IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
MICHAEL AND SARA NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
WILLENS, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
Appellants,
CASE NO. 1D16-4704
v.
JOEL WILLENS AND LINDA
WILLENS,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed September 20, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
John Bradford Stetson, Jr., Judge.
Kansas R. Gooden of Boyd & Jenerette, PA, Jacksonville, for Appellants.
Harold S. Lippes of Lippes & Bryan, P.A., Ponte Vedra Beach, for Appellees.
PER CURIAM.
We find no merit in the substantive issues raised by Appellants and affirm the
final judgment without further discussion. However, because the trial court
inadvertently entered duplicate judgments, * we remand for the court to strike the
later-entered judgment. See Diecidue v. Lewis, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D376 (Fla. 2d
DCA Feb. 10, 2017); Sound Builders of St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Hanlon, 439 So. 2d
276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions.
LEWIS and WETHERELL, JJ., CONCUR; WINSOR, J., CONCURRING WITH
OPINION.
*
The original judgment was filed with the clerk on September 8, 2016, at 11:03
a.m. and it was recorded in the official records (book 17701, pages 2137–47) on the
same date. The duplicate judgment was filed with the clerk on September 8 at 2:23
p.m., but it was not recorded in the official records (book 17705, pages 535–45) until
September 12.
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WINSOR, J., concurring.
Michael Willens and his wife Sara own a home on Canopy Oaks Drive in
Jacksonville, and they invited Michael’s parents to live there rent free. The parents
moved in, the relationship deteriorated, and everyone ended up in litigation. After a
two-day bench trial, the trial court entered a final judgment declaring that the parents
“are entitled to live in the home for as long as they like.” This is the Willenses’
appeal. *
The facts that led to the final judgment, many of which were disputed, are
complicated and peculiar. The short version is that the Willenses recognized the
parents’ financial needs and sent a letter saying “[y]ou may move into our home on
Canopy Oaks Drive and live as long as you like rent free.” (emphasis in original).
The letter expressed hope that the move would improve the parties’ relationship and
noted that “the whole purpose is to make life easier so that [the parents] can enjoy
and build a life here with [the Willenses].”
There were other emails and letters, and the parties considered other
arrangements, but the parents ultimately moved from Maine and into the Canopy
Oaks Drive home. Once there, they undertook some $160,000 worth of
improvements, to which the Willenses objected at some point. This and other factors
*
The parents’ last name is also Willens, so to avoid confusion, this opinion
will refer to Michael and Sara Willens as the “Willenses” and the parents as the
“parents.”
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contributed to the relationship’s continued deterioration, until finally the Willenses
asked the parents to move out. The parents refused and changed the locks, and the
Willneses sued to evict. The parents counterclaimed, claiming breach-of-contract
and promissory estoppel, among other things.
After trial, the court entered its final judgment. The court found the parents’
testimony credible, found portions of the Willenses’ testimony “entirely
unreasonable, inconsistent with the documents, and not credible,” and found the
parents had “proved their case . . . by substantially more than a preponderance of the
evidence.” It concluded the parties had a written agreement with “clear and
unequivocal” terms and that the parents were entitled to specific performance. It
therefore directed the parties “to perform the agreement,” meaning the Willenses
were to let the parents live in the house indefinitely.
Separate from its ruling on the existence of an agreement, the court concluded
the parents had also proven their claim for promissory estoppel, finding the parents
had “significantly relied on [the Willenses’] promises to their detriment.” The court
awarded no separate relief on this point, explaining that the parents “are entitled to
the same relief awarded under their claim for specific performance.”
On appeal, the Willenses challenge the court’s conclusions as to the
agreement. They argue that there was no agreement and that if there were, the parents
violated it. But they presented no argument challenging the trial court’s promissory
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estoppel claims, at least not in their initial brief. When a decision is based on more
than one independent ground and the initial brief challenges only one, we must
affirm. See State v. J.V., 184 So. 3d 662, 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“As the order on
appeal had two grounds . . . , and as the State’s initial brief only challenges the first
ground . . . , we are compelled to affirm since reversal can only be premised on
arguments made in the initial brief.”); see also Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 181 So.
3d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“We affirm because appellants failed to raise
their arguments in their initial brief . . . .”). Even if the trial court was incorrect in
finding an agreement, the court’s independent conclusion on promissory estoppel
afforded the same relief, and that conclusion stands unchallenged. We therefore must
affirm the judgment.
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