NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4734-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NICHOLAS D. SOKOLOVSKI,
Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________________________
Argued March 16, 2017 – Decided September 19, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa, Suter, and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County,
Docket No. 2016-163.
Monica do Outeiro argued the cause for
appellant (Christopher J. Gramiccioni,
Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. do
Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
Raymond A. Raya argued the cause for
respondent.
PER CURIAM
By our leave granted, the Monmouth County Prosecutor's
Office (MCPO) appeals from the April 15, 2016 order entered by
Assignment Judge Lisa P. Thornton, granting the motion of
defendant Nicholas D. Sokolovski to consolidate complaints
pending in two municipal courts.
Defendant was arrested in Freehold Township on July 13,
2015, and charged with disorderly persons offenses involving
possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Fifteen days
later, defendant was arrested in Howell Township and again
charged with marijuana related offenses.1
Defendant moved pursuant to Rule 7:8-4 to consolidate the
two municipal matters in order to apply for a conditional
discharge, N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1, which would not be available if
the two cases were prosecuted separately. Defendant's motion
was unopposed by both municipal prosecutors, but MCPO objected,
arguing the Rule did not permit consolidation of unrelated
charges pending in different municipalities.
After hearing oral argument, Judge Thornton granted
defendant's motion and ordered both matters consolidated and
heard in Howell municipal court. The judge conditioned the
consolidation on resolution of the matters by guilty pleas
1
Although the initial summons included a third-degree
distribution charge and a fourth-degree charge alleging
possession of more than fifty grams, both were downgraded to
disorderly persons offenses after review by MCPO.
2 A-4734-15T2
within forty-five days, or they would be returned to the
respective municipalities for trial.
On appeal, MCPO presents one argument:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RULE AND GRANTING
CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENDANT'S MUNICIPAL COURT
CASES FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES.
Rule 7:8-4 addresses consolidation of municipal court
matters:
The court may order two or more complaints to
be tried together if the offenses arose out
of the same facts and circumstances,
regardless of the number of defendants. In all
other matters, the court may consolidate
complaints for trial with the consent of the
persons charged. Complaints originating in
two or more municipalities may be consolidated
for trial only with the approval of the
appropriate Assignment Judge, who shall
designate the municipal court in which trial
is to proceed. A party seeking consolidation
of complaints originating in different
municipalities shall file a written motion for
that relief directly with the Assignment
Judge.
MCPO argues the Rule permits consolidation only if the
charges arise from "the same facts and circumstances" or if the
consolidation is sought "for trial."
Recently, we rejected a similar challenge to consolidation
by MCPO in State v. Whooley, No. A-3395-15 (App. Div. Aug. 8,
2017). In Whooley, we observed:
3 A-4734-15T2
While the first sentence of Rule 7:8-4 appears
to limit consolidation to matters arising "out
of the same facts and circumstances," when
read in conjunction with the next sentence,
it is apparent that the restriction is limited
to instances where the persons charged do not
consent to consolidation. The second sentence
refers to "all other matters" and suggests
that complaints may be consolidated "with the
consent of the persons charged." R. 7:8-4.
When read in context, the Rule allows for
consolidation of municipal complaints when the
offenses do not arise from the same facts and
circumstances, as long as the defendant
consents. Because defendant not only
consented but sought consolidation here, we
reject MCPO's argument that consolidation is
precluded because the two matters did not
arise out of the same facts and circumstances.
For the reasons stated in Whooley, we reject MCPO's
argument that Judge Thornton erred in ordering consolidation
here.
Affirmed.
4 A-4734-15T2