Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC16-2089
____________
GREGORY PRESLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[September 20, 2017]
LABARGA, C.J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District
Court of Appeal in Presley v. State, 204 So. 3d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). The
district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Wilson v. State (Wilson v. State), 734 So. 2d
1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the First District and
hold that law enforcement officers may, as a matter of course, detain the
passengers of a vehicle for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without
violating the Fourth Amendment.1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the events in this case, Gregory Presley was on drug offender
probation. A special condition of the probation provided, “You will abstain
entirely from the use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs, and you will not associate
with anyone who is illegally using drugs or consuming alcohol.”
During the early morning hours of January 29, 2015, Gainesville police
officer Tarik Jallad conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle for a faulty taillight and a
stop sign violation. Presley was one of two passengers in the vehicle. Officers
John Pandak and Joshua Meurer subsequently responded to the scene based upon a
request for backup due to a struggle occurring with the other passenger, who had
exited the vehicle and attempted to leave. At the time of their arrival, Officer
Jallad and a second officer were dealing with that passenger, who was in handcuffs
and behaving belligerently. Presley and the driver were standing outside of the
vehicle. Officer Pandak approached Presley and asked for his name and
identification, both of which Presley provided. Presley volunteered his date of
1. In reaching this holding, we expressly decline to address whether law
enforcement may detain passengers during a traffic stop of a common carrier or a
vehicle that, at the time of the stop, is being utilized as part of a transportation-
based business.
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birth. Officer Pandak asked general questions, and Presley stated that the group
had been at his aunt’s house. During the interaction, Presley admitted he had been
consuming alcohol.2 When Presley asked, “So what is the problem?” Officer
Pandak responded, “I don’t know, man. This is a traffic stop, you’re part of it. So
we’re hanging out. That’s all there is to it.” Officer Pandak later stated, “Well,
we’re just talking, man. You can’t go anywhere at the moment because you’re part
of this stop. That’s all.” After a background check revealed Presley was on drug
offender probation with the special condition that he not consume alcohol, Presley
was arrested for the violation of probation. During the search incident to arrest,
Officer Pandak recovered a plastic bag containing powder cocaine from Presley’s
pocket.
Presley filed a motion to suppress his statements and all evidence seized on
the basis that he was illegally detained during the traffic stop. The circuit court
denied the motion, concluding that although Presley was detained, the limited
nature and duration of the detention did not significantly interfere with his Fourth
Amendment liberty interests. The circuit court revoked Presley’s probation and
sentenced him to multiple terms of incarceration for his earlier drug crimes.
2. Officer Meurer could smell alcohol on Presley, and he heard Presley say
he had been “drinking all day.”
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The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “an officer may, as
a matter of course, detain a passenger during a lawful traffic stop without violating
the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Presley, 204 So. 3d at 85-86. The
district court fully concurred with the unanimous en banc decision of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in Aguiar v. State, 199 So. 3d 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
Presley, 204 So. 3d at 89.
The First District recognized that in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977), and Maryland v. Wilson (Maryland v. Wilson), 519 U.S. 408 (1997), the
United States Supreme Court held that both drivers and passengers can be asked to
exit the vehicle during a traffic stop. Presley, 204 So. 3d at 87. The First District
then explained that the seminal case in Florida on passenger detentions during
traffic stops is Wilson v. State, the case with which conflict was certified. Presley,
204 So. 3d at 88-89. In Wilson v. State, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held:
[A] police officer conducting a lawful traffic stop may not, as a matter
of course, order a passenger who has left the stopped vehicle to return
to and remain in the vehicle until completion of the stop. The officer
must have an articulable founded suspicion of criminal activity or a
reasonable belief that the passenger poses a threat to the safety of the
officer, himself, or others before ordering the passenger to return to
and remain in the vehicle.
734 So. 2d at 1113. The Fourth District determined that:
[A] command preventing an innocent passenger from leaving the
scene of a traffic stop to continue on his independent way is a greater
intrusion upon personal liberty than an order simply directing a
passenger out of the vehicle. Such an arbitrary interference with the
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freedom of movement of one who is not suspected of any illegal
activity whatsoever cannot be classified as a de minimis intrusion.
Id. at 1111-12.
The First District noted that the Aguiar court concluded the analysis in
Wilson v. State was flawed because it failed to give sufficient deference to officer
safety. Presley, 204 So. 3d at 88 (citing Aguiar, 199 So. 3d at 923). The Fifth
District in Aguiar posited that, while allowing a passenger to remain in the vehicle
during a stop posed a danger to officers in that the passenger might have access to
weapons, allowing a passenger to leave the scene could also present a dangerous
situation. 199 So. 3d at 925. For example, the passenger might return to attack the
officer while the officer is focused on the driver. Id. The Fifth District further
noted, “[a] departing passenger is a distraction that divides the officer’s focus and
thereby increases the risk of harm to the officer.” Id. The First District
acknowledged the Aguiar court’s disagreement with the Fourth District’s
conclusion that detaining the passenger for the duration of the stop was not a de
minimis intrusion:
[E]ven if detaining a passenger who desires to leave is more
burdensome than directing a stopped passenger to step out of the
vehicle, the infringement is minimal in light of the fact that: (1) the
passenger’s planned mode of travel has already been lawfully
interrupted; (2) the passenger has already been “stopped” due to the
driver’s lawful detention; and (3) routine traffic stops are brief in
duration. . . . Because the legitimate and weighty concern of officer
safety can only be addressed “if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation[,]” we believe that this
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interest outweighs the minimal intrusion on those few passengers who
might prefer to leave the scene.
Presley, 204 So. 3d at 88 (quoting Aguiar, 199 So. 3d at 925-26 (quoting Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414)).
Additionally, the Aguiar court determined that two Supreme Court cases—
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323
(2009)—support the conclusion that a passenger may be detained for the duration
of a traffic stop. See Presley, 204 So. 3d at 88-89 (citing Aguiar, 199 So. 3d at
927-30). The First District noted that in both cases, the Supreme Court held a
traffic stop seizes both the driver and any passengers. Presley, 204 So. 3d at 88-89
(citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 251; Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327). The Supreme Court
in Johnson further concluded that “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
stop’s duration.” See Presley, 204 So. 3d at 89 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333).
Noting that the Aguiar court relied upon Brendlin and Johnson to hold an officer
may, as a matter of course, detain a passenger during a lawful stop without
violating the Fourth Amendment, the First District agreed with this conclusion and
certified conflict with Wilson v. State, as well as “its progeny.” Presley, 204 So.
3d at 89.
This review follows.
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ANALYSIS
Standards of Review
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of
Florida’s Declaration of Rights both guarantee citizens the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure provision of the
Florida Constitution contains a conformity clause providing that the right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this
right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; see also State v. Butler, 655 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1995)
(“This Court is bound, on search and seizure issues, to follow the opinions of the
United States Supreme Court regardless of whether the claim of an illegal arrest or
search is predicated upon the provisions of the Florida or United States
Constitutions.”).
The holdings in Presley and Wilson v. State reach opposite conclusions on a
legal issue—whether law enforcement officers may, during a lawful traffic stop,
detain a passenger as a matter of course for the duration of the stop without
violating the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because this is a pure
question of law, the standard of review is de novo. Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d
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177, 192 (Fla. 2010). However, to the extent any factual findings are involved in
the application of the law to a specific case, the findings of the circuit court “must
be sustained if supported by competent substantial evidence.” Id.
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he touchstone of [an]
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.’ ” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
(1968)). “Reasonableness . . . depends ‘on a balance between the public interest
and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by
law officers.’ ” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
Supreme Court Precedent
Because the Presley and Aguiar courts concluded that the evolution of
United States Supreme Court precedent with regard to traffic stops and passengers
necessitated a reconsideration of Wilson v. State—a conclusion the State contends
is also supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)—a review of those cases follows.
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers during a
traffic stop could ask the driver to exit the vehicle without violating the Fourth
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Amendment. 434 U.S. at 108-09. Weighing the competing interests, the Court
first stated:
We think it too plain for argument that the State’s proffered
justification—the safety of the officer—is both legitimate and
weighty. “Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”
Terry v. Ohio, [] 392 U.S. at 23. And we have specifically recognized
the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person
seated in an automobile. “According to one study, approximately
30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a
suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings—
A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P.S. 93 (1963).” Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972). We are aware that not all
these assaults occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have
before expressly declined to accept the argument that traffic violations
necessarily involve less danger to officers than other types of
confrontations. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
Indeed, it appears “that a significant percentage of murders of police
officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” Id. at 234
n.5.
Id. at 110.3 The Supreme Court then concluded that the intrusion upon the liberty
interest of the driver was de minimis:
The driver is being asked to expose to view very little more of his
person than is already exposed. The police have already lawfully
decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is
whether he shall spend that period sitting in the driver’s seat of his car
or standing alongside it. Not only is the insistence of the police on the
latter choice not a “serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,”
3. The Supreme Court also noted “[t]he hazard of accidental injury from
passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle may also be
appreciable in some situations.” Id. at 111. Therefore, an officer “prudently may
prefer to ask the driver to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road
where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.” Id.
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but it hardly rises to the level of a “ ‘petty indignity.’ ” Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 17. What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail
when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.
Id. at 111.
In Maryland v. Wilson, the Supreme Court applied the holding in Mimms to
passengers in vehicles that are lawfully stopped. 519 U.S. at 410. The Court noted
the same interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the vehicle
occupant is a driver or passenger:
Regrettably, traffic stops may be dangerous encounters. In 1994
alone, there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during
traffic pursuits and stops. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
Crime Reports: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted 71,
33 (1994). In the case of passengers, the danger of the officer’s
standing in the path of oncoming traffic would not be present except
in the case of a passenger in the left rear seat, but the fact that there is
more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible sources
of harm to the officer.
Id. at 413. The Supreme Court concluded the personal liberty interest of the
passenger is greater than that of the driver because, while there is probable cause to
believe the driver has committed a vehicular offense, “there is no such reason to
stop or detain the passengers.” Id. However, the Court determined that the
additional intrusion in asking a passenger to exit the vehicle was minimal:
[A]s a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of
the stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances which
will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be
outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car. Outside the car, the
passengers will be denied access to any possible weapon that might be
concealed in the interior of the passenger compartment. It would
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seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the
ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but
from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be
uncovered during the stop. And the motivation of a passenger to
employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit
as great as that of the driver.
Id. at 413-14. The Supreme Court quoted Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981), in support of its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits law
enforcement officers to order passengers out of a vehicle:
[In Summers,] the police had obtained a search warrant for contraband
thought to be located in a residence, but when they arrived to execute
the warrant they found Summers coming down the front steps. The
question in the case depended “upon a determination whether the
officers had the authority to require him to re-enter the house and to
remain there while they conducted their search.” Id. at 695. In
holding as it did, the Court said:
Although no special danger to the police is suggested by
the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to
search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may
give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal
or destroy evidence. The risk of harm to both the police
and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03).
The Supreme Court rejected Wilson’s contention that, because the Court
generally eschews bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, it should not
adopt a bright-line rule with regard to passengers during lawful traffic stops:
“[T]hat we typically avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not
mean that we have always done so; Mimms itself drew a bright line, and we
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believe the principles that underlay that decision apply to passengers as well.” Id.
at 413 n.1. The Supreme Court also declined to address the State of Maryland’s
assertion that the Court should hold an officer may forcibly detain a passenger for
the duration of a stop. Id. at 415 n.3. The Supreme Court concluded that Wilson
was not subjected to detention based upon the stop of the vehicle once he exited it
at the officer’s request. Id. Instead, when Wilson exited the vehicle, crack cocaine
fell to the ground. Id. at 411. Therefore, Wilson was arrested based on probable
cause to believe he was guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.
at 415 n.3. As a result, the Supreme Court stated, “The question which Maryland
wishes answered . . . is not presented by this case, and we express no opinion upon
it.” Id. Thus, Maryland v. Wilson did not resolve the issue presented by this
case—the detention of a passenger as a matter of course during a traffic stop.
In Brendlin, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a traffic stop seizes both
driver and passengers for Fourth Amendment purposes, such that a passenger may
challenge the constitutionality of the stop. 551 U.S. at 251. In that case, two
officers stopped a vehicle to verify that a temporary permit affixed to the vehicle
was actually assigned to the vehicle. Id. at 252.4 One officer recognized the
passenger as “one of the Brendlin brothers,” and knew that one of the brothers had
4. The State of California conceded the police did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify a traffic stop on this basis. Id. at 253 n.2.
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“dropped out of parole supervision.” Id. The officer verified that Brendlin was a
parole violator with an outstanding no-bail arrest warrant and ordered Brendlin out
of the vehicle. Id. During the search incident to arrest, the officers found a syringe
cap on his person, and a search of the vehicle revealed tubing, a scale, and “other
things used to produce methamphetamine.” Id. Brendlin was charged with
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. at 253. He moved to
suppress the evidence, contending the traffic stop constituted an unlawful seizure
of his person. Id.
In concluding that passengers are seized during a traffic stop for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court first noted the general proposition that:
[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer,
“ ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ ” terminates or
restrains his freedom of movement, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434 (1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)),
“through means intentionally applied,” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original). Thus, an “unintended
person . . . [may be] the object of the detention,” so long as the
detention is “willful” and not merely the consequence of “an
unknowing act.” Id. at 596.
Id. at 254. The Court then addressed the State of California’s assertion that
Brendlin was not seized and, therefore, could not claim the evidence was tainted by
an unconstitutional stop:
We think that in these circumstances any reasonable passenger would
have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the
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point that no one in the car was free to depart without police
permission.
A traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has
chosen just as much as it halts the driver . . . and the police activity
that normally amounts to intrusion on “privacy and personal security”
does not normally (and did not here) distinguish between passenger
and driver. An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts
with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a
sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow people to
come and go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation
into faulty behavior or wrongdoing. If the likely wrongdoing is not
the driving, the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion
owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad
driving, the passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and
his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt
an objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to
leave in the first place.
It is also reasonable for passengers to expect that a police
officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let
people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety. In
Maryland v. Wilson, [] we held that during a lawful traffic stop an
officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary
measure, without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a
safety risk. In fashioning this rule, we invoked our earlier statement
that “ ‘[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is
minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of
the situation.’ ” Wilson, [519 U.S.] at 414 (quoting Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 (1981)). What we have said in
these opinions probably reflects a societal expectation of
“ ‘unquestioned [police] command’ ” at odds with any notion that a
passenger would feel free to leave, or to terminate the personal
encounter any other way, without advance permission.
Id. at 257-58 (some citations and footnote omitted). Based upon this analysis, the
Supreme Court held that Brendlin was seized from the moment the vehicle stopped
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on the side of the road, and it was error for the trial court to conclude that seizure
did not occur until the formal arrest. Id. at 263.5
In Johnson—another unanimous Supreme Court decision—members of a
gang task force stopped a vehicle when a license plate check revealed the
registration had been suspended. 555 U.S. at 327. An officer noticed one of the
two passengers, Johnson, wore colors consistent with gang membership and was in
possession of a police scanner. Id. at 328. In response to the officer’s questions,
Johnson provided his name and date of birth, and he volunteered the city he was
from—which the officer knew was home to a Crips gang. Id. Johnson also
admitted he had previously been incarcerated for burglary. Id. The officer asked
Johnson to exit the vehicle so she could distance him from the other passenger and
obtain “intelligence” about the gang of which Johnson might be a member. Id.
5. The Supreme Court rejected the State of California’s contention that,
under this holding, “all taxi cab and bus passengers would be ‘seized’ under the
Fourth Amendment when the cab or bus driver is pulled over by the police for
running a red light.” 551 U.S. at 262 n.6. The Supreme Court explained:
[T]he relationship between driver and passenger is not the same in a
common carrier as it is in a private vehicle, and the expectations of
police officers and passengers differ accordingly. In those cases, as
here, the crucial question would be whether a reasonable person in the
passenger’s position would feel free to take steps to terminate the
encounter.
Id.
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Based upon her observations and Johnson’s answers to her questions while he was
still seated in the vehicle, the officer suspected he might possess a weapon, so
when Johnson exited, she frisked him and felt the butt of a gun. Id.
After being charged with possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor,
Johnson moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search. Id. at
329. In concluding the trial court properly denied suppression, the Supreme Court
expressed that most traffic stops “resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind
of brief detention authorized in Terry.” Id. at 330 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984)). The Court explained that:
Terry established the legitimacy of an investigatory stop “in
situations where [the police] may lack probable cause for an arrest.”
[392 U.S. at 24]. When the stop is justified by suspicion (reasonably
grounded, but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot
. . . the police officer must be positioned to act instantly on reasonable
suspicion that the persons temporarily detained are armed and
dangerous. Ibid. Recognizing that a limited search of outer clothing
for weapons serves to protect both the officer and the public, the
Court held the patdown reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 330. The Supreme Court held:
[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition—a lawful
investigatory stop—is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular
violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any
occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a
patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however,
just as in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal
activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person
subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.
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Id. at 327. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reiterated that “traffic stops are
‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’ ” but the risk of harm to both
the police and the vehicle occupants is minimized if “ ‘the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’ ” Id. at 330 (quoting Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414). The
Supreme Court then traced its precedent—first Mimms, then Maryland v. Wilson,
then Brendlin—to conclude that a vehicle driver or any passenger may be
subjected to a patdown when there is reasonable suspicion to believe he is armed
and dangerous. Id. at 331-32.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Arizona Court of
Appeals that, although Johnson was lawfully detained incident to the legitimate
traffic stop, once the officer began to question him on matters unrelated to the stop,
the authority to conduct a frisk ceased in the absence of reasonable suspicion that
Johnson was engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal activity. Id. at 332. The
Supreme Court explained:
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for
investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver
and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the
duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no
further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers
they are free to leave. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 258. An officer’s
inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop,
this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do
not measurably extend the duration of the stop.
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In sum, as stated in Brendlin, a traffic stop of a car
communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to
terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.
Nothing occurred in this case that would have conveyed to Johnson
that, prior to the frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was
otherwise free “to depart without police permission.” Officer Trevizo
surely was not constitutionally required to give Johnson an
opportunity to depart the scene after he exited the vehicle without first
ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a dangerous person
to get behind her.
Id. at 333-34 (some citations omitted).
Lastly, in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court articulated a limitation on traffic-
stop detentions. There, a K-9 officer observed a vehicle veer onto the shoulder of a
road and then jerk back onto the road. 135 S. Ct. at 1612. After running a records
check on the driver, Rodriguez, the officer requested the license of the passenger.
Id. at 1613. The officer returned to his vehicle a second time to run a records
check on the passenger and, at that time, he requested a second officer. Id. The
officer issued a written warning to Rodriguez and returned to both men their
documents. Id. The officer admitted that he had “got all the reason[s] for the stop
out of the way.” Id. Nonetheless, the officer required the men to wait until the
second officer arrived. Id. At that time, the officer who pulled the men over led
his dog around the vehicle, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Id. A
search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine. Id.
After being indicted in federal court, Rodriguez moved to suppress the
evidence on the ground that the officer who initiated the stop prolonged it without
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reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff. Id. The Supreme Court
agreed, explaining:
Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the
traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to
related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the
purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate th[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have
been—completed.
Id. at 1614 (citations omitted).6 Consistent with Johnson, the Supreme Court
stated:
The seizure remains lawful only “so long as [unrelated] inquiries do
not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” An officer, in other
words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise
lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs
the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.
6. The Supreme Court has further explained:
Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some
point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our
cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops. While it is clear
that the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is
so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion, we
have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes
to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to
effectuate those purposes.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
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Id. at 1615 (citations omitted). According to the Supreme Court, the officer’s
mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop—such as checking
the driver license, checking for outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, all of which serve the
same goal as enforcing the traffic code: “ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly.” Id.
The Supreme Court then distinguished the dog sniff as a measure directed at
detecting evidence of criminal wrongdoing—something which is not an ordinary
incident of a traffic stop, or part of the officer’s traffic mission. Id. The Supreme
Court elaborated:
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the
government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop
itself. Traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police
officers,” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted),
so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely. On-scene
investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission.
So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours.
Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was no more intrusive
than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be justified on
the same basis. Highway and officer safety are interests different in
kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or
drug trafficking in particular.
Id. at 1616 (citations omitted).
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Analysis
The evolution of these cases—primarily the statements in Brendlin, 551 U.S.
at 258, that “[i]t is . . . reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at
the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in
ways that could jeopardize his safety,” and in Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, that “[t]he
temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains
reasonable, for the duration of the stop” (emphasis added)—demonstrates that the
Presley and Aguiar courts correctly held that law enforcement officers may prevent
passengers from leaving a traffic stop, as a matter of course, without violating the
Fourth Amendment. In Johnson, the Supreme Court reiterated that the “weighty
interest in officer safety” applies regardless of whether the occupant of the vehicle
is a driver or a passenger, and the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to
prevent apprehension for a more serious crime “is every bit as great as that of the
driver.” 555 U.S. at 331-32 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14).
The Supreme Court also explained that because the passenger is already stopped,
the “additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.” Id. at 332 (quoting
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415).
As previously discussed, both the First and Fifth Districts concluded that,
even if asking a passenger to remain at the scene is more burdensome than merely
asking the passenger to exit the vehicle, the intrusion upon personal liberty is de
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minimis because (1) the method of transport has already been lawfully interrupted
by virtue of the stop, (2) the passenger has already been stopped by virtue of the
driver’s lawful detention, and (3) routine traffic stops are brief in duration.
Presley, 204 So. 3d at 88 (quoting Aguiar, 199 So. 3d at 926). This conclusion is
consistent with the evolution of Supreme Court precedent and the common thread
that runs through these cases—the “legitimate and weighty interest” in officer
safety during a traffic stop outweighs the intrusion upon a passenger’s liberty
interest and permits an officer to exercise “unquestioned command of the
situation.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110;
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414).
As reflected by Rodriguez, however, the length of detention during a traffic
stop is not subject to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement. Instead,
“[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer
than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose,” and the “[a]uthority for the seizure
. . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have
been—completed.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, law enforcement officers may detain passengers only
for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop. See id. (citing United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), for the proposition that “in determining the reasonable
duration of a stop, ‘it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
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pursued [the] investigation’ ”). During a routine traffic stop, this is the length of
time necessary for law enforcement to check the driver license, the vehicle
registration, and the proof of insurance; to determine whether there are outstanding
warrants; to write any citation or warning; to return the documents; and to issue the
warning or citation. At that time, and in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a
passenger is engaged in criminal activity, “the police have no further need to
control the scene,” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, and the passenger must be allowed to
depart. Detention is permissible for this limited period of time because it allows
law enforcement officers to safely do their job—accomplishing the “mission” of
the stop—and not be at risk due to potential violence from passengers or other
vehicles on the roadway.
The Present Case
Despite our previous explanation as to what constitutes a reasonable period
of time to detain passengers during a routine traffic stop, the facts of this case
present a situation that was anything but routine. Instead, a stop that was initiated
for basic traffic violations7 quickly evolved into a struggle between a law
enforcement officer and a passenger who had attempted to leave, requiring that
officer to call for backup. Therefore, in determining whether the detention of
7. Presley does not challenge the bases asserted by Officer Jallad for the
initiation of the traffic stop.
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Presley was constitutional, we must evaluate under the specific facts of this case
whether the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable, such that the “mission” of
the stop—“to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to
related safety concerns”—could be completed. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614
(citations omitted).
Here, the traffic stop commenced when Officer Jallad pulled the vehicle
over for a faulty taillight and a stop sign violation. It is not clear from the record
how much time elapsed between the stop and the arrival of Officers Pandak and
Meurer in response to the request for assistance. However, the circuit court found
that from the time Officers Pandak and Meurer arrived, to the time they were
notified that Presley was on probation, thereby providing probable cause for
Presley’s arrest, “only a matter of minutes had passed.” This conclusion is
supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 192.
Further, although this traffic stop may have lasted longer than a routine, uneventful
stop, it was prolonged not by law enforcement, but by the fact that one of the
passengers exited the vehicle and attempted to leave. Therefore, instead of being
able to address the traffic violations immediately, Officer Jallad first needed to
secure that passenger, who was belligerent and had to be placed in handcuffs. For
Officer Jallad to “complete his mission safely,” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, we
conclude the detention was reasonably extended in order for backup officers to
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arrive and assist with the driver and Presley. Nothing in the record suggests that
the duration of this traffic stop was unreasonable and, accordingly, we hold that the
seizure of Presley did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we approve both the decision below and Aguiar.
We hold that, as a matter of course, law enforcement officers may detain a
vehicle’s passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without violating
the Fourth Amendment. We disapprove of the Fourth District’s decision in Wilson
v. State, and any cases that rely upon Wilson v. State for the proposition that law
enforcement officers under the Fourth Amendment are precluded from detaining
passengers for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring.
This Court is bound by the precedent of the United States Supreme Court
when interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Consistent with that precedent, the majority is correct that
“as a matter of course, law enforcement officers may detain a vehicle’s passengers
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for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop without violating the Fourth
Amendment.” Majority op. at 25. In this case, the defendant does not challenge
the reasonableness of the duration of the traffic stop, and I agree with the majority
that “under the specific facts of this case,” the stop was reasonable when “it was
prolonged not by law enforcement, but by the fact that one of the passengers” was
belligerent and had to be secured. Majority op. at 24.
I also fully appreciate that officer safety is a reason the United States
Supreme Court has concluded “that the Fourth Amendment permits law
enforcement officers to order passengers out of a vehicle.” Majority op. at 11.
However, when the traffic stop does not give rise to a need to question passengers
or ask for their identification, I fail to comprehend why the interrogation of
passengers on matters unrelated to the traffic stop, “so long as those inquiries do
not measurably extend the duration of the stop,” does not intrude on the
constitutional guarantee to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
In this case, similar to the conflict case, Aguiar v. State, 199 So. 3d 920 (Fla.
5th DCA 2016), the traffic stop was for a faulty taillight and running a stop sign.
See id. at 922 (explaining that the defendant “was the front-seat passenger in a
vehicle being stopped because a brake light was out and the driver was not wearing
a seat belt”). Presley, who is black, was a passenger in a car driven in the early
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morning hours in a neighborhood in Gainesville, Florida, that one of the
responding police officers described as a “high-crime, high-drug area.” One of the
other passengers in the car lived in a house in the neighborhood. The stop was
certainly justifiable based on the traffic violations, but there was no reasonable
suspicion to otherwise justify the continued interrogation. Yet, the officer
attempted to justify the detention of the passengers of the stopped car based on the
following:
[T]he totality of circumstances . . . late at night, one person already
left the—left the car, which was suspicious in and of itself, high-
crime, high-drug area, numerous other people walking around, officer
safety . . . for me to feel comfortable with this person leaving a
potential crime scene and getting away with something, and/or
destroying evidence, or coming back to harm me and my fellow
officers. So yes, he was not free to leave.
Because under the Fourth Amendment it does not matter whether the traffic
stop was pretextual, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), I fear
that Johnson and other recent Fourth Amendment decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, which condone the detention and questioning of passengers for
reasons entirely unrelated to the traffic stop so long as the questioning occurs under
the auspices of a “reasonably” long traffic stop, will lead to the erosion of the
guarantees afforded by the Fourth Amendment to those citizens who visit and live
in neighborhoods some may describe as “high-crime,” or otherwise suspicious.
See majority op. at 10-18 (discussing Johnson, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408
- 27 -
(1997), and Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)). Indeed, as this case and
Aguiar demonstrate, passengers need be wary of the risk of detention when
choosing whether to ride in a car with a faulty taillight.
As Justice Sotomayor has eloquently explained, it is a real concern that these
expanded rules regarding lawful seizures will adversely impact minorities:
This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and
examine you. When we condone officers’ use of these devices
without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in
an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our
communities as second-class citizens.
....
As the Justice Department notes, . . . many innocent people are
subjected to the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches. The
white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be
violated in this manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught 119-138 (2015).
But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of
this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow 95-136
(2010). For generations, black and brown parents have given their
children “the talk”—instructing them never to run down the street;
always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of
talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun
will react to them. See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black
Folk (1903); J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates,
Between the World and Me (2015).
....
We must not pretend that the countless people who are
routinely targeted by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in
the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can
breathe in this atmosphere. See L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner’s
Canary 274-283 (2002). They are the ones who recognize that
unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our
lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to
be anything but.
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Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069-71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
In this case, the majority announces a bright-line rule for cases involving a
routine traffic stop but then explains how the facts of this case were anything but
routine. See majority op. at 23. Regardless, I agree that “under the specific facts
of this case,” id. at 24, the length of the traffic stop was reasonable, and subsequent
United States Supreme Court precedent requires that we disapprove of Wilson v.
State, 734 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Because we are bound to follow the
United States Supreme Court precedent “on search and seizure issues,” I concur
but I would not announce a bright-line rule.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 1D15-4891
(Alachua County)
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Laurel Cornell Niles, Steven L. Seliger, and Joel
Arnold, Assistant Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Samuel B.
Steinberg, and Robert “Charlie” Lee, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondent
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