaults, that the victim delayed reporting the incidents to police, and
that the Commonwealth failed to corroborate the events with third party
witnesses or physical evidence. Under these circumstances, Appellant
contends that his delinquency adjudications should shock one’s sense of
justice. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-13.
The following principles guide our review of Appellant’s weight claim.
“[T]he general rule in this Commonwealth is that a weight of the
evidence claim is primarily addressed to the discretion of the
judge who actually presided at trial.” Armbruster v. Horowitz,
813 A.2d 698, 702 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Edwards,
903 A.2d 1139, 1148 (Pa. 2006). In reviewing a trial court's
adjudication of a weight of the evidence claim, “an appellate
court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion
based upon review of the record; its role is not to consider the
underlying question in the first instance.” Commonwealth v.
Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2008). Thus, a weight of the
evidence claim must be presented to the trial court so that it
may address it in the first instance. Commonwealth v.
Widmer, 689 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa. 1997)[; s]ee also
Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 n.3 (Pa.
1993) (“An allegation that the verdict is against the ‘weight’ of
the evidence is a matter to be resolved by the trial court.”).
Once a weight of the evidence claim has been presented to the
trial court, it then reviews the evidence adduced at trial and
determines whether “notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give
them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.”
[Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)]. A
trial court should award a new trial if the verdict of the fact
finder “is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of
justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right
may be given another opportunity to prevail.” Id. Stated
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another way, “[a] weight of the evidence claim concedes that
the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new
trial on the ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so
weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one's
sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053,
1067 (Pa. 2013). These principles have been deemed equally
applicable to the adjudication of weight of the evidence
challenges brought in juvenile court proceedings. McElrath v.
Commonwealth, 592 A.2d 740, 745 (Pa. 1991).
In re: J.B., 106 A.3d 76, 94-95 (Pa. 2014) (parallel citations omitted).
Before we proceed to the substance of Appellant’s weight claim, we
are compelled to consider whether he sufficiently preserved this issue by
first raising it in the juvenile court.2 “The question of whether [an appellant]
waived appellate review of his weight-of-the-evidence claim is a question of
law, and, accordingly, our standard of review is plenary.” Id. at 95. While
the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 specifies that weight-of-the-evidence
claims in criminal proceedings are waived unless they are raised with the
trial court in a motion for a new trial, “the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile
Procedure have no counterpart requiring the same manner of preservation.”
In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 91. Indeed, “the current Rules of Juvenile Court
Procedure—which ‘govern delinquency proceedings in all courts'—are utterly
silent as to how a weight-of-the-evidence claim must be presented to the
juvenile court so that it may rule on the claim in the first instance, which is
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2
We note that Appellant failed to include his weight claim in his statement of
questions involved, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be
considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is
fairly suggested thereby.”). We shall overlook this omission, however, as it
has not hampered our review.
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... a necessary prerequisite for appellate review.” Id. at 98 (footnote
omitted). Pa.R.J.C.P. 620(A)(2) governs the filing of what it expressly
designates as an “optional post-dispositional motion.” See Pa.R.J.C.P.
620(A)(2) (“Issues raised before or during the adjudicatory hearing shall be
deemed preserved for appeal whether or not the party elects to file a post-
dispositional motion on those issues.”). The relevant case law holds that
where a juvenile raises his weight claim for the first time in a concise
statement under Rule 1925, the claim is sufficiently preserved for purposes
of appellate review. See In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 96-99 (declining to find
waiver where juvenile included weight claim in concise statement and trial
court considered the issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion); see also In the
Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1187-1188 (Pa. Super. 2016).
It is uncontested that Appellant did not file post-dispositional motions.
Instead, Appellant referenced his challenge to the weight of the evidence for
the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement and the juvenile court rejected
his claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, finding that the victim was more
credible than Appellant and that the victim’s testimony, standing alone, was
sufficient to sustain an adjudication. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/23/17,
at 3 and 5. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Appellant
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preserved his weight claim for purposes of appellate review. Hence, we
address the claim.3
Within the context of our limited review of challenges to the weight of
the evidence, and given the well-settled principle that we are to defer to the
juvenile court on issues of credibility, we are satisfied that this matter does
not warrant a new adjudicatory hearing. There is ample support in the
certified record for the findings and inferences drawn by the juvenile court.
In the absence of circumstances that disclose a palpable abuse of discretion,
we are without grounds to upset the challenged ruling and the trial judge's
reasons should prevail. See Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054–1055 (“[a] new trial
should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony”).
Because the court acted well within the limits of its judicial discretion in
rejecting Appellant’s weight claim, the adjudications in this case do not
shock one’s sense of justice and we therefore conclude that Appellant’s
weight claim lacks merit.
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3
We acknowledge the procedure followed by prior appellate courts that have
remanded cases under similar circumstances to give the appellant the
opportunity to file, nunc pro tunc, post-dispositional motions challenging the
weight of the evidence. See In re: J.B., 106 A.3d at 99; see also In the
Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d at 1188. We decline to follow that procedure in
this instance. The facts of this case are very straightforward and the
juvenile court has adequately explained its reasons for rejecting Appellant’s
weight challenge. We need nothing more to undertake our assessment of
the manner in which the juvenile court exercised its discretion.
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Because we rely upon the juvenile court’s opinion in deciding this case,
the parties are directed to attach a copy of the juvenile court’s March 23,
2017 opinion to any future filings regarding this appeal.
Order of disposition affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/6/2017
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Circulated 08/10/2017 03:16 PM
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Thejuvenile, A.J.J., appeals this Court's Dispositional Order entered January 13, 20!7.
As setforth more fully below, that Order should be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
A.J.J. and the victim.KR, both high school students, began a dating relationship in.
April, 2015 .. Shortly thereafter they started a sexual relationship, Their dating relationship lasted
until the end ofAugust, 2015, They briefly continued a sexual rclationstnp af:1:¢1; their dating
relationship ended. Most of'the sexual contact between A.JJ. and K.R, during their relationship
was
. consensual. There were ~ however ' two
. occasions
. when
. . the
.· contact
. . was. non-consensual.
. . . ·. ...
The first.non-consensual incident occurred sometime between July 15, 2015 and July 20.,
2015. This incident took place around two orthree in the-afternoon in the downstairs of the.
residence where K.R. resided with her parents. K.R. and A,J.J, were talking when AJ.J. begun
asking to have sexual intercourse. K,R,. responded thtit she did nor want to. Atthat pQint,A.J.J.
told K.R. to sit ori the.floor
.. next
. to him.
. . . He
.. then
. .. . turned her around
. . . . over ..on the
. . couch
. .. . and .
pushed her down with his forearm so she could not gi!t up .. K.R. kept saying "no, I don't want
to" and A.lJ. just told her to stop and.relax. K.R. was facing the. buck of the couch, she was bent
over the seat, and AJ..J. was. behind her. A.J.J. then proceeded to penetrate K.R.'s vagina with.
his penis and began having sexual intercourse.with her while K.R. told him to stop. K.R. was
crying at this point. K.R. 's aims were behind her and A.lJ, 's forearm was 011 her back. K R.
».
was crying during this time . and telling A.J .J, to stop. This went on for approximately twenty
i
minutes. A.J.J. finallystopped becauseKk. was able to get.him off.of her when he went to take
her underwear off. .K.Ri'sfather was upstairs during.this-incident,
After the incident K.R, was crying and A..JJ. asked her why. K.R. told him why and
A.J.J. apologized and.said, 'Tm sorry, I didn't hear you." Thetwo continued to hang out the rest
ofthe day until.nine or ten o'clock, including having.dinnerwith k.R.'s parents.
Another nonconsensual
. encounter
. occurred
.·. between
. . the
. . K.R.
. . and.AiLl.
. . . sometime
. . .~.
between August I, 2015 and August 14, 2015 around three in the.afternoon. This incident again
took place in. the home K.It resides with her parents. This time K.R. and AJ .J. were upstairs
watching DVD;s and talkht~ while K.R.'s father was asleep downstairs. The incident. again
began with A.J .J. asking K.R. to have sexual intercourse and K.R. saying she. did not want to.
A.J J. then went around K.R. and laid on top of her. K.R. responded by saying get off and that
she was not doing that at that time. A.J.J. movedKR. 'sskirtupand then moved her underwear
to the side. He then penetrated K.R. 's vagina with his penis and had sexual intercourse with her;
She was able to push him ofher twice, The.first time.he j ustgot back on top of her and kept
going and the second time hi; stopped, During the incident A.J .J. told K.R. torelax and KR
kept saying stop.rio, get off me. The incident lasted. approximatelyten minutes. K:R. and A.J.J.
continued to hang out that day after the .incidentiook place.
Officer Stager of the Mansfield Borough Police Department was first norified of these
incidents on February 1, 2016. A peti tion Alleging Delinquency was filed by Tioga County
Juvenile Probation Officer Mary Jackson on July 13, 2016 alleging two C