RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED
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20 l 6-SC-000530-TG
(2016-CA-OO 1399-MR)
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
NO. 16-CR-00635
I
JOSHUA DEANTE JACKSON . APPELLEE
AND
2016-SC-000531-TG
(2016-CA-OO 1400-MR)
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
NO. 16-CR-00645
TELLY SAVALAS DENSON
)
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
REVERSING
In April 2016, the Governor signed l.nto law SB 56, which amended KRS
189A.010, Kentucky's principal driving under the influence o(alcohol (DUI),.
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statute. Subsection (5) of KRS 189A.010 provides substantially enhanced
penalties for subsequent DUI offenses committed within a specified time frame,
which we refer to as the "look-back" period. Subsequent offenses committed
after the look-back period are not subject to enhancement.
The 2016·amendment increased the look-back period from five years to
ten years. By the terms of the bill, the new ten-year look-back period went into
effect immediately. Obviously, the expanded ten-year look-back period will
capture more prior DUI offenses than the former five-year period.
Correspondingly, the additional five years during which DUI offenses can serve
as penalty-enhancing prior offenses means that more DUI offenders.with prior
DUI convictions will be subject to enhanced sentences ..
A unique issue, created by-the 2016 amendment of the look-back period,
arises in the cases now before this Court. ·In separate prosecutions in the
Warren Circuit Court, Joshua Deante Jackson and Telly Sayalas Denson were
charged with DUI, Fourth Offense, for offenses that occurred after the newly-
amended version of KRS 189A.010 .became effective. Both defendants had
prior convictions for,DUI offenses including one committed more than five
years but less than ten years· prior to his current, and thus beyond the five-
year· look-back period of the former law, but within the ten-year look-bacl~
period of the current law.
The circuit court held that the convictions exceeding the former five-year
/ look-back period could not be used to elevate the current DUI charges to DUI,
/
Fourth Offense. The Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Appeals.
2
R~cognizing the matter as one of "great and immediate public import~nce,"
pursuant to CR 74.02, we accepted transfer of the appeal.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the trial court erred
by excluding Jackson's 2009 and Denson's 2011 offenses from use as
enhancing prior DUI convktions.
I
I. FACTUAL AND' PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
. '
. As noted above, the Commonwealth charged each defendant with DUI,
Fourth Offense, and the offense was committed after the 2016 revision of KRS
189A.010. As predicates for the DUI, Fourth Offense, charges, Jackson and
Denson each had at least three prior DUI convictions, two of which were
committed within five years of the current charge, but one of which preceded
the current offense by more than five years, but less.than ten years. Jackson's
applicable charge was incurred October 9, 2008, in Warren County and he
entered his guilty plea on March 3, 2009; Denson's applicable charge was
incurred August 26, ~010, in Bullitt County and he pled guilty to the char~e on
March 2, 2011. ·
As pertinent here, Jackson's 2009 DUI conviction and Denson's 2011
DUI conviction were each based upon a written pfoa agreement that included
the following standardized language:
5 . . . . Should I be convicted of additional DUI offenses or operating on a
suspended license offenses, penalties will be increased with each
conviction.
6. I understand if I plead GUILTY, the Court may impose any
punishment within the range.provided by law .... The legal DUI penalty
ranges are: (a) First Offense Within 5 Years [penalties stated] . . . . (b)
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Second Offense Wjthin 5 Years [penalties stated] .... (c) Third Offense
Within 5 Years [penalties stated] .... (d) Fourth or Subsequent Offense
1
Within 5 Years [penalties stated].1 ·
The plea agreements correctly stated the sentencing scheme applicable -
/
when each DUI charge was incurred, including the -then-current five-year look-
back peri~d provided in the pre-2016 version of KRS 189A.010.
r
Just after the effective change of the look-back period, Jackson and
Denson were each charged with DUI, Fourth Offense, based in part upon their
respective 2009 and 2011 convictions. Under the former version of KRS
18.9A.010, these offenses could not be used to enhance a DUI committed in
I , .
2016 because the five-year look-back limitation had expired. But, under the
· 2016 version of KRS 189A.010, they each fit easily within the ten-year)ook-
back period.
Jackson and Derison, represented by the same attorney, each filed a
motion in the circuit court challenging their prosecutions as fourth-time
offenders. They presented three grounds for relief: 1) the app~ication of the
2016 amendment to their pre-2016 conviction violates expostfacto principles;·
2) the amendment was "entrapment by estoppel";2 and 3) respectively, the use
of the 2009 and 2011 DUI convictions violates due process under Boykin
because each defendant was informed at the time of his guilty plea that his
1Denson's Bullitt County plea agreement had the additional relevant paragraph: "I
understand that because of my conviction here today, I may be subjected to
greater/ enhanced penalties if found guilty and/ or convicted of any future criminal
offenses ... ~,,
The defendants abandoned their "entrapment by estoppel" argument and so
2
we do not further address ·that theory of reµef. '-
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crime exposed him to penalty enhancements only for future DUis committed
within five years.
The trial court was not persuaded by these arguments, and instead
concluded sua spohte that the provisions of the 2009 and 2011 plea
agreements quoted above created enforceable contractual provisions which
assured Jackson and Denson that their convictions could not enhance
subsequent DUI offenses committed after five years. The circuit court therefore
ruled that, d,espite the 2016 amendment allowing a ten-year retrospective
period for prior DUis, using prior offenses more than five years old to enhance
the penalty for 2016 offenses wo~ld violate contractual rights established in
)
the defendants' plea agreements.
The Commonwealth appealed both rulings to the Court of Appeals. We
accepted transfer pursuant to CR 74.02.
II. PLEA AGREEMENT CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DO NOT
BAR APPLICATION OF THE NEW RULES
The Commonwealth challenges on appeal the trial court's contract
rationale for barring 'the use of the 2009 and 20 ~ 1 convictions to enhance the
penalty applicable to the 2016 offenses. The Commonwealth acknowledges,
and we reaffirm that "[g]enerally, plea agreements in criminal case~, are
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con~raets between the accused and the Commonwealth, and are interpreted
according to ordinary contract principles." McClanahan V; Comrrwnwealth, 308
S.W.3d 694, 701 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted); accord Smith v. Commonwealth,
400 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Ky. 2013) ("[T]his Court applies traditional principles of
contraCt law when interpreting and enforcing plea agreements."). The
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"-
interpretation of a contract is a question of law to be determined de novo on
appellate review. Kentucky Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway, 490 S.W.3d
691, 695 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted). "Once a plea agreement is accepted by a
- I -
defendant, the agreement is binding upon the Commonwealth-subject to
approval by the trial court-and the accused is entitled to the benefit of his
bargain." Elmore v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Ky. App. 2007)
(citations omitted).
The Commonwealth accepts that contract principles generally govern
plea agreement issues,3 but it disputes the trial court's interpretation ofthe
2009 and 20I1 plea agreements as having created a contractual promise to
Jackson and Denson, respectively, that their convictions could only enhance
-future DUI offenses committed within the five-year limitation of the version of
KRS 189A.010 applicable,at that time. Upon revie;w of the 2009 and 2011
guilty pleas, we agree that Jackson and Denson were not promised, nor were
. \
they reasonably induced to believe, that their pleas in these cases would never
be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent DUI conviction more than five
years in the future.
(\
3We hasten to add that plea agreements are also governed by due process analysis.
Because a defendant pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
waives several fundamental constitutional rights, see Boykin v. Alabama,,
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), the circumstances surrounding the plea
agreement'must comport with due process to ensure defendant's
understanding of its consequences. _The notion of fundamental fairness
embodied in due process implies that whatever promises the government
makes in the course of a plea agreement to induce a guilty plea must be
fulfilled;
Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, 219 F.3d 162,
167 (2d Cir. 2000) (mternal citations omitted).
6
Jackson's and Denson's arguments, and the trial court's decision in each.
case, rely only on the two sections .of the plea agreement quoted ~hove. The
plea agreements clearly explained that DUI penalties "will be increased with
each conviction," but neither agreement promised a time limit to the period for
which the conviction could be used as a penalty enhancement of future DUI
· convictions. The only reference to a five-year period is the section of the plea
agreement that accurately details the range of penalties applicable at 'the time
of the plea. That provision does not promise that DUI convictions can only be
used to enhance penalties of future offenses for five years. That provision
relates only to the crime being pled, and says nothing about the penalty for
subsequent DUI violations. We do not believe it would be reasonable for a
defendant pleading guilty under the agreement to infer from some combination
of the two provisions that the future r~mifications of his conviction would cease
after five years. They were not told that, and the plea agreement contract does
not say that. We reject the contentions of Jackson and Denson that the plea
agreement contains a five-year look-back period.
Utilities Electrical Machine Corp. v .. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 187
S.W.2d 1015, 1018 (Ky. 1945), held that the meeting of the minds was "the
most essential factor to constitute a binding contract." Objectively, we
conclude from the language employed in the plea agreement that a reasonable
person could not construe the intent of the boilerplate language parroting the
statutory range of penalties for a DUI conviction as a promise by the
Commonwealth limiting the future effect of the conviction so as to immunize .
7
the defendant forever thereafter from future legislative modifications of the
look-back period. That 'clearly is not the purpose of th.e language relied upon;
and if indeed such was the intent of the parties, then the expectation would be
that such a crucial limitation would be prominently featured instead of being
embedded ambiguously in an informational provision whose primary purpose
is to explain· the range of penalties applicable to the specific conviction.
Similarly, frbm a subjective perspective, we are not persuaded that either
the defendants, defense counsel, the prosecutors, or the presiding judge left
the courtroom after completing the guilty pleas with the belief that the .plea
agreement had locked-in the statutory five-year look-back period. Realistically,
that concern, if it existed at all, was not part of the agreement.
It is also worth noting that, under the defendants' theory, a DUI
defendant who had incurred the same prior DUI offenses on the same previous
dates but who went to trial instead of pleading guilty would have no cognizable
claim to the exemption from the 2016 amendment, while the similarly situated
defendant pleading guilty would be exempted. This theory produces an absurd
result, which further supports our conclusion that this was not the intent of
the plea agreement language relied upon by the defendants.
We further note with interest that courts in California have addressed
virtually the same issue, under substantially similar plea agreement terms.
See People v. Sweet, 207 Cal. App. 3d 78 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1989); People v.
Forester, 156 Cal. App. 4th 1021 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2007). Those courts, too,
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examined and rejected the contractual theory applied here by the trial court
and urged now by Jackson and Denson.
In summary, we conclude that language in DUI agreements such as that
in this case, and similar allusi.ons to the five-year look-back period which may
have occurred during the plea bargain process, were not intended to constitute
an immunization of DUI defendants from the 2016 changes to the DUI statute,
and so may not be relied upon by defendants to avoid the application of the
I)ew look-back period.
III. THE ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS. RELIED UPON BY JACKSON AND
DENSON FOR AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ARE
UNPERSUASIVE
Jackson and Denson cite altern~tive grounds upon which we might
affirm the trial court if we are otherwise disposed to reject the proffered
contractual theory. We consider each argument in turn.
1) Application of the 2016 amendments to KRS 189~.010 does not violate
ex post facto principles or KRS 446.080(3).
The defendants argue that the new look-back rule should'not be applied
to their post-April 2016 DUI charges because the application of the newer
statute \\l'Ould violate ex post facto principles prohibited under both the United
States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I,§ 10;4
4"No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility."
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Ky. Const.§ 19(1).s They further argue that applicati~n of the amended look-
,,
back period would violate the retroactivity rules contained in KRS 446.080(3).
An ex post facto law is any law, which criminalizes ari act that was
innocent when done, aggravates or increases the punishment for a
crime as compared to the punishment when the crim~ was
committed, or alters the rules of evidence to require less or
different proof in order to convict than what was necessary when
'the crime was committed. The key inquiry is whether a
retrospective law is punitive.
Buck v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 661, 664-65 (Ky. 20_10) (citations omitted);
see also Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480, 486-87 (Ky. 2015)
(In determining whether a statute _violates the constitutional ex post facto
prohibition, courts must consider whether the law imposes a punishment for
an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed.)
The defendants' 2016 DUI offenses were committed after the effective
date of the 2016 amendment of KRS 189A.010 extending the DUI prior offense
. ~ '
look-back period from five years to ten years. They are not ~harged with a
crime that was legal when committed but was rendered ill~gal by the 2016
amendment. Because their current crime was committed after the 2016
amendment, it cannot be s~d that the amendment aggravated or increased the
punishment beyond the applicable punishment when the crime was.
committed. The _2016 amendment did not alter the rules of evidence to require
les~ proof or different proof to convict than what was 'necessary ~hen the crime
s "No ex post facto law:, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be
enacted:"
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was cdmmitted. Because the 2016 amendment was in effect when the crimes
under review were committed, ex post facto principles cannot preclude its
application to the crimes under review.
The defendants also argue that the April 2016 amendment should not be
applied to them as the amended statute fails to state an intent for retroactive
application. KRS 446.080(3) pro"."ides that "No statute shall be construed to be
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." See also, KRS 446.110 ("No new law
shall be construed to repeal a former law as to any offense committed against a
former law .... "). Again, however, because the crimes under review were
allegedly committed after the effective date of the 2016 amendment, the
defendants are being prosecut~d under the statute that was in effect at the
time of their alleged crimes; There is no retroactive ~pplication of _a new law to
a situation that occurred before the law became effective.·
Under essentially these identical circumstances, we previously held that
any new DUI penalty provisions as contained in the amended statute may be
applied to the new DUI charges.- In Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207
. .
·(Ky. 1985), the defendant had a prior DUI conviction obtained before the
enactment of the statute enhancing the penalties for subsequent DUI offenses,
KRS 189A.010. When the same defendant was_ charged with another DUI after
the enactment of KRS 189A.010, we held that expostfacto principles posed no
barrier to using the first conviction to enhance the penalties for the latter
conviction. We said that the new statute did not create a new offense, but
'\
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merely imposed different penalties on the same criminal act depending on the .
status of the offender. The same principle is applicable here.
Based .upon the authorities cited above, we agree with the circuit court's·
conclusion that application of the new look-back period to current charges
\
against Ja~kson ahd Denson is not barred by ~xpostfacto principles and is not
being impro:perly applied retroactively.
2) Boykin v. Alabama doe$ not bar the application of the 2016
·an:iendment of KRS 189A.010.
The defendants also argue that the application of the amended new look-
back period violates the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969). Boykin sets forth the constitutional mandates applicable to guilty
pleas. More specifically Boykin requires that when a -plea of' guilty is entered in
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a state criminal triru, the record must affirmatively show t.hat the defendant
was informed of, and waived, his privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination; his right to a trial by jury; and his right to confrop.t his accusers.
·Id. at 243. Waiver of these three important federal rights cannot be presumed
from a silent record. Id.
The fact that subsequent legislative measures may unforeseeably alter
the consequences and effects of the criminal conviction does not take the plea
retrospectively outside the scope of the Boykin requirements. A plea entered
without knowledge of unanticipated and unforeseeable consequences that may ·
not become manifest for many years does not have the constitutional
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significance of a plea entered without knowledge of its immediate foreseeable
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con~equerices, or in ignorance of the fundamental rights to remain silent, to a
Jury trial, and to confront witnesses. Thus, we are unpersuaded that the
defendants' 2009 and 2011 guilty pleas, undertaken in ignorance of legislative
changes years in the future; fall within the scope of Boykin.
IV. CONCLUSION
'
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Warren Circuit Court in
Commonwealth v. Jackson and Commonwealth v. Denson are reversed, and the
cases are remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Andy Beshear
Attorney General
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
COUNSEL FORAPPELLEES:
- Steven Jared Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS:
James David Niehaus
Professional Arts Building, 4th Floor . /
730 W. Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Amy Irene Hannah
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President, KACDL
P.O. Box 326
Hebron, KY 41048
Joshua Michael Reho
Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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