J-S22028-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DANIEL NELSON THOMAS
Appellee No. 1730 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000557-2016
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the September 23, 2016 order
entered in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas granting Daniel Nelson
Thomas’ motion to suppress blood test results.1 We affirm.
In March 2016, Thomas was charged with driving under the influence
of alcohol (“DUI”)–general impairment and DUI–high rate.2 On July 18,
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified that the trial
court’s order granting Thomas’ motion to suppress terminates or
substantially handicaps the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (permitting
interlocutory appeal where Commonwealth certifies with its notice of appeal
that order terminates or substantially handicaps prosecution). Thus, the
appeal is properly before us. See Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241,
244 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2016).
2
75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and (b), respectively.
J-S22028-17
2016, Thomas filed a motion to suppress evidence of blood test results. In
lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted the following stipulated facts:
1. On March 20, 2016, at approximately 1:26 a.m.,
[Thomas] was involved in a two-vehicle accident in
Gettysburg Borough, Adams County, Pennsylvania.
2. Officer Michael Carricato arrived at the scene and
determined that [Thomas] was the driver of one of the
vehicles involved in the accident.
3. As a result of Officer Carricato’s observations, [Thomas]
was placed under arrest for driving under the influence.
4. [Thomas] was transported to Gettysburg Hospital for a
blood draw.
5. After being read the then-existing DL-26 form,
[Thomas] consented to have his blood drawn for testing.
6. The form read to [Thomas] included language that
[Thomas] could face enhanced criminal penalties if he
refused to submit to a blood draw.
7. [Thomas’] blood was later tested and a result of .128
blood alcohol content was received.
Stipulated Facts, 9/21/16. On September 23, 2016, the trial court granted
the motion, finding that Thomas did not voluntarily consent to the blood
draw and that the results of the blood test were inadmissible. On October
14, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.
The Commonwealth raises the following issue on appeal: “Did the
Honorable Suppression Court err in applying the exclusionary rule and
suppressing the results of [Thomas’] blood draw when a good faith exception
to the rule should have been applied?” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 4. The
Commonwealth does not argue that the trial court erred in finding Thomas’s
-2-
J-S22028-17
consent to the blood draw involuntary following Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). Rather, it argues that this Court should
recognize “a limited good faith exception [to the exclusionary rule] in the
wake of Birchfield.” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 16. The Commonwealth argues that
we should apply the good-faith exception because the exclusionary rule’s
deterrent effect is not furthered by application in this case, noting that the
implied-consent law relied on by the police officers had previously been
upheld. Id. at 9-15.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the exclusionary rule
and the good-faith exception to that rule as follows:
The established remedy for illegal seizures and searches,
in criminal cases, is exclusion of the fruits of the illegal
police conduct—under both the Fourth Amendment and
under Article I, Section 8. That general rule of exclusion,
of course, is subject to numerous exceptions. The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized a new such exception to the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule in United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677
(1984). Leon held that, where a police officer conducts a
search in objective good faith reliance upon a search
warrant duly issued by a magistrate or judge, the Fourth
Amendment does not require exclusion of evidence found
pursuant to the warrant, even if it is later determined that
there was no probable cause for the warrant to issue. 468
U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The High Court considered
that the deterrence goal of the federal exclusionary rule
based on the Fourth Amendment would not be served by
applying it in circumstances where officers have properly
relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Id.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187-88 (Pa. 2014). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has determined that Article I,
-3-
J-S22028-17
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not contemplate a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, concluding that the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy interests than
does the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887,
899, 906 (Pa. 1991); accord Commonwealth v. Myers, ___ A.3d ____,
2017 WL 3045867, at *10 n.16 (Pa. July 19, 2017) (discussing Birchfield
and decisions from other jurisdictions, and noting that “Pennsylvania law
does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule”);
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 2822511, at *1, 9
(Pa. June 30, 2017) (concluding trial court properly suppressed evidence
because there is no good-faith exception to exclusionary rule in case where
“information contained in the affidavit in support of probable cause is later
determined to be demonstrably untrue, despite the absence of any showing
of police misconduct”);3 Johnson, 86 A.3d at 188 (noting that Pennsylvania
____________________________________________
3
Hopkins was decided by an evenly divided court. The opinion in
support of affirmance based its decision to affirm the order suppressing the
evidence “upon [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] historical rejection of a
‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule.” 2017 WL 2822511, at *1
(Donohue, J., joined by Baer and Dougherty, JJ.). The opinion in support of
reversal found the “good-faith ‘exception’ to the exclusionary rule” was not
implicated, concluding that:
[T]he salient issue, in my view, is whether the search
warrant was valid and, thus, whether the exclusionary rule
applies in the first instance. As I would find that the
warrant was supported by probable cause as
constitutionally required—and was therefore valid—I would
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4-
J-S22028-17
Supreme Court’s rejection of good-faith exception in “Edmunds turned on a
determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in
Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an
individual’s right to privacy”). Based on this Supreme Court precedent, we
decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to establish a good-faith exception
for post-Birchfield cases.
Accordingly, because Pennsylvania does not recognize the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s
claim lacks merit.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
conclude that the evidence should not have been
suppressed.
Id. at *9 (Pa. Jun 30, 2017) (Saylor, C.J., joined by Todd and Mundy, JJ.).
-5-
Com. v. Thomas, D.
Combined Opinion