NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3080-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RONNELL HEDGESPETH, a/k/a
RONEL HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
Submitted February 1, 2017 – Decided September 13, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Hudson County, Indictment No.09-
11-1928.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Kimmo Z.H. Abbasi, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Kerry J. Salkin,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ronnell Hedgespeth appeals from the order of the
Criminal Part denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition.
We affirm.
On October 27, 2009, a Hudson County grand jury returned an
indictment against defendant charging him with three counts of
second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, three counts of second degree unlawful
possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b, second degree
possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of one
of the offenses listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, fourth degree
possession of hollow nose or dum-dum bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3f,
fourth degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3j, second degree possession of a firearm while
committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring to commit an
illicit narcotics offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39:4.1a, third degree
possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1), third degree
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3), and third degree possession of
heroin with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school
property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1
1
The indictment also included one count of fourth degree
possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3, and one count
of fourth degree possession of a police scanner while in the course
2 A-3080-14T1
The matter first came to trial before a jury on December 2,
2010. When the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the
judge declared a mistrial on December 21, 2010. The second trial
began on February 15, 2011 and continued for four more trial-days.
On February 23, 2011, the jury found defendant guilty on all
charges. On May 18, 2011, after merging the appropriate offenses,
the trial judge sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of
ten years, with five years of parole ineligibility on the three
convictions for second degree possession of a firearm for an
unlawful purpose. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6f, the judge also
sentenced defendant to a mandatory extended term of ten years,
with five years of parole ineligibility, on the conviction for
third degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute within
1000 feet of school property. The judge also ordered that this
term of imprisonment was to run consecutive to the term imposed
for the firearm convictions. This resulted in an aggregate
sentence of twenty years, with ten years of parole ineligibility.
On June 16, 2011, defendant filed a direct appeal of his
conviction to this court. Defendant argued: (1) the trial court
erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence found
of committing or attempting to commit a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-22.
The trial judge dismissed these two charges as a matter of law.
3 A-3080-14T1
by the police in his apartment; (2) certain testimony elicited at
trial by the State violated his confrontation rights; and (3) the
state failed to sustain its burden of proof as to the weapons
offenses. We rejected these arguments and affirmed defendant's
conviction. State v. Ronnell Hedgespeth, Docket No. A-4964-10
(App. Div. Feb. 28, 2013). The Supreme Court denied defendant's
petition for certification. State v. Hedgespeth, 216 N.J. 8
(2013). In lieu of reciting the facts developed by the parties
at trial and in pretrial motion practice, we incorporate by
reference the facts we described in our unpublished opinion
affirming defendant's conviction. State v. Ronnell Hedgespeth,
Docket No. A-4964-10 (App. Div. Feb. 28, 2013) (slip op. at 2 to
4).
On October 22, 2013, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition
arguing he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel
because his attorney did not compel the State to produce at trial
the confidential informant; "the police report was not in evidence
for the jury;" the prosecutor spoke to one of the jurors who was
part of the jury in the first trial and consequently removed "black
female jurors" from being part of the jury in his second trial;
and his trial attorney in the second trial was administratively
suspended from the practice of law as of January 7, 2011, "for
failure to comply with IOLTA requirement." Defendant argued his
4 A-3080-14T1
trial counsel was not licensed to represent him during the trial
because his right to practice law was not restored until May 17,
2011.
The court assigned counsel to represent defendant in
prosecuting his PCR petition. PCR counsel filed a brief in support
of defendant's request for relief and appeared before the PCR
judge on October 30, 2014 to argue the matter personally. The
judge reserved judgment after oral argument. On November 5, 2014,
the PCR judge denied defendant's petition. The judge included a
memorandum of opinion explaining the legal reasons for her
decision.
Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments:
POINT ONE
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING HEDGESPETH AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE
DEMONSTRATED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF THE
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE
COUNSEL.
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineligible To
Practice Law At The Time Of
Hedgespeth's Trial.
B. The Identify [sic] Of The
Confidential Informant Should Have
Been Disclosed At Trial.
C. Hedgespeth Was Denied The
Effective Assistance Of Appellate
Counsel.
5 A-3080-14T1
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), and subsequently adopted by
our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). A
defendant must first demonstrate that defense "counsel's
performance was deficient." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687,
104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Second, she or he must
show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
698.
A court presented with a PCR petition is not obligated to
conduct an evidentiary hearing. State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311
(2014). Rule 3:22-10 gives the court the discretion to conduct
such a hearing only "if a defendant has presented a prima facie
case in support of PCR." Ibid. Once a prima facie case has been
established, the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
ordinarily require consideration of "evidence that lie[s] outside
the trial record." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992).
Here, the PCR judge correctly concluded an evidentiary hearing was
not necessary because the salient facts underpinning her decision
to deny defendant's petition were uncontested. We reject these
6 A-3080-14T1
arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by
Judge Mitzy Galis-Menendez in her memorandum of opinion.
Affirmed.
7 A-3080-14T1