IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
RALPH FLINT, III, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D17-1212
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed October 6, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Edward P. Nickinson, Judge.
Ralph Flint, III, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Quentin Humphrey, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The appellant appeals the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence
challenging his designation as a sexual predator. The appellant was convicted of
kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery without force likely to cause serious
personal injury. As the State has conceded, the appellant’s prior convictions do not
qualify him to be designated as a sexual predator. The appellant’s kidnapping
conviction does not qualify him for designation as a sexual predator because the
victim was not a minor. See § 775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); Maceo v. State,
870 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (conviction for life felony of armed
kidnapping did not qualify him for classification as sexual predator where victim
was not a minor). Additionally, the appellant’s three convictions for violating
section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2010), do not qualify as they are second-
degree felonies and he does not have any prior enumerated convictions. See §
775.21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2010); Lupianez v. State, 909 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005) (holding that an offender who violates section 794.011(5) must have a prior
enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator). Accordingly, we reverse
the denial of the appellant’s motion and remand for the lower court to vacate the
order designating him a sexual predator.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
ROBERTS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR
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