FILED
Sep 26 2017, 6:07 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John J. Schwarz, II William A. Ramsey
Schwarz Law Office, PC Barrett McNagny, LLP
Hudson, Indiana
Edmund P. Kos
David M. Mustard
Kos & Associates
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Harold David Walters, September 26, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
44A03-1609-CC-2214
v. Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit
Court
Lima Elevator Company, Inc., The Honorable J. Scott
Appellee-Plaintiff VanDerbeck
Trial Court Cause No.
44C01-1604-CC-52
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 1 of 7
[1] Harold David Walters (“Walters”) appeals the trial court’s grant of Lima
Elevator Company’s (“Lima”) motion to correct error. He argues the trial court
erred when it determined it had specific personal jurisdiction over him. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 26, 2016, Lima filed a claim against Walters, a resident of Michigan,
in LaGrange Circuit Court for non-payment of a purchase made on April 30,
2010. On June 17, 2016, Walters filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. On June 20, 2016, the trial court granted Walters’ motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
[3] On July 18, 2016, Lima filed a motion to correct error, alleging the court erred
when it granted Walters’ motion to dismiss because the facts underlying
Walters’ motion were unsupported by affidavit or verified pleading. Based
thereon, Lima claimed Walters failed to meet his burden to prove lack of
personal jurisdiction. 1 Walters responded on August 10, 2016, and on August
30, 2016, the trial court granted Lima’s motion to correct error, concluding it
had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters.
1
Lima also argued the court’s order was premature because Lima had not been given an opportunity to
respond to Walters’ motion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 2 of 7
Discussion and Decision
[4] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion to correct error. 2
Volunteers of Am. v. Premier Auto Acceptance Corp., 755 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001). We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. An abuse
of discretion occurs if the decision was against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court or if the court misapplied the law. Id.
[5] Our review of a trial court’s decision regarding personal jurisdiction is well-
settled:
“Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power to bring a person into
its adjudicative process and render a valid judgment over a
person.” Brockman v. Kravic, 779 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002). “The existence of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant is a constitutional requirement to rendering a valid
judgment, mandated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Anthem Ins. Cos. v. Tenet Healthcare
Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1237 (Ind. 2000). “Because Indiana
state trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction, jurisdiction is
presumed. Therefore, the plaintiff need not allege jurisdiction in
its complaint.” Id. at 1231 (footnote [o]mitted). “[O]nce the
party contesting jurisdiction, usually the defendant, challenges
the lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present
evidence to show that there is personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. However, the defendant bears the burden of proving
the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
2
The court’s order is a final judgment under Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(H)(4), which states a
judgment is a final judgment if “it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion to Correct Error
which was timely filed under Trial Rule 59.” Our court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments
under Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(A).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 3 of 7
evidence, unless the lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the complaint.” Id. “It is within the trial court’s sound discretion
to decide the jurisdictional facts.” Brockman, 779 N.E.2d at 1255.
“A trial court’s findings of jurisdictional facts are generally
reviewed for clear error. Once the court has decided those facts,
however, whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of
law. We review a trial court’s determination of personal
jurisdiction de novo.” Id. (citations omitted).
Keesling v. Winstead, 858 N.E.2d 996, 1000-1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[6] Here, the trial court found Walters “purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting business with Lima Elevator within Indiana, such that
he could reasonably anticipate defending a lawsuit in Indiana related to his
failure to pay for his credit purchases that he picked up from Lima Elevator in
Indiana.” (App. Vol. II at 7.) Based on that finding, the trial court concluded it
had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters in Lima’s claim against him.
[7] Regarding the determination of specific personal jurisdiction, our Indiana
Supreme Court has explained
specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related
to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
[Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,]
414 & n. 8, 104 S. Ct. 1868 [(1984)]. Specific jurisdiction
requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state so that
the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court there.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S. Ct.
2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A single contact with the forum
state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a
defendant, if it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 4 of 7
state and the suit is related to that connection. McGee v. Int’l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).
But a defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction “solely as a
result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868;
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct.
1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490
(1980)).
LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind. 2006). Walters contends
the trial court did not have specific personal jurisdiction over him because the
transaction from which Lima’s claim arose was not sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction. We disagree.
[8] To support his argument, Walters contends:
Lima has sued Walters for non-payment of money. The entirety
of Walters’ contact with Indiana, as to the 2010 transaction with
Lima was a) ordering seed from an Indiana company and b)
crossing into Indiana to pick up the seed. Lima is not suing
Walters for ordering the seed. Nor is it suing Walters for picking
up the seed. Lima is suing Walters alleging the non-payment of
money for the seed he received.
(Reply Br. of Appellant at 9.) We are hard pressed to conclude anything other
than that Walters has described facts to support the exact opposite of what he
purports to argue. His argument provides facts to satisfy the contacts required
for specific personal jurisdiction. Lima’s suit against Walters alleges he did not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 5 of 7
pay for seed he ordered from an Indiana business and picked up in Indiana.
Further, the record indicates this is the third such order Walters made with
Lima. There is no doubt Walters availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in Indiana such that he could anticipate being sued in Indiana.
Walters consented to Indiana courts having specific personal jurisdiction when
he ordered seed from an Indiana company and traveled to Indiana to pick up
the seed. See Attaway v. Omega, 903 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (specific
personal jurisdiction proven in case involving non-payment for a vehicle sold by
Indiana plaintiff to Idaho defendant, even when Indiana plaintiff traveled to
Idaho to deliver vehicle), reh’g denied.
[9] Once we determine the trial court’s conclusion regarding specific personal
jurisdiction is correct, due process requires the assertion of personal jurisdiction
“does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Boyer
v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). To determine this requirement, we
must balance five factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenience and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
[10] Here, the balance falls squarely in favor of the trial court’s determination of
specific personal jurisdiction. Regarding the burden to Walters, Lima directs us
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 6 of 7
to the fact Walters lives less than twenty miles from the courthouse and to the
fact it was not an imposition for Walters to come into Indiana to pick up the
seed for which he allegedly did not pay. As we held in Attaway, a case in which
we affirmed the trial court’s decision to assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in Idaho:
[I]t is certainly within the bounds of fair play and substantial
justice to allow Indiana to exercise personal jurisdiction over
individuals who have entered into a contract with an Indiana
resident for the purchase of property in Indiana, have removed
that property from the state of Indiana, and then rescinded
payment.
903 N.E.2d at 79. The trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over
Walters and it therefore did not abuse its discretion when it granted Lima’s
motion to correct error.
Conclusion
[11] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Lima’s motion to
correct error because it had specific personal jurisdiction over Walters. We
affirm and remand for further proceedings.
[12] Affirmed and remanded.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A03-1609-CC-2214 | September 26, 2017 Page 7 of 7
Harold David Walters v. Lima Elevator Company, Inc.
Combined Opinion