NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2476-15T3
ASHLEY NELSON-GUEDEZ and
LYNDSAY NELSON-NUGENT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JACQUELINE T. LIMOLI, f/k/a
JACQUELINE T. NELSON, and/or
JACKY NELSON,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________________________
Argued telephonically March 22, 2017 –
Decided September 19, 2017
Before Judges Espinosa and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Union County,
Docket No. C-101-15.
Richard J. Kaplow argued the cause for
appellants.
Stephen J. Edelstein argued the cause for
respondent (Schwartz Simon Edelstein &
Celso, LLC, attorneys; Lawrence S. Schwartz
and Mr. Edelstein, of counsel and on the
brief; Stephen R. Catanzaro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Ashley Nelson-Guedez and Lyndsay Nelson-Nugent
appeal from the February 1, 2016 Chancery Division order
dismissing their complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
Plaintiffs are the daughters of Paul Nelson, who died in
2007. Paul Nelson's father, Theodore Nelson, died in February
2011, leaving each of his four children an equal share of his
estate. Defendant Jacqueline Limoli,1 who was married to Paul
Nelson at the time of his death, received her late husband's
share of Theodore Nelson's estate.
Plaintiffs allege that, shortly after Theodore Nelson's
death, defendant agreed to divide her inheritance into thirds,
with one-third, or approximately one million dollars, going to
each of them. On May 26, 2011, defendant executed a written
document indicating that as of May 9, 2011, she has given or
will give $500,000 to Ashley. In addition, defendant gave
approximately $250,000 to Lyndsay in various forms.
In September 2015, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
Union County Chancery Division seeking to compel defendant to
fully perform her agreement to transfer monies to plaintiffs.
Defendants moved to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).
1
During her marriage to Paul Nelson, defendant was known as
Jacqueline or "Jacky" Nelson.
2 A-2476-15T3
After hearing oral argument, Chancery Judge Katherine R.
Dupuis granted defendant's motion. In a statement of reasons
accompanying her dismissal order, Judge Dupuis found defendant,
who was domiciled in Vermont, was not subject to the court's
personal jurisdiction because there were insufficient contacts
with New Jersey. Although the estate was probated in New Jersey
and the alleged promise was made here, the judge held those
contacts did not overcome the burden to defendant in appearing
in a New Jersey court.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue their complaint is not subject
to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction or failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), we
must search the allegations of the pleading in depth and with
liberality to determine whether a cause of action is "suggested"
by the facts. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989). We must "ascertain whether the
fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an
obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if
necessary." Ibid. (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove
Memorial Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). "If a
generous reading of the allegations merely suggests a cause of
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action, the complaint will withstand the motion." F.G. v.
MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 556 (1997).
We employ a plenary standard of review to the motion
judge's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 4:6-2(e) and owe no deference to the judge's
conclusions. Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone,
423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J.
366 (2011).
"The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a
forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts,
ties, or relations.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 471-72, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540 (1985)
(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90 L. Ed. 95, 104 (1945)). "The Due
Process Clause . . . limits the power of a state court to render
a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant."
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100
S. Ct. 559, 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 497 (1980).
Although New Jersey's long-arm provision permits our courts
to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents, the use of that
authority must comply with the due process limits imposed by the
United States Constitution. Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264,
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268 (1971). Critical to the due-process analysis is the
question whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in the forum state. Burger King, supra,
471 U.S. at 474, 105 S. Ct. at 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 542.
"[T]he requisite quality and quantum of contacts is dependent on
whether general or specific jurisdiction is asserted[.]"
Citibank, N.A. v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 526
(App. Div. 1996).
"If a cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's
contacts with the forum state, the court's jurisdiction is
'general.'" Mische v. Bracey's Supermarket, 420 N.J. Super. 487,
491 (App. Div. 2011). To obtain general jurisdiction, the
defendant must have contacts with this State that are "'so
continuous and substantial as to justify subjecting the
defendant to jurisdiction.'" Waste Management, Inc. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 123 (1994) (internal citations omitted),
cert. denied sub nom., WMX Techs. v. Canadian Gen. Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 1183, 115 S. Ct. 1175, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1128 (1995).
Specific jurisdiction is available when the "cause of
action arises directly out of a defendant's contacts with the
forum state." Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 119. The "minimum
contacts inquiry must focus on 'the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" Lebel v. Everglades
5 A-2476-15T3
Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L. Ed. 2d
683, 698 (1977)). "The 'minimum contacts' requirement is
satisfied so long as the contacts resulted from the defendant's
purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the
plaintiff." Ibid.
A nonresident's direct contacts with the forum may vest the
court with specific jurisdiction. Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v.
S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 450 N.J. Super. 1, 74 (App. Div.
2017). "In assessing the sufficiency of the relationship
between the forum and the nonresident, the initial step examines
two factors: whether minimum contacts exist at all and whether
those contacts provide adequate grounds for asserting
jurisdiction." Ibid.
If a plaintiff demonstrates the existence of minimum
contacts, the inquiry shifts to verifying that "the maintenance
of the suit [would] not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66
S. Ct. at 158, 90 L. Ed. at 102 (internal quotation omitted).
Relevant factors in the "fair play" evaluation include "the
burden on [the] defendant, the interests of the forum state, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, the interstate
judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of disputes,
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and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies." Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at
124-25.
To establish defendant's minimum contacts with New Jersey,
plaintiffs rely not only on defendant's travel here and her
communication with New Jersey residents, but point to the
actions and contacts of other parties. Plaintiffs reference
defendant's "frequent visits" to New Jersey to visit plaintiff
Lyndsay Nelson-Nugent; defendant's travel to New Jersey to
attend Theodore Nelson's funeral; Theodore Nelson's New Jersey
residence; the sale of property located in New Jersey which
accounted for a significant portion of the inherited estate; the
administration of the estate by a New Jersey law firm; and the
New Jersey residence of the executrix of the estate.
When examining minimum contacts, the focus must be on
contacts defendant creates with the forum state, as "the State's
adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the
nonresident defendant — not the convenience of plaintiffs or
third parties." Walden v. Fiore, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct.
1115, 1122, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12, 20 (2014). Courts have
consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the minimum contacts
inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff or third
parties and the forum State. Ibid. (citing Helicopteros
7 A-2476-15T3
Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S.
Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984)) ("[The] unilateral activity
of another party or a third person is not an appropriate
consideration when determining whether a defendant has
sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion
of jurisdiction"). "[O]ur 'minimum contacts' analysis looks to
the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant's contacts with persons who reside there." Ibid.;
Baanyan Software Services, Inc. v. Kuncha, 433 N.J. Super. 466,
477 (App. Div. 2013) ("[C]ommunications with individuals and
entities located in New Jersey alone," constitute "insufficient
minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.").
In summary, defendant's contacts with New Jersey were
limited, sporadic, and insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction. There is no evidence that she sought to avail
herself of the benefits and privileges of New Jersey law and
thus do not establish specific jurisdiction. We are therefore
satisfied that the facts support Judge Depuis' finding that
plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the State of New Jersey for jurisdiction
to exist.
8 A-2476-15T3
As New Jersey lacked jurisdiction over defendant, we need
not address plaintiffs' arguments regarding the sufficiency of
their complaint.
Affirmed.
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