In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.R. & L.R. (Children) and K.M. (Father) & A.R. (Mother) A.R. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Oct 10 2017, 10:08 am

the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination October 10, 2017
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of M.R. & L.R. (Children) and 91A02-1705-JT-1196
K.M. (Father) & A.R. (Mother); Appeal from the White Circuit
Court
A.R. (Mother), The Honorable Robert W.
Appellant-Respondent, Thacker, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
v. 91C01-1609-JT-17
91C01-1609-JT-18
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

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 May, Judge.

[1] A.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to M.R. and

L.R. (collectively, “Children”). She argues the Department of Child Services

(“DCS”) did not present sufficient evidence the conditions under which

Children were removed from her care would not be remedied and termination

was in Children’s best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and K.M. (“Father”) 1 (collectively, “Parents”) are parents of M.R. and

L.R., born November 3, 2012, and May 30, 2014, respectively. On January 4,

2015, Father hit Mother in the face twice in the presence of Children. Mother

called the police, and the police arrested Father for domestic violence. DCS

received a report of the domestic violence incident and investigated, but did not

remove Children from Mother’s care.

[3] Father was deported to El Salvador on January 12, 2015. Mother did not have

a job, and the family was evicted from its home on January 25. Mother and

Children went to live with Mother’s friends, a married couple. On February 1,

2015, Mother and Children were forced to leave this living arrangement after a

domestic disturbance involving Mother.

1
Father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.

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[4] DCS investigated and discovered Mother’s living arrangement was unsuitable

for Children because it did not meet minimum health and safety standards,

Children were not appropriately clothed, and Mother “barely had any supplies

for them,” (Tr. at 23), such as diapers and wipes. On February 2, 2015, DCS

filed petitions to adjudicate Children as Children in Need of Services

(“CHINS”) and an emergency request to remove Children from Mother’s care.

The trial court approved DCS’s emergency request to remove Children from

Mother’s care and place them in foster care, where they have remained during

subsequent proceedings.

[5] On March 17, 2015, Mother admitted Children were CHINS. On March 25,

the State charged Mother with three counts of Level 6 felony fraud, one count

of Level 6 felony theft, and one count of Class A misdemeanor theft because

Mother allegedly used credit cards that did not belong to her. On April 10, the

trial court held a dispositional hearing, and on April 17, 2015, entered its

dispositional orders in the CHINS cases, requiring Mother to complete

parenting and domestic violence assessments and follow all recommendations;

refrain from the use of illegal substances or alcohol; submit to random drug

screens; attend visitation with Children; participate in home-based case

management and follow all recommendations; maintain safe, stable, and

suitable housing; maintain a legal and stable source of income; abide by the

terms of her probation; obey the law and not commit any acts of domestic

violence; and complete an evaluation of her cognitive ability.

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[6] Mother participated in services from February 2015 to October 2015. On

October 8, 2015, Mother pleaded guilty to three counts of Level 6 felony fraud

and served approximately nine months in jail. While incarcerated, Mother

attempted to obtain her GED and participated in parenting classes “every other

Friday through the White County Jail.” (Ex. Vol. III at 89.) Upon her release

in September 2016, Mother was referred to George Junior Republic for services.

[7] On September 12, 2016, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s rights to

Children. From September 1, 2016, to January 20, 2017, Mother was generally

non-compliant with services. She attended eight out of nineteen home-based

case management meetings, eleven of sixteen individual therapy sessions, and

thirteen of eighteen supervised visits with Children. During visits with

Children, Mother was “distant.” (Tr. at 63.) While Mother engaged with

Children, “she really doesn’t talk to them much. . . . [S]he scrolls on her

telephone a lot. She texts people on her phone. She calls [Father] at least once

during the visit.” (Id.) During one visitation, Mother spent some of the time on

the phone with Father “arguing back and forth.” (Id. at 19.)

[8] In January 2017, Mother reported she had obtained appropriate housing. Upon

inspection of the premises, the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) described the

living conditions as “bare at most.” (Id. at 32.) On February 28, 2017, the

FCM visited Mother at her home and observed “something was different.” (Id.

at 35.) The FCM testified Mother “had slow lethargic movements. Her lips

were white and clammy almost. Um - her pupils were the size of pin needles.”

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 (Id.) The FCM administered a drug screen and Mother tested positive for

cocaine and opiates.

[9] On March 7, 2017, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS’s petitions

to terminate Parents’ rights to Children. On April 28, 2017, the trial court

issued its orders terminating Parents’ rights to Children.

Discussion and Decision
[10] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S.,

& B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh

evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the

juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a

judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied

534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

[11] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children, however, when

evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d

at 837. The right to raise one’s own children should not be terminated solely

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 because there is a better home available for the children, id., but parental rights

may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet her parental

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof

of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g

denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must

terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

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[13] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the

evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[14] Mother challenges the court’s conclusions the conditions under which Children

were removed would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent-child

relationship posed a risk to Children, and termination was in the best interests

of Children. 2

Reasonable Probability Conditions Would Not Be Remedied

[15] The trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for her children at the time

of the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App.

2010). Evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment

to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services “demonstrates the

2
The trial court found the conditions under which Children were removed would not be remedied and the
continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children. DCS does not have to prove both.
The statute is written in the disjunctive, and DCS must prove either by clear and convincing evidence. See
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Because the evidence supports the conclusion there was a reasonable probability
conditions leading to Children’s removal would not be remedied, we need not address whether the
continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children’s well-being. See In re L.S. 717
N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’d denied, trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1161 (2002) (because
statute is written in the disjunctive, court needs to find only one requirement to terminate parental rights).

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 requisite reasonable probability” that the conditions will not change. Lang v.

Starke County OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[16] Here, Children were removed from Mother’s care due to instability in their

housing situation and Mother’s lack of employment. Over the course of these

proceedings, Mother “had eight different jobs over the last two years,” (Tr. at

31), and she worked for no more than two or three months at each job. At the

time of the termination hearing, Mother claimed to have a job, but had not

provided verification of her wages or length of employment. DCS presented

evidence Mother lived “in at least five different towns” during the proceedings

but didn’t “know specifically [how many] houses.” (Id. at 32.) At the time of

the termination hearing, Mother lived in a duplex that the FCM described as:

Um - the conditions are bare at most. Um - when I visited the
home, there was [sic] three twin size [sic] mattresses that did -
that were just piled up. Um - there was a metal bedframe, a little
loveseat. There was [sic] no dishes, no plates, no silverware - um
- no cups, anything like that. In the refrigerator, I saw like a half
gallon of milk and a jar of pickles and a jar of peanut butter so
there wasn’t any food in the home. She said that she preferred to
eat out and so that’s why there wasn’t very much food in the
home.

(Id. at 32-3.) Mother also tested positive for illegal drugs approximately one

week prior the termination hearing.

[17] When assessing a parent’s fitness to care for a child, the trial court should view

the parent as of the time of the termination hearing and take into account the

changes that have occurred during the proceedings. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847,
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 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. However, the trial court must also

“evaluat[e] the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the

probability of future neglect or deprivation of [a] child.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d

509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[18] While we recognize Mother had obtained housing and employment at the time

of the termination hearing, we cannot ignore her patterns of housing and

employment instability. Additionally, Mother tested positive for illegal

substances, committed criminal offenses, and was not compliant with services.

Mother’s arguments are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the

credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265

(appellate court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

We therefore conclude DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove there was a

reasonable probability the conditions under which Children were removed from

Mother’s care would not be remedied.

Best Interests of Children

[19] In determining what is in the children’s best interests, the juvenile court is

required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality

of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.

dismissed. A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment,

along with the parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination

of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d

896, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager

and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to
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 evidence that conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

children’s best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236.

[20] In addition to Mother’s housing and employment instability, DCS presented

evidence Children had been in foster care for two years, were doing well in their

current placement, and were receiving services like First Steps that Mother did

not provide when Children were in her care. Additionally, the FCM testified

termination would be in the best interests of Children because:

I believe that [Children] need to be provided with a safe and
stable environment where there’s no more domestic violence and
no more law enforcement being brought into the home. That
they’re not moving from place to place to place every few
months, and that they can be provided with meals without
having to worry about where it’s coming from - um - or who’s
going to be in their life the next day or who’s going to be caring
for them that they don’t know.

(Tr. at 38-9.)

[21] Mother argues she is bonded with Children and service provider criticism of her

interaction with Father via telephone during her supervised visits with Children

was unfair because she was “trying to make sure the children also maintained a

relationship with their father.” (Br. of Appellant at 19.) Mother’s arguments

are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of

witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate

court does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Based on

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 the evidence and testimony, we conclude DCS presented sufficient evidence to

prove termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of

Children.

Conclusion
[22] DCS presented sufficient evidence there was a reasonable possibility the

conditions under which Children were removed from Mother’s care would not

be remedied and termination of Mother’s parental rights were in Children’s best

interests. Accordingly, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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