IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
· THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), .
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR,USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
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UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, ·
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED ~OR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
201 7 -SC-000300-TG
(2016:..CA-001731-MR)
DARYL WAYNE LIGGETT APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KATHY LAPE, JUDGE
NO. 15-CR-00741
COMMONWEALTH OF.KENTUCKY APPELLEE
. .
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
·AFFIRMING
. Daryl Wayne Liggett appeals as a matter of right I from a circuit court
judgment convicting him of first-degree sodomy and sentencing him to 25
. years' imprisonment. The trial court entered thisjudgment upon Liggett's guilty
plea and imposed the sentence consistent with the plea bargain agreement
I
between Liggett and the Commonwealth. Liggett now argues that the trial court
erred.when it denied his motion made before final sentencing to set aside his
. .
guilty plea as involuntarily made. We affirm the judgment because we hold that
the trial court's findings that Liggett's guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent are supported by substantial evidence, and thus not clearly
1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). '\
. erroneous, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Liggett's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.
A g1:"and jury indicted Liggett for one count of first-degree sodomy of a
victim under 12 years of age. Initially, the court appointed counsel to represent
Liggett, and Liggett pleaded not guilty to the charge. In exchange for Liggett's
guilty plea.to the charges in the indictment, the Commonwealth agreed to
recommend 25 years in prison and further agreed not to seek indictment on
other potential changes arising out of the underlying facts. Based on the.
charged offense, Liggett faced 20 to 50 years, or life, in prison.2
In his motion to ente:r: a guilty plea, Liggett declared in writing the
following:
I declare my pie.a of "GUILTY" is freely, knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made; that I.have been represented by counsel; that my
attorney has fully explained my constitutional rights to me, as well
as the charges against me and any defenses to them; and that I
understand the nature of this proceeding and all matters
contained in this document.
' the trial court conducted a Boykin
Before accepting Liggett's guilty plea,
hearing3, canvassing Liggett's understanding of the proceedings; During this
colloq~y, Liggett stated und~r oath: he has a 12th gtade education and can
read and write; his judgment was not impaired; he understood his .
constitution~! rights; he fully unde~stood ·what was happening in his case; he
2 KRS 510.070(2); KRS 532.060(2)(a) .
.a Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
2
had sufficient time to discuss the plea· with counsel; he had no complaints
about counsel's representation; and that he was not cbetced into pleading
guilty, but was doing so of his own free will because he was, in fact, guilty.
In the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) prepared after the trial
court accepted the guilty plea, Liggett took responsibility for ~~e crime and
stated that the sentence contemplated by the plea bargain agreement was fair,
in addition to indicating that he fully understood his guilty .Plea. At the
conclusion of the Boykin colloquy, the trial court accepted Liggett's guilty plea,
finding it to be knowingJy, voluntarily, .and inteiligently made.
Before final sentencing, Liggett retained new counsel. New counsel
. . .
moved to withdraw the guilty plea and supporte~ the motion with an affidavit
from Liggett stating various deficie.ncies on the part of former counsel,
including:
.. ' .
(1) that he [Liggett] was not provided adequate representation on
the matter;· · · .
(2) that he was hot afforded the opportunity to review his discovery
with his attorney until the day he pled guilty; ·
(3) that he and his attorney did not spend enough time on
reviewing and explaining his discovery to fully understand his
case;
(4) that his attorney did not provide him with advice when he
requested her advice; · ·
(5) that he was unable to reach his attorney on the phone, nor
could he schedule a meeting with her;
(6) that his attorney(did not attend all court appearances, instead
another attorney that ·was not adequately advised of his case filled
in several times; and
(7) that his guilty ·plea was ·not made knowingly and intelligently;
as required.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Liggett's motion to withdraw the
guilty' plea, allowing both sides to present arguments and denied the motion.
3
The trial court supported its denial by recalling'Liggett's previous statements
made in open court and his previously signed document, in addition to
statements attributed to him in his PSI, in which Liggett took responsibility for
the crime and stated that his sentence was _fair. All these facts, the trial cou~t
found, refuted Liggett's more recent allegations concerning the validity of his
guilty plea.
Later, the trial court sentenced Liggett to 25 years imprisonment in
accordance with the plea agreement and entered judgment accordingly.
II. ANALY;SIS.
A. Standard of Review.
An appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of~ motion to withdraw
a guilty piea in a two-step. process. First, a trial court's determination as to th.e
voluntariness of a plea is reviewed for clear error. 4 A decision. that is supported
.
by substantial.evidence is not clearly erroneous.s Second, once. a court
determines a plea to be voluntary, a trial court's refusal to allow a voluntary
· plea to be withdrawn is review<;!d for an abuse of discretion. 6 "A trial court
abuses its discretion when it render_s a decision which is arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." 7
4 Rigdon v. Commonwealth, I44 S.W.3d 283~ 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing Bronk. v. Commonwealth,
58 S.W.. 3d 482, 489 (Ky. 200I) (Cooper, J., concurring)).
s Rigdon, i 44 S. W .3d at 288 (citing Baltimore v. Commonwealth, I I 9 S. W ..3d 532 (Ky. App. 2003)).
6 Rigdon, I44 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Bronk, 58 S.,W,3d at 487). These case~ interpret Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.10 to afford. abuse of discretion review of a trial court's decision.
RCr a.10 states, "At any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty ... to be
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." (emphasis added). ·
1 Rigdon, I44 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Goodyear 1lre & Rubber Co. v. Tlwmpson, I I S.W.3d 575,
58.I (Ky. 2000)). .
4
B. General Law.
"A guilty plea is valid only when it is entered intelligently and
voluntarily."8 "In determining the validity of guilty/pleas in criminal cases, the
plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
course of action open to the defendant. "9 "Whether a guilty plea is voluntarily
given is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
it. "10 "The trial court is in the best position to determine the totality of
. .
circumstances surrounding a guilty plea." 11 If the c.ourt finds a·guilty plea to be
involuntary, the motion to withdraw must be granted; however, if a plea is
found to be voluntary, it is then within the trial court's discretion to permit its
withdrawal. 12 "A defendant who expressly represents in open court that his
guilty plea is voluntary may not ordinarily repudfate his statements to the
sentencingjudge."1 3 "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption ofverity."14
Because Liggett alleged ineffective assistan.ce of counsel, we :in1:J.st
"consider
.
the totality of circumstances surrounding the. . guilty plea and
jID<;tapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent. in a proper plea colloquy
a Bronk, 58 S.W.3d.at 486. . · · . .·
9 Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990) (citing Norlh Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1986)).
10 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 287-88 (citing Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2002)}.
11 Id.
. 12 Id. . . . . . . .
13 Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 568 (Ky. 2006) (quoting U.S. v. Todaro, 982 F.2d.
1025, 1030 (6th Cir. 1993)). . . . ·
14Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54 (citing Bla,ckledge v. Allison,'431 U.S. 63 (1997)).
5
with a Strickland v. Washington 15 inquiry into the performance of counsel."16
Under this inquiry, Liggett must demonstrate:
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance
fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance;
and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea proce.ss that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability thatthe defendant would not have
pleaded.gl.lilty, but would hav.e insisted on going to trial.17
"The fact that counsel .consulted ' only briefly with his client before his.
.
client eritered a gliilty plea does not, absent more, establish ineffective
assistance of counsel; it is only a factor to be considered in the totality of
circumstances."18 While limited communications between an attorney
and client are far from ideal, "such situations are not uncommon."19
"A conclusory
.
allegation
.
to the effect that. absent
.
the error the.
movant would have insisted upo~ a tri~l is not enough" to demonstrate
prejudice.20 Liggett "must allege facts that, if proven, would 'support a
·conclusion that th~ decision to reject the plea bargain and go to trial
would have been rational" under the circumstances.21.
C. The Trial Court's Ruling was not Clearly Erroneous, nor did it Abuse
its Discretion. ·
The trial court's finding that Liggett entered his plea voluntarily,
·knowingly, and intelligently finds much support in the record. As stated, the
1s 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
16 Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486.
17 Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 486-87 (citing Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727-28).
is Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 290 (citing Jones v. Parke, 734 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (6th Cir. 1984)).
19 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 291.
20 Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W~3d 230, 237 (Ky. 2012).
21 Id.
6
trial court conducted a colloquy in open court with Liggett. During this
colloquy, Liggett confirmed that he was intellectually capable of understanding
and did understand the charge against him, his right to contest his guilt on
this charge, and the consequences of his decision to plead guilty. And the later-
made statements attributed to him in the PSI further supported the validity of
the guilty plea he made under oath during the plea colloquy.
Liggett's affidavit is the only evidence he submitted to support his effort
to set aside the guilt)' plea. Even viewing Liggett's allegations in the light most
favorable to him,. the totality of the circumstances favors the trial court's
finding that Liggett knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his guilty
plea. Liggett's statements in open court, his statements in his PSI, and the
written motion to enter the plea not only directly refute the conclusory
allegations he made in his affidavit, but also substantially outWeigh those
allegations, including his ineffec.tive assistance of counsel allegations. Liggett
presents no other evidence in support of his allegations, thus failing to meet
his burden.
Without more than conclusory allegations supported by Liggett's
affidavit, we cannot speculate. as to whether Liggett's-allegations amount to
such adeficient performance on the part of counsel so as to classify these
actions as "outside the range of professionally competent."22 Additionally~
nothing Liggett presented undermines the strength of the trial court's factual
findings regarding the voluntary, knowin·g, and intelligent nature of the guilty
22 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
7
plea, nor does· it demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
alleged errors, he would not ~ave pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.
.. Liggett's plea bargain resulted in imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment that was half the length of the se.nte:r:ice that he could have
received under the law. The bargain included an agreement by the
Commonwealth to forego seeking indictment for additional serious charges with
substantial ranges of punishment. Liggett thus did not meet his burden of
showing that a rat~onal individual would have rather fac.ed this possibility than
accept the guilty plea offer.
The question is whether the trial court's finc:lings are supported by
substantial evipence.; if they. are, the trial court did not commit clear error, and
,
its rulirig must be upheld. Because the trial court's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, as stated ·above, the trial court's finding that Liggett's
guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. is not clearly erroneous.
Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Liggett's .
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Nothing about the trial court's de.cision
renders it arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.23 Stated differently, nothing in the record c8.lls into question the
reasonableness of the trial judge's decision to deny Liggett's motion. The
·.judge's decision in this case to deny the motion did not amount to an abuse of
23 Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 288 (citing Goodyear Tire, 11 S.W.3d at 581).
8
.discretion because it was reasonable.to do so, based on the totality of the
record.
III. CONCLUSION . .
We affirm the judgment because we conclude that substantial evidence
supported the trial court's ruHng regarding the voluntariness of the guilty plea,
and thus the ·trial court committed no clear error on the fact, and because th·e
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Liggett's motion·to withdraw
his ple.a.
All sitting. All concur.
· COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Darrell A.· Cox
Berger & Cox
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky
John PaulVaro .
Assistant Attorney General ·
9
Daryl Wayne Liggett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Combined Opinion