Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 467
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-17-231
CRYSTAL BECK Opinion Delivered September 20, 2017
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 26JV-15-398]
HONORABLE TED C. CAPEHEART,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE
HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR
CHILDREN AFFIRMED
APPELLEES
PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge
Crystal Beck appeals a Garland County Circuit Court order terminating her parental
rights to her daughters, SB and OB. More specifically, she challenges both the trial court’s
findings of statutory grounds and its best-interest determination. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On July 7, 2015, Beck took SB and OB to a child-advocacy center, reporting
allegations of sexual abuse. The Arkansas Crimes Against Children Division (CACD) was
contacted to conduct a criminal investigation, and the Arkansas Department of Human
Services (Department or DHS) was contacted to perform a safety assessment. DHS had
concerns about Beck’s ability to care for and protect the children. She had driven the children
to the center and was exhibiting bizarre and agitated behavior, causing DHS to suspect the
influence of drugs. Beck tested positive for THC, opiates, benzodiazapines,
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 467
methamphetamine, and amphetamine. The family service worker also had concerns about the
children’s home environment. The children were then removed from her custody by the
Department.
On September 9, 2015, the court adjudicated the children dependent-neglected. The
court noted specifically that Beck had tested positive for several illegal substances and that she
had driven a vehicle with the children while under the influence of those illegal substances,
thereby placing them at a risk of harm. Thus, the court based its adjudication on both neglect
and parental unfitness. The trial court set the goal of the case as reunification, ordered DHS
to provide services to Beck, and directed Beck to comply with the orders of the court.
After adjudication, the court conducted two review hearings. At both hearings, the
court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide services necessary to achieve
reunification. The court also found that Beck had only partially complied with the case plan
and had made some progress in mitigating the causes of the out-of-home placement.1
Specifically, the court noted that Beck was either unemployed or working only part-time, had
been jailed twice since adjudication, and had not provided any proof of her place of residence
to DHS. Regarding the children, the court suspended Beck’s visitation on the
recommendation of the children’s therapist. Regarding sobriety, the court found that Beck
had not remained clean and sober; that she had tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamine, THC, and opiates; that she had missed drug/alcohol assessment appointments;
and that she had not completed a drug-treatment program. Despite these findings adverse to
1
At the second review hearing, the court found that Beck had made only minimal
progress in alleviating the causes of out-of-home placement.
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Beck, the trial court continued the goal of the case as reunification, with a concurrent plan
of legal adoption/legal guardianship/permanent custody.
On June 29, 2016, the court conducted a permanency-planning hearing and changed
the goal of the case to termination of parental rights and adoption. One month later, on July
29, 2016, DHS filed a petition to terminate Beck’s parental rights, alleging the following
grounds: twelve months’ failure to remedy; subsequent other factors; and aggravated
circumstances. The Department alleged that it was in the best interest of the children for
Beck’s parental rights to be terminated, citing homelessness, inadequate supervision, continued
sexual abuse, and “all dangers associated with a parent abusing illegal substances.”
The termination hearing was initially scheduled for October 5, 2016. Beck did not
appear at the call of the docket. She had moved to the state of Utah and, due to difficulty
with travel, was late for the hearing. 2 The termination hearing was finally held on December
16, 2016. The court heard from numerous witnesses, including Beck, regarding Beck’s
compliance with the case plan, the adoptability of the children, and the progress of the
children in therapy and foster care. The court found the Department’s witnesses to be
credible in this regard. After the hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence
that (1) the children had been out of Beck’s custody for over 12 months, she had failed to
follow and complete the case plan, and she had not remedied the circumstances that brought
the children into the state’s custody; (2) her failure to complete the case plan and remedy the
conditions that brought the children into custody demonstrated her incapacity or indifference
2
The case was rescheduled to October 20, 2016, but did not proceed that day due to
a conflict with the court.
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to remedy the circumstances preventing reunification; and (3) the Department had offered her
numerous services to achieve reunification and that there was little likelihood that continued
services would result in successful reunification and, as such, that Beck had subjected the
children to aggravated circumstances. The court noted that Beck had moved to Utah after
the permanency-planning hearing and that, since that hearing, she had attempted to make
progress on the case plan. However, the court found that Beck’s resumption of contact and
her efforts to participate in the case plan or follow the orders of the court both after the
permanency-planning hearing and before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, were
insufficient to prevent termination of her parental rights. The court found the Department
had proved all three statutory grounds alleged in the petition and that it was in the best
interest of the children to terminate Beck’s parental rights. More specifically, the court stated
it had considered the likelihood that the children would be adopted and the potential harm
to the children if they were returned to Beck’s custody. Beck appeals the order of
termination.
II. Standard of Review
The rights of natural parents are not to be passed over lightly. The termination of
parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents. Fox v.
Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, 448 S.W.3d 735. As a result, there is a heavy
burden placed on the party seeking to terminate the relationship. Id. However, parental rights
will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the
child. Smithee v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 506, 471 S.W.3d 227.
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In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one statutory ground for termination exists and that termination is in the
child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2015). Clear and convincing
evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the
allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196
(1992).
Our standard of review in termination-of-parental-rights cases is well settled; we
review these cases de novo. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d
286 (2001). We will not reverse the trial court’s rulings unless its findings are clearly
erroneous. J.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). In
determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, we give due deference to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Dinkins, supra.
III. Statutory Grounds
Beck challenges all three statutory grounds for termination found by the trial court: the
twelve-month-failure-to-remedy, the subsequent-other-factors, and the aggravated-
circumstances grounds. However, only one ground must be proved to
support termination. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the twelve-month-failure-to-remedy ground,
her challenge fails.
The failure-to-remedy ground found at section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) allows for
termination of parental rights if the child has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-
neglected and has continued to be out of the custody of the parent for twelve months, and
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despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the parent and correct the
conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Here,
it is undisputed that OB and SB were adjudicated dependent-neglected by the court and had
remained out of Beck’s custody for over twelve months. It is undisputed that the conditions
that caused their removal were Beck’s drug usage and her inability to properly supervise the
children. It is also undisputed that the trial court made specific findings at every hearing that
DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide services necessary to achieve reunification. Thus,
the only issue for discussion is whether Beck remedied the conditions that caused removal.
Here, Beck did not remedy the conditions that caused removal. Admittedly, she did
complete a 15-day outpatient-treatment program in May 2016. However, based on her drug-
and-alcohol assessment completed in August 2016, it was recommended that she enter
outpatient treatment for a minimum of 90 days while continuing with her individual therapy
appointments. While there was some evidence that she attended AA/NA meetings after she
had moved to Utah, there is no evidence that she has ever completed the recommended
outpatient treatment. Overall, throughout the history of these proceedings, Beck repeatedly
tested positive for controlled substances, continued to have issues with drugs up until at least
the permanency-planning hearing in June 2016 when she tested positive for buprenorphine,
attempted to manipulate the outcome of several of her drug screens, and failed to show for
others. The trial court heard all this evidence and was not convinced of her sobriety or that
she had shown that she could maintain sobriety. We cannot say that its finding in this regard
was clearly erroneous.
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Beck argues that she had shown recent progress and that the trial court erred in not
giving this due consideration. Her argument is misplaced. In termination proceedings, the
trial court must consider a parent’s compliance during the entire dependency-neglect case and
the evidence presented at the termination hearing in deciding whether termination is in the
child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(4)(B). Here, the trial court acknowledged
that Beck had recently made some progress but found that her progress was too little, too late.
Thus, the trial court clearly considered and weighed Beck’s compliance throughout the entire
case and did not reject her last-minute efforts out of hand.
IV. Best Interest
Beck next challenges the trial court’s best-interest finding, arguing that there was
insufficient evidence of a potential harm; she does not challenge the court’s adoptability
finding. However, we hold that the court’s potential-harm analysis was not clearly erroneous.
In considering whether there will be potential harm caused by returning the child to the
parent, the trial court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively
identify a potential harm. Reid, supra. Potential harm must be viewed in broad terms,
including the harm the child suffers from the lack of stability in a permanent home. Martin v.
State, 2017 Ark. 115, 515 S.W.3d 599.. Moreover, a court may consider past behavior as a
predictor of likely potential harm should the child be returned to the parent’s care and
custody. Harbin v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 715, at 3, 451 S.W.3d 231,
233. Here, the court noted that Beck’s failure to complete the case plan demonstrated how
SB and OB would be at risk of harm if returned to her custody. There was also evidence that
Beck is living with an 80-year-old man in exchange for caring for him and his house. She
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met the man after she had moved to Utah and had been picked up by him while she was
hitchhiking. They do not have a written lease agreement, and she could be kicked out at any
time for any reason. He has not yet undergone a background check, and because a home
study has not been completed, it is unclear whether his household would even meet with
court approval for placement. Finally, the children are in counseling, and their former
therapist has recommended no contact with Beck until more progress has been made in their
treatment. As a result, Beck has had no contact with the children for almost a year, and there
is no evidence as to when contact could resume without harm to the children’s treatment.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s finding in this regard was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
GRUBER, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
Tina Bowers Lee, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.
Andrew Firth and Mary Goff, County Legal Operations, for appellee.
Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor
children.
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