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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-16-659
Opinion Delivered: October 5, 2017
JONATHAN ANTONIO WOODS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DREW
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 22CR-14-40]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE SAM POPE, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
Jonathan Woods was convicted of the kidnapping and murder of his girlfriend,
Samantha Poole. The state sought the death penalty, but a Drew County jury instead
sentenced Woods to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder plus forty
years imprisonment for kidnapping. On appeal, Woods argues that the trial court erred in
denying his challenges to the State’s use of peremptory strikes during jury selection. We
affirm.
Woods argued during jury selection and now on appeal that the State’s decision to
use peremptory strikes against the only three black potential jurors in the pool was motivated
by unconstitutional racial bias of the sort prohibited by the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In order to identify improper racial
strikes under Batson, this court has delineated a three-step process. First, the party
challenging the strike must present facts sufficient to “raise an inference of purposeful
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discrimination.” MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 398, 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (1998). This
requires demonstrating “(1) that the strike’s opponent is a member of an identifiable racial
group, (2) that the strike is part of a jury-selection process or pattern designed to
discriminate, and (3) that the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race.” Id.
Second (and only if the challenger has succeeded on the first step), the trial court must
request that the striking party provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike. The
explanation “must be more than a mere denial of discrimination or an assertion that a shared
race would render the challenged juror partial to the one opposing the challenge.” Id. The
explanation, however, “need not be persuasive or even plausible” so long as it is race-
neutral. Id. Third, the trial court must determine “whether the strike’s opponent has proven
purposeful discrimination” based on the evidence and argumentation presented. Id. at 399,
978 S.W.2d at 296. If the strike’s opponent presents no further evidence of discrimination
beyond the initial prima facie case, the court must make its decision solely on the
information already presented and its assessment of the credibility of those who presented
it. Id. In reviewing the result of this three-step process, we will reverse the trial court only
if its determination is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Williams
v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 111, 991 S.W.2d 565, 572 (1999).
In this case, the state made use of ten peremptory strikes. Woods challenges the three
strikes used against the black potential jurors: Ronia Young, Garrett Sheets, and Valerie
Simmons. These were the first, sixth, and tenth strikes, respectively. For each of these strikes,
the defense counsel requested race-neutral explanations, and the trial court prompted the
State to provide them.
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For Ronia Young, the State’s race-neutral explanation focused on three actions by
Young: (1) failing to return a jury questionnaire, (2) self-identifying as belonging to a faith
group that believes the death penalty to be morally wrong, and (3) asserting that she did not
feel her role was to be “judge or jury.” As the State argued at the time of the challenge to
the strike, the trial court’s request for a race-neutral explanation of the peremptory strike
against Young was premature. As the first juror to be struck overall, there was simply no
basis on which to argue that the strike was part of a “process or pattern” of discriminatory
strikes. Demonstration of this process or pattern is necessary to the first step of the Batson
inquiry, and only successful completion of the first step triggers the need to provide a race-
neutral explanation. Because the trial court need not have reached steps two or three of the
Batson inquiry at all for the strike against Young, Woods’s argument on appeal regarding
the adequacy of the trial court’s consideration of these steps is unavailing.
For both Garrett Sheets and Valerie Simmons, the State’s race-neutral explanation
involved the potential jurors’ answering “B” when asked which of options “A” or “B”
below more closely matched their views on the death penalty:
A: I believe the death penalty is appropriate in some capital cases and I could return
a verdict resulting in death in the proper case; or
B: Although I do not believe that the death penalty should be imposed, as long as
the law provides for it, I could assess the death penalty in the proper set of
circumstances.
Sheets and Simmons were among a group of eight individuals (the remaining six were
nonblack) who answered “B” to the question; the prosecution used peremptory strikes
against all of them. In addition, Sheets indicated multiple times in both his questionnaire
and during jury selection that he suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and mental
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illness. Simmons stated in her questionnaire that she did not believe the public “should have
the power to kill.”
Unlike with Young, with these later strikes Woods could have at least arguably
presented a satisfactory prima facie case to require the State to provide race-neutral
explanations. Woods relies on Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995), and this court’s frequent
citation to that case for the proposition that ending the Batson inquiry after the second step
and simply accepting the State’s race-neutral explanation is reversible error. See, e.g., Weston
v. State, 366 Ark. 265, 271, 234 S.W.3d 848, 853 (2006). Applying that rule to these
circumstances, however, misunderstands both Purkett and this court’s precedent. Purkett held
that courts may not combine steps two and three of the Batson inquiry by importing a
plausibility requirement to dismiss facially race-neutral explanations without further
consideration. Purkett was, in fact, an attempt to reinforce the ultimate rule—favorable to
the State in this case—that the opponent of the allegedly discriminatory strike bears the
burden of proving discriminatory intent. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. What Woods
contends was flippant treatment of his challenges was instead an appropriate application of
the Batson inquiry. As we invariably state when reciting the Batson steps, when the opponent
of the strike fails to provide any additional argumentation or evidence to demonstrate
discriminatory intent, the trial court has no option but to rely on the prima facie showing,
the race-neutral explanation, and its own assessment of the credibility of the parties when
making a ruling. See, e.g., Weston, 366 Ark. at 271, 234 S.W.3d at 853.
Here, Woods did not present any additional evidence or arguments after the court
elicited the State’s race-neutral explanations for Sheets and Simmons. Given the absence of
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evidence of discriminatory intent available, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to
deny both challenges was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, we
have affirmed peremptory strikes based on “B” answers to the exact question cited by the
prosecution as race-neutral justification for potential jurors. See, e.g., Weston, 366 Ark. at
274–75, 234 S.W.3d at 856. While the qualified opposition to the death penalty expressed
in the provided answer may not have sufficed to strike jurors for cause, it was a sufficient
race-neutral explanation to justify the State’s use of one of its limited number of peremptory
strikes. Id.
As required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(i) (2017), the record has been examined for
reversible error. None has been found.
Affirmed.
Montgomery, Adams & Wyatt, PLC, by: Dale E. Adams, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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