16‐2608‐cr
United States v. Piton
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of October, two thousand
4 seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
7 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 JOHN F. KEENAN,
10 District Judge.*
11 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
12
13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14
15 Appellee,
16
17 v. No. 16‐2608‐cr
18
19 ALAIN PITON, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,
20
21 Defendant‐Appellant.
22
23 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
* Judge John F. Keenan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
1
2 FOR APPELLANT: Matthew D. Myers, Myers, Singer &
3 Galiardo, LLP, New York, NY.
4
5 FOR APPELLEE: Negar Tekeei, Anna M. Skotko,
6 Assistant United States Attorneys, for
7 Joon H. Kim, Acting United States
8 Attorney for the Southern District of
9 New York, New York, NY.
10
11 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
12 Southern District of New York (Loretta A. Preska, Judge).
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
14 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
15 Alain Piton appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Preska, J.)
16 convicting him, after a jury trial and denials of his motions for a judgment of
17 acquittal, of one count of mail theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, and one count
18 of conspiracy to commit mail theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. On appeal,
19 Piton argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and
20 that the District Court lacked a sufficient factual basis to instruct the jury on
21 conscious avoidance. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and
22 record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain
23 our decision to affirm.
2
1 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
2 A defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
3 conviction “bears a heavy burden.” United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 348
4 (2d Cir. 2002). We “must sustain the jury’s guilty verdict if viewing the evidence
5 in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
6 found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
7 States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
8 Piton argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond
9 a reasonable doubt that the checks recovered from his apartment were stolen
10 from the mail; that he possessed them with knowledge that they had been stolen
11 from the mail; that he acted with the intent to contribute to the success of the
12 mail theft scheme; and that he agreed with another person to steal checks from
13 the mail.
14 Based on our review of the trial record, including evidence recovered from
15 Piton’s home and cellphone, Piton’s post‐arrest statements, and the testimony of
16 various witnesses, we conclude that there was overwhelming evidence to
17 support the jury’s findings on each of these elements.
3
1 2. Jury Instructions
2 Piton’s argument concerning the District Court’s conscious avoidance
3 instruction is essentially that there was not enough evidence for a rational juror
4 to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of a high probability that
5 the checks recovered from his apartment were stolen from the mail, such that the
6 District Court lacked the factual predicate to give the jury a conscious avoidance
7 instruction. The challenge is merely a variation on the sufficiency argument that
8 we have already rejected. See United States v. Aina‐Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 171
9 (2d Cir. 2003).
10 We have considered Piton’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
11 are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court
12 is AFFIRMED.
13 FOR THE COURT:
14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
4