NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4756-15T1
IN THE MATTER OF THE
DENIAL OF THOMAS TEDESCO'S
REQUEST FOR A SECOND AND/OR
DUPLICATE FIREARMS PURCHASER
IDENTIFICATION CARD.
_____________________________
Submitted September 12, 2017 – Decided September 20, 2017
Before Judges Fasciale and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court, Law Division,
Bergen County.
Michael J. Beatrice, attorney for appellant.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Ian C. Kennedy,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Tedesco appeals from a May 23, 2016 order denying his request
for a "second and/or duplicate Firearms Purchaser Identification
Card (FPIC)." Judge Edward A. Jerejian entered the order and
rendered a thorough oral opinion. After conducting a hearing, the
judge found that it would be against the public health, safety,
and welfare for Tedesco to receive the FPIC. There exists
substantial credible evidence in the record to support such a
finding. We therefore affirm.
Tedesco discharged a weapon into a stack of magazines located
in a bathroom, while his wife and sons were downstairs in the
home. The police arrived at the residence and instructed Tedesco
to exit the bathroom. He eventually complied and the police
arrested him. Tedesco later admitted that he had fired the weapon
that night because he had previously been depressed and
intoxicated.
Tedesco did not dispute that he had fired the weapon in the
bathroom, or that his wife and children were downstairs. Instead,
he offered evidence that he had resolved his mental health and
alcohol issues. He testified that since the incident, he completed
substance abuse and alcohol treatment. Tedesco produced at the
hearing medical reports from his treating physicians stating that
since the incident he has remained sober and has properly treated
his depression.
The judge commended Tedesco for making progress towards his
alcohol and mental health issues. But the judge determined, after
having had the opportunity to observe and listen to him testify,
that Tedesco could relapse at any time. The judge then made an
independent finding that it would be against the public health,
safety, and welfare for Tedesco to receive the FPIC, upheld the
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police chief's denial of Tedesco's application for the FPIC, and
entered the order under review.
On appeal, Tedesco argues that the judge's findings – that
it would not be in the interest of the public health, safety, and
welfare for him to receive the FPIC – are against the weight of
the evidence.
The law governing this appeal is well settled. A municipal
police chief has the discretion, "subject to standards which have
been adjudged constitutionally adequate[,]" to grant or deny an
individual's application for a handgun permit or identification
card. Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 43 (1972). "The function of
the Police Chief as the local administrative official charged with
responsibility for the original decision to grant or withhold . .
. involves largely the exercise of an informal discretion, based
upon the information disclosed by a good faith investigation." In
re Application of Boyadjian, 362 N.J. Super. 463, 475 (App. Div.)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied,
178 N.J. 250 (2003).
When reviewing an application, a police chief must consider
the interests of the community and must not make a decision that
is "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Id. at 478. After
completing the investigation, if the police chief decides to deny
the application, there is "no obligation to hold a trial-type
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hearing before doing so." Weston, supra, 60 N.J. at 43. If the
police chief decides to deny the application, however, the
applicant should be given "an opportunity . . . to discuss the
matter . . ., to be informed of the reasons for the denial and to
offer any pertinent explanation or information for the purpose of
meeting the objections being raised." Id. at 43-44.
The police chief's decision to deny an application is subject
to de novo review by the Law Division, which "in this context
contemplates introduction of relevant and material testimony and
the application of an independent judgment to the testimony by the
reviewing court." Id. at 45. The police chief bears the burden
of establishing the existence of good cause for the denial "by a
fair preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 46. In evaluating
the facts and the reasons given for rejection, "the court should
give appropriate consideration to the [police chief's]
investigative experience and to any expertise he appears to have
developed in administering the statute." Ibid.
Upon review of the Law Division's decision, "an appellate
court should accept a [judge's] findings of fact that are supported
by substantial credible evidence." In re Return of Weapons to
J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc.
v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 (1989)). Where the evidence is
mostly testimonial and involves questions of credibility,
4 A-4756-15T1
deference to a judge's findings of fact is particularly
appropriate. Id. at 117. We will not disturb a judge's findings
of fact unless those findings would result in an injustice. Ibid.
(citing Rova Farms Resort v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84
(1974)).
Here, there exists substantial credible evidence in the
record to support the judge's findings. Tedesco fired a gun into
a stack of magazines in his home bathroom, knowing that his family
was in the residence. Tedesco then resisted exiting the bathroom
when the police arrived. The judge carefully considered Tedesco's
substance abuse and mental-health history, and observed Tedesco's
demeanor during the hearing. Given our standard of review, we
defer to the judge's findings, which we have no reason to disturb,
and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge
Jerejian.
Affirmed.
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