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Appellate Court Date: 2017.08.28
08:36:25 -05'00'
Carroll v. Community Health Care Clinic, Inc., 2017 IL App (4th) 150847
Appellate Court DAVID S. CARROLL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMUNITY
Caption HEALTH CARE CLINIC, INC.; PAUL PEDERSEN, M.D.; and SUE
McGINNES, APN, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket Nos. 4-15-0847, 4-16-0667 cons.
Filed June 22, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 15-L-59; the
Review Hon. Rebecca S. Foley, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Joseph A. Bartholomew, Stephanie A. Brauer, and Leah A. Captain,
Appeal of Cook, Ysursa, Bartholomew, Brauer & Shevlin, Ltd., of Belleville,
for appellant.
Jonathan J. Bobell and Christopher L. Nyweide, of Livingston,
Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, LLP, of Bloomington, for appellee
Community Health Care Clinic, Inc.
Paul C. Estes and Jesse A. Placher, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of
Peoria, and Adam R. Vaught and Joshua G. Vincent, of Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for other appellees.
Robert J. Kane, of Illinois State Medical Society, of Springfield, and
Sherri T. DeVito and Richard R. King II, of Illinois State Medical
Society, of Chicago, amicus curiae.
Craig L. Unrath, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for
amicus curiae Illinois Association of Free & Charitable Clinics.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pope and Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In April 2015, plaintiff, David S. Carroll, filed a medical malpractice complaint against
defendants, Community Health Care Clinic, Inc. (Clinic), Paul Pedersen, M.D., and Sue
McGinnes, APN. In June 2015, the Clinic filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)
(West 2014)), asserting it was immune from liability (1) as a free and charitable clinic under
section 30 of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30 (West 2004)) and section 31 of the
Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Medical Practice Act) (225 ILCS 60/31 (West 2012)) and (2)
because any action against it was derivative of plaintiff’s action against Dr. Pedersen and
McGinnes, who were immune from civil liability. The next month, Dr. Pedersen and
McGinnes also filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, alleging they were both immune from
liability under section 30 of the Good Samaritan Act and Dr. Pedersen was also immune under
section 54.5(e) of the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/54.5(e) (West 2012)). After a
September 2015 hearing, the McLean County circuit court granted the motions to dismiss with
prejudice, finding (1) McGinnes was immune under the Good Samaritan Act, (2) Dr. Pedersen
was immune under the Medical Practice Act, and (3) the Clinic itself was immune from
liability under the Good Samaritan Act. Plaintiff appealed the court’s dismissal of his medical
malpractice action.
¶2 In May 2016, plaintiff filed a petition to vacate the circuit court’s September 2015 order
under section 2-1401 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)), based on a
previously unknown employee lease agreement (Lease Agreement) between the Clinic and
OSF Healthcare System (OSF), which owns and operates St. Joseph Medical Center, Dr.
Pedersen and McGinnes’s employer. Plaintiff alleged McGinnes was, in fact, paid for her
services to plaintiff through the lease agreement. After an August 2016 hearing, the circuit
court denied plaintiff’s section 2-1401 petition. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his petition to
vacate. In September 2016, this court consolidated plaintiff’s two appeals.
¶3 In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff argues (1) the Good Samaritan Act does not grant
immunity to nonvolunteers like Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes, (2) Dr. Pedersen failed to show
he was immune from liability under the Medical Practice Act, and (3) the Clinic is vicariously
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liable for Dr. Pedersen’s and McGinnes’s conduct because neither the Medical Practice Act
nor the Good Samaritan Act directly provide the Clinic Immunity. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes (incorrectly spelled
“McGinness” in the trial court pleadings), an advance practice nurse and licensed nurse
practitioner, rendered medical services to him at the Clinic on March 13 and April 17, 2013.
He also asserted Dr. Pedersen was required to supervise McGinnes when she rendered care and
treatment. On May 20, 2013, plaintiff suffered a massive myocardial infarction. Plaintiff
alleged Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes were professionally negligent because they negligently
and carelessly failed to diagnose and recommend treatment for angina pectoris, coronary artery
disease, and coronary insufficiency. As a direct and proximate cause of their negligent actions,
plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction, which caused damage to his heart and his body as a
whole. Plaintiff alleged the Clinic was also liable as Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes were its
agents, staff, and employees.
¶6 In July 2015, the Clinic filed a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint,
asserting it was immune from liability under section 30 of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS
49/30 (West 2004)) and section 31 of the Medical Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/31 (West 2012)).
It further argued that, even if it was not directly immune from liability under the
aforementioned acts, it was immune because any action against it was derivative of plaintiff’s
actions against Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes, who were immune from liability. In support of its
motion, the Clinic filed a memorandum, which included an affidavit of John Kim, president of
the Clinic’s board of directors. In his affidavit, Kim stated the Clinic provided free medical
care to individuals who were unable to pay for medical care. Plaintiff received free medical
care at the Clinic. Attached to Kim’s affidavit was a copy of the sign posted in the Clinic
notifying clients the healthcare workers were immune from liability under the Good Samaritan
Act.
¶7 That same month, Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes filed a joint section 2-619(a)(9) motion to
dismiss, first contending Dr. Pedersen was immune under section 54.5(e) of the Medical
Practice Act (225 ILCS 60/54.5(e) (West 2012)) because he was only a collaborating physician
for McGinnes at the time she provided services to plaintiff. The motion further argued
McGinnes was immune from liability under section 30(a) of the Good Samaritan Act (745
ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004)), noting she was in no way compensated by the Clinic for the
medical care she provided to plaintiff. Attached to the motion to dismiss were the affidavits of
Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes. In his affidavit, Dr. Pedersen testified he did not provide any
medical services to plaintiff on March 13 and April 17, 2013, and did not assist McGinnes in
any way with respect to the care she provided plaintiff on the dates at issue. He was only a
collaborating physician for McGinnes. Additionally, he stated the patients at the Clinic were
not charged for the medical care they received. In her affidavit, McGinnes stated Dr. Pedersen
did not assist her in any way with respect to the medical care she provided plaintiff on the dates
at issue. She also stated she did not receive a fee or compensation from the Clinic for the
medical care she provided plaintiff.
¶8 Plaintiff filed responses, asserting defendants’ arguments failed because they had not
demonstrated they were not compensated by any source for the services provided to plaintiff at
the Clinic, as required by the Good Samaritan Act, and Dr. Pedersen had failed to show he was
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not supervising McGinnes during her treatment of plaintiff. He further argued the plain
language of the Good Samaritan Act granted immunity only to individuals and not to the free
medical clinics themselves. Defendants filed replies disagreeing with plaintiff’s arguments.
¶9 On September 29, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss. After
hearing the parties’ arguments, the court first found the “from that source” language of section
30(a) of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004)) referred to compensation
from the free clinic itself. It was undisputed McGinnes was not paid by the Clinic. Thus, the
court found she was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act. As to Dr. Pedersen,
the court concluded it was undisputed that he was not involved in any way in the care of
plaintiff at the Clinic. Accordingly, the court found he was immune from liability as a
collaborating physician under the Medical Practice Act. Last, the court found section 30(a) of
the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004)) was not limited to individuals and
the Clinic was directly immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act. That same day,
the court entered a written order, dismissing with prejudice the complaint against all three
defendants.
¶ 10 On October 19, 2015, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient compliance with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015), which is appellate court case No.
4-15-0847. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction of defendant’s appeal from the circuit
court’s September 2015 order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 11 On May 26, 2016, plaintiff filed a petition to vacate the circuit court’s September 2015
order under section 2-1401 of the Procedure Code. In the petition, plaintiff noted that, on April
4, 2016, he received notice of a June 20, 2002, Lease Agreement between OSF, as owner and
operator of St. Joseph Medical Center, and the Clinic. Under the agreement, OSF (lessor) was
to provide certain employees for the Clinic (lessee), including a nurse practitioner. As to
compensation, the agreement provided the following: “Lessee shall pay to Lessor the
productive salary and wages and non-productive wages paid by Lessor to the Leased
Employees plus an amount equal to the cost of benefits provided by the Lessor to Leased
Employees measured as a percentage of the average wage of the Leased Employees, rounded
to the nearest percent ***.” OSF was to give the Clinic an invoice at the end of every month for
all leased employees who worked during the month. All leased employees were employees of
OSF and not the Clinic. Plaintiff again argued Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes were not immune
because they received compensation for their work at the Clinic. Plaintiff further contended
that, even under the circuit court’s interpretation of the Good Samaritan Act, the Lease
Agreement indicated the Clinic was the source of McGinnes’s compensation, as the
compensation was merely routed through OSF. Plaintiff attached a copy of the Lease
Agreement to his section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 12 Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes filed a response, arguing the agreement was irrelevant to Dr.
Pedersen’s immunity because the circuit court found him immune under the Medical Practice
Act, not the Good Samaritan Act. Moreover, they argued the Clinic did not compensate
McGinnes because she was compensated by OSF, a fact which was not altered by the existence
of the Lease Agreement. The Clinic also filed a response, noting the existence of the Lease
Agreement had no bearing on the circuit court’s dismissal of it from the lawsuit. It further
argued the agreement had no impact on Dr. Pedersen’s and McGinnes’s immunity because
they were employees of OSF and, as such, were paid by OSF.
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¶ 13 On August 1, 2016, the circuit court held a hearing on plaintiff’s section 2-1401 petition.
Plaintiff stated he was renewing his arguments against the Clinic and Dr. Pedersen but was not
raising a new argument based on the Lease Agreement against them. As to McGinnes, plaintiff
argued she was being paid by the Clinic through OSF. That day, the court entered an order
denying the section 2-1401 petition as to the Clinic and Dr. Pedersen but taking the petition
under advisement as to McGinnes. On August 5, 2016, the court entered an order denying the
petition as to McGinnes. The court found McGinnes was compensated by OSF and not the
Clinic.
¶ 14 On September 2, 2016, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient compliance
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015), seeking to join the appeal in case No.
4-15-0847. On September 20, 2016, this court entered an order, finding plaintiff’s notice
seeking to join the prior appeal would be considered a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s
August 5, 2016, order as appellate court case No. 4-16-0667. Moreover, we sua sponte
consolidated case Nos. 4-15-0847 and 4-16-0667. We note this court also has jurisdiction over
defendant’s appeal from the circuit court’s August 5, 2016, order under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 A. Standard of Review
¶ 17 Defendant appeals the dismissal of his complaint under section 2-619 of the Procedure
Code and the denial of his section 2-1401 petition without an evidentiary hearing. With a
section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the movant admits the sufficiency of the complaint but asserts
an affirmative matter that defeats the claim. Leetaru v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 40, 32 N.E.3d 583. Specifically, section 2-619(a)(9) provides for
dismissal when the claim “is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or
defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014). The existence and preclusive effect
of immunity is one such affirmative matter. See Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d
111, 115, 896 N.E.2d 232, 235 (2008) (addressing immunity under the Local Governmental
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2002))).
“The defendant bears the initial burden of proof of the affirmative matter and, if satisfied, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that ‘the defense is unfounded or requires the resolution of
an essential element of material fact before it is proven.’ ” Mondschein v. Power Construction
Co., 404 Ill. App. 3d 601, 606, 936 N.E.2d 1101, 1106 (2010) (quoting Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116, 619 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1993)). In
ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the circuit court must interpret all pleadings and
supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Richter v. Prairie Farms
Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 18, 53 N.E.3d 1. We review de novo the grant of a section 2-619
motion to dismiss. Richter, 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 18, 53 N.E.3d 1. Moreover, when a circuit court
enters judgment on the pleadings of a section 2-1401 petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing, the standard of review is also de novo. Cavalry Portfolio Services v. Rocha, 2012 IL
App (1st) 111690, ¶ 9, 979 N.E.2d 930.
¶ 18 Additionally, we note this court may affirm the circuit court’s granting of a motion to
dismiss on any basis or ground established by the record, regardless of the circuit court's
reasoning. Guinn v. Hoskins Chevrolet, 361 Ill. App. 3d 575, 586, 836 N.E.2d 681, 691 (2005).
The same holds true for a circuit court’s decision on a section 2-1401 petition. See Padilla v.
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Vazquez, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1027, 586 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1991).
¶ 19 B. Good Samaritan Act
¶ 20 Plaintiff contends section 30(a) of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West
2004)) does not provide immunity to Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes because that section only
applies to medical professionals who do not receive any fee or compensation for the services
they provide at free clinics. In his supplemental brief, plaintiff further asserts that, under the
Lease Agreement between OSF and the Clinic, McGinnes was, in fact, compensated by the
Clinic for her services rendered there. Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes assert that section 30(a)
applies to medical professionals who provide services at a free clinic and do not receive
compensation from the free clinic for those services.
¶ 21 1. Applicable Version of Section 30
¶ 22 Here, the alleged negligence occurred in March and April 2013, which is before Public Act
98-214 (Pub. Act 98-214, § 115, eff. Aug. 9, 2013) became effective. Throughout his briefs,
plaintiff cites the version of section 30 that was amended by Public Act 94-677 (Pub. Act
94-677, § 340 (eff. Aug. 25, 2005)), which became effective on August 25, 2005. However, in
Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 250, 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (2010), our
supreme court found Public Act 94-677 invalid and void in its entirety. The version of section
30 in effect before Public Act 94-677 was last amended by Public Act 90-742 (Pub. Act
90-742, § 40 (eff. Aug. 13, 1998)). Accordingly, we apply the version of section 30 amended
by Public Act 90-742. See 745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004).
¶ 23 Section 30(a) of the Good Samaritan Act (745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004)) provides the
following:
“A person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987, a person licensed to
practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United
States, or a health care professional, including but not limited to an advanced practice
nurse, physician assistant, nurse, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatrist, or social
worker licensed in this State or any other state or territory of the United States, who, in
good faith, provides medical treatment, diagnosis, or advice as a part of the services of
an established free medical clinic providing care to medically indigent patients which
is limited to care that does not require the services of a licensed hospital or ambulatory
surgical treatment center and who receives no fee or compensation from that source
shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of his or her acts or omissions in
providing that medical treatment, except for willful or wanton misconduct.”
At issue is the meaning of the language “who receives no fee or compensation from that
source.”
¶ 24 2. Statutory Construction
¶ 25 When presented with an issue of statutory construction, the reviewing court’s primary
objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman
Management Services, Inc., 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 72 N.E.3d 323. The statutory language,
given its plain and ordinary meaning, best indicates the legislature’s intent. Murphy-Hylton,
2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 72 N.E.3d 323. Moreover, we must evaluate the statute as a whole,
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“construing words and phrases in context to other relevant statutory provisions and not in
isolation.” Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 72 N.E.3d 323. In doing so, we should not
render any language superfluous. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25, 72 N.E.3d 323.
Where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous and its meaning is plain, we must apply
the statute as written without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. Board of
Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois, 2017 IL
120343, ¶ 24. We note the standard of review for statutory construction is also de novo. Board
of Education of Springfield School District No. 186, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 22.
¶ 26 Plaintiff argues “from that source” means from the performance of the medical services.
McGinnes and Pedersen contend the language refers to compensation from the free medical
clinic. We begin our analysis by breaking down the language of the provision.
¶ 27 After describing what medical practitioners are immune under the provision, section 30(a)
bifurcates into the requirements for the application of immunity. The first part requires the
person to “in good faith, provide[ ] medical treatment, diagnosis, or advice.” 745 ILCS
49/30(a) (West 2004). It then adds on qualifications for the provision of that care. Specifically,
the services must be (1) part of an established free medical clinic providing care to the
medically indigent and (2) limited to care that does not require the services of a licensed
hospital or ambulatory surgical treatment center. 745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004). The second
part mandates the person “receive[ ] no fee or compensation from that source.” 745 ILCS
49/30(a) (West 2004). Additionally, the end of the section contains an exception to the
immunity for willful or wanton misconduct. Thus, section 30(a) contains two main
requirements for receiving immunity; the medical practitioner (1) must perform the services as
described by the statute and (2) not receive a fee or compensation from that source. Plaintiff’s
interpretation of “from that source” renders the “from that source” language superfluous. If the
legislature intended for the compensation to be for the performance of those services, the
bifurcated structure of the provision would have made that clear—performance of services and
no fee or compensation. Accordingly, plaintiff’s interpretation is erroneous as statutes are to be
construed in a manner that does not render any language superfluous. Board of Education of
Springfield School District No. 186, 2017 IL 120343, ¶ 24.
¶ 28 As to the plain language of the statute, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “source” as “[t]he
originator or primary agent of an act, circumstance, or result .” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014). The prepositional phrase “from that source” modifies the preceding nouns “fee or
compensation.” The originator or primary agent of a fee or compensation is the entity from
which the person received payment. The use of the word “that” indicates “the kind or thing
specified as follows.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/that (last visited June 9, 2017). The only logical thing preceding the
prepositional phrase “from that source” that could compensate a person is the free medical
clinic. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the performance of medical services is not a source of
fees or compensation. Thus, the “from that source” language is referring to the free medical
clinic. We do not find the language of the provision ambiguous, and thus we do not resort to
other aids of statutory construction. Accordingly, we find the second requirement for
immunity is the person did not receive a fee or compensation from the free medical clinic itself.
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¶ 29 3. Lease Agreement
¶ 30 In this case, it is undisputed the Clinic did not directly pay Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes for
their work at the Clinic. However, plaintiff notes that, under the Lease Agreement, Dr.
Pedersen’s and McGinnes’s compensation from the Clinic was merely routed through OSF,
and thus they were compensated by the Clinic. Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes disagree.
¶ 31 Under the Lease Agreement, OSF remained the employer of the leased employees and
retained the authority to hire, fire, and assign them. The Clinic had the sole authority to direct
and supervise the action of the leased employees on the Clinic’s premises and to request the
removal of any leased employee at any time and for any reason. The Lease Agreement further
provided the leased employee would be discharging their duties and responsibilities under the
agreement as an employee of OSF and an independent contractor of the Clinic. Nothing in the
Lease Agreement was to be construed as creating a relationship of employer and employee or
principal and agent between any of the leased employees and the Clinic. Moreover, for all
leased employees, OSF was to (1) provide and maintain all insurance coverage, (2) provide
and pay for employee benefits, and (3) pay all payroll related taxes. The Clinic was to pay OSF
for the leased employees’ productive salary and wages, nonproductive wages, and a
percentage of the costs of the benefits provided by OSF to the leased employees. That payment
was done by OSF giving the Clinic an invoice at the end of every month for all leased
employees during that month. Additionally, the Lease Agreement provided the parties
intended the Clinic to operate as a free medical clinic at all times.
¶ 32 Clearly, Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes were employees of OSF and not the Clinic, as OSF
paid their salary, wages, insurance, benefits, and payroll related taxes. OSF paid all of the
compensation of the leased employees, regardless of what the Clinic paid OSF for the leased
employees’ services. The source of Dr. Pedersen’s and McGinnes’s compensation was OSF.
The fact the Clinic paid OSF an amount equal to the leased employees’ salary and benefits for
their services at the Clinic does not change the fact their compensation came from OSF.
¶ 33 Accordingly, we find Dr. Pedersen’s and McGinnes’s compensation did not come from the
Clinic, and thus they are immune from liability under section 30(a) of the Good Samaritan Act
(745 ILCS 49/30(a) (West 2004)).
¶ 34 C. Medical Practice Act
¶ 35 Since we have found Dr. Pedersen is immune under the Good Samaritan Act even if he
actually rendered medical services to plaintiff, we need not address whether he was also
immune as a collaborative physician under section 54.5(e) of the Medical Practice Act (225
ILCS 60/54.5(e) (West 2012)).
¶ 36 D. The Clinic
¶ 37 In this case, plaintiff did not raise a direct negligence claim against the Clinic. Instead, he
raised a negligence claim under the theory of vicarious liability, under which an
employer/master can be liable for the torts of an employee/agent that are committed within the
scope of the employment. Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 375, 939 N.E.2d 328, 343 (2010)
(employer/employee); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 533,
513 N.E.2d 387, 399 (1987) (master/agent). Thus, “[w]here the agent is not guilty, it
necessarily follows that the party for whom he acted, the master, cannot be guilty.” Kirk, 117
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Ill. 2d at 533, 513 N.E.2d at 399. Since we have found both Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes
immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, the Clinic is immune from liability on
plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim. Accordingly, we do not address whether the Clinic is
directly immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act and the Medical Practice Act.
¶ 38 Since defendants are all immune from liability, we find the circuit court’s dismissal with
prejudice of plaintiff’s complaint and denial of plaintiff’s section 2-1401 petition were proper.
¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the McLean County circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 41 Affirmed.
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