IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0440
Filed October 11, 2017
IN THE MATTER OF PROPERTY SEIZED FROM JEAN CARLOS HERRERA
and FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ,
JEAN CARLOS HERRERA and
FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ,
Claimants-Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gregory W.
Steensland, Judge.
Consolidated appeal from asset forfeiture proceeding filed pursuant to
Iowa Code chapter 809A (2015). AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
Dean Stowers of Stowers & Sarcone PLC, West Des Moines, for
appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, Judge.
In this consolidated appeal, Jean Carlos Herrera and Fernando Rodriguez
each appeal from separate orders issued in the same civil asset forfeiture
proceeding initiated pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 809A (2015). Herrera
appeals from an order forfeiting certain property to the State of Iowa. The
property was forfeited on the ground Herrera failed to file a proper answer in
response to the State’s petition. In his appeal, Herrera contends he should be
excused from compliance with the statutory pleading requirements because
compliance would violate his right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure and his right against self-incrimination. Rodriguez was successful in
obtaining the return of certain property, but he appeals from an order denying his
request for statutory attorney fees. In his appeal, Rodriguez contends he was
the prevailing party and thus entitled to statutory attorney fees.
I.
This case arises out of an Interstate traffic stop and roadside detention.
The particular facts and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop and detention
are largely immaterial to the resolution of the claims on appeal. In short, in
September 2015, an Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) officer initiated a
traffic stop of a Ford Expedition being driven by Herrera. The ground for the
traffic stop was Herrera was exceeding the speed limit. Over the course of a
forty-minute detention, the officer claimed to have developed reasonable
suspicion Herrera and his passenger were engaged in drug trafficking. Herrera
denied consent to search the vehicle, but the officer persisted. Without Herrera’s
consent, the officer used a canine unit to investigate further. The canine unit
3
alerted to the Expedition. After additional officers arrived at the scene, the
officers searched the vehicle. The officers found the following: an ice cream
maker, which had been gutted; a cordless drill and battery, which could be used
to open the ice cream maker; a “boost phone,” which is commonly used in drug
trafficking; marijuana paraphernalia and a trace of marijuana inside a Pelican
case; a rivet gun and rivets; a cellophane dispenser; a vacuum pump; $2600 in
cash in the center console of the vehicle; and $887 in cash in the passenger’s
pocket. The officers also found a false compartment under the vehicle, but the
false compartment was empty. The officers returned the cash to Herrera and the
passenger but seized the other items, including the vehicle. The officers allowed
the men to call for a taxi and leave the scene. The vehicle was towed to the
IDOT maintenance garage. The vehicle was searched again at the garage, but
the officers did not find anything else.
Rodriguez became involved in this case after the officers seized the
Expedition. Rodriguez is the registered owner of the vehicle, and he obtained
counsel to reclaim the vehicle. The officer initiating the traffic stop learned
Rodriguez was interested in reclaiming the vehicle. Rodriguez’s efforts to
reclaim the vehicle caused the officer to become suspicious; in the officer’s view,
the market value of the old vehicle did not justify any effort to recover the vehicle.
The officer emailed the assistant county attorney responsible for Rodriguez’s
claim, and the assistant county attorney informed the officer Rodriguez would be
able to recover attorney fees if he prevailed on his claim. This undoubtedly
should have lessened any suspicion. Nonetheless, the officer obtained a search
warrant for the vehicle. The application for the warrant relied on the officer’s
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suspicion generated by the mere fact Rodriguez sought the return of his vehicle,
but the application failed to mention Rodriguez would be entitled to fees if he
prevailed on his claim. When the officers executed the search warrant, they
found a secret compartment underneath the center console containing $44,900
in cash.
In October of 2015, the State filed an in rem forfeiture complaint, seeking
forfeiture of the items seized during the traffic stop and during the subsequent
search pursuant to the warrant. Herrera and Rodriguez filed a joint answer.
Their answer contained the following statements:
1. I, Fernando Rodriguez, am the owner of the 1999 Ford
Expedition identified in the complaint as being subject to forfeiture
and an interest holder in the property seized therefrom, including
the U.S. Currency in the vehicle.
2. I, Jean Carlos Herrera, was in lawful possession of the
1999 Ford Expedition, soft serve ice cream machine, pelican case,
cordless drill and battery, vacuum pump and U.S. Currency
identified in the complaint as being subject to forfeiture and have a
legal ownership and possessory interest in those items.
3. We would ask that all mail in this matter be sent to our
attorney . . . .
4. With this answer we are also filing a motion asserting that
the vehicle stop, the subsequent detention and seizure, and the
search of that vehicle, violated the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures found in the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the corresponding provision of the
Iowa Constitution.
5. The exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and
Iowa Constitution applies in forfeiture proceedings. See In re
Flowers, 474 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 1991).
6. By virtue of the application of the exclusionary rule, further
statements concerning the vehicle and its contents would constitute
derivative evidence also subject to the exclusionary rule.
Consequently, until there is a determination on the motion to
suppress, we object to providing further information for the reason
that such further information would be the product of the original
search and seizure that we believe violated by [sic] constitutional
rights.
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7. We request that the vehicle and its contents be returned
to Jean Carlos Herrera and Fernando Rodriguez . . . .
Herrera signed the answer, but Rodriguez did not. In addition to the answer,
Herrera filed a motion to suppress evidence. Herrera claimed the traffic stop was
unlawful at its inception and in its scope. Herrera also filed a supplemental
motion to suppress, arguing the subsequent search was unconstitutional
because it was granted pursuant to a defective application and because probable
cause was based solely on Rodriguez obtaining counsel to reclaim his vehicle.
Herrera’s claims were resolved in February 2016. At that time, the district
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Herrera’s claim on the ground
Herrera’s answer failed to comply with statutory pleading requirements.1 The
district court denied Herrera’s motion to suppress evidence, concluding the issue
was moot because Herrera had not filed a proper answer and thus had no
standing to challenge the forfeiture. Herrera timely filed his appeal.
Rodriguez’s claim was resolved shortly after Herrera’s claim. The
prosecutor notified the district court the State no longer had any objection to the
return of the Expedition to Rodriguez. The claim was resolved without any
1
The district court labeled the motion a “motion to dismiss,” which conveys the gravity of
the motion but suggests the defendant is bringing the motion. See Shumate v. Drake
Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014) (discussing contours of motions to dismiss).
Other cases label the strategy a motion for summary judgment, see United States v.
$17,900 in U.S. Currency, 200 F. Supp. 3d 132, 137 (D.D.C. 2016), or a motion to strike,
see United States v. $25,790 in U.S. Currency, No. AW-09-3283, 2010 WL 2671754, at
*2 (D. Md. July 2, 2010) (“[I]f a claimant has failed to file a qualifying claim within the time
limits allowed by law, the district court should strike the answer on the pleadings and
enter a default judgment for the government.”). The name may be less important than
the substance of the motion. See State v. $3,356,183.00 in U.S. Currency, 894 So. 2d
339, 346 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“The procedural method chosen by the State was a
mechanism to challenge [the claimant’s] standing to assert the purported claim in light of
his previous disavowal of any ownership interest in the subject property. The particular
name by which the substance of the motion is denominated, we find incidental.”).
6
hearing on Rodriguez’s claim. Rodriguez’s counsel sought attorney’s fees
pursuant to section 809A.12(7), contending he was a prevailing party within the
meaning of the statute. See Iowa Code § 809A.12(7) (“The agency or political
subdivision bringing the forfeiture action shall pay the reasonable attorney fees
and costs, as determined by the court, incurred by a claimant who prevails on a
claim for exemption in proceeding under this chapter.”); see also Iowa Code
§ 809A.5(1) (defining exempt property to include property belonging to an
innocent owner). The district court denied the fee claim. Rodriguez timely filed
his appeal.
II.
Our review of forfeiture proceedings is for correction of errors at law. See
In re Young, 780 N.W.2d 726, 727 (Iowa 2010). To the extent claimants raise
constitutional issues, our review is de novo. See id.
A.
We first address Herrera’s claim. An in rem asset forfeiture proceeding
initiated pursuant to chapter 809A is a civil proceeding. See In re Aronson, 440
N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1989). An owner or interest holder in the property can
contest the forfeiture proceeding by filing an answer to the petition. See Iowa
Code § 809A.13(3). The statute sets forth the required contents of the answer:
The answer shall be signed by the owner or interest holder
under penalty of perjury and shall be in accordance with [Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure] 1.405 and shall also set forth the following:
(a) The caption of the proceedings and identifying number, if
any, as set forth on the notice of pending forfeiture or complaint and
the name of the claimant.
(b) The address where the claimant will accept mail.
(c) The nature and extent of the claimant’s interest in the
property.
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(d) The date, the identity of the transferor, and the
circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the
property.
(e) The specific provision of this chapter relied on in
asserting that it is not subject to forfeiture.
(f) All essential facts supporting each assertion.
(g) The specific relief sought.
Iowa Code § 809A.13(4).
There is not a legitimate dispute here that Herrera’s answer failed to
comply with section 809A.13(4). Specifically, Herrera failed to identify the date
he obtained an interest in the property at issue, the identity of the transferor, and
the circumstances of acquisition as required by paragraph (d). He failed to
identify any statutory provision supporting his claim the property was not subject
to forfeiture, contrary to paragraph (e). He also failed to identify the essential
facts supporting his assertions, contrary to paragraph (f). Under the
circumstances, we cannot conclude Herrera complied with the statutory provision
at issue.
Herrera contends his failure to comply with the statute should be excused.
Specifically, he contends the traffic stop was unlawful and any evidence obtained
as a result of the traffic stop, including derivative evidence, should be
suppressed. He further contends the averments required by statute to be set
forth in the answer would be derivative of the traffic stop and obtained in violation
of his Fifth Amendment privilege. He further contends that ordering forfeiture of
the property to the State is an unconstitutional penalty for invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege. In sum, Herrera argues the statute forces him to choose
between asserting his constitutional rights and forfeiting his property and waiving
his constitutional rights to avoid forfeiting his property but potentially incriminating
8
himself. Because of this choice, Herrera contends we should construe the
statute to allow the suppression claim to be decided on the merits before
requiring the compliance with the section 809A.13(4).
We reject the premise that any statements Herrera would have to make to
file a proper answer were derivative of the purportedly illegal traffic stop. While
the traffic stop was a but-for cause of the need to file an answer to the resulting
forfeiture proceeding, any statements made in support of a claim to the forfeited
property are not derivative within the meaning of the relevant case law.
Specifically, any averments set forth in the answer would not be made by
exploitation of the initial illegality:
Duchi has suggested another basis for upholding the district
court’s decision that is closely akin to the compelled testimony
argument. He maintains that he gave testimony at Conrad’s trial as
a result of the illegal search and seizure, so the testimony should
be suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Conrad had
made a motion to suppress the evidence, as had Duchi. As in the
Duchi trial, suppression was denied, albeit erroneously. Had the
district court properly suppressed the evidence prior to Conrad’s
trial, Duchi argues, then charges would never have been brought
against Conrad and he would not have been forced to testify on her
behalf.
Accepting for the moment the argument that charges would
never have been raised against Conrad had the evidence been
suppressed, a proposition that is not without doubt, it is clear that
Duchi’s testimony is not sufficiently related to the initial illegality to
warrant imposition of the exclusionary rule. In New York v. Harris,
495 U.S. 14, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990), the Supreme Court expanded
on a theme which it first intimated in United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463 (1980). The Court in both cases emphasized that
evidence, whether testimonial or tangible, is the fruit of the
poisonous tree and thus suppressible only if the authorities have
obtained the evidence through “exploitation” of the initial illegality.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963). In
Harris, the majority determined that a statement obtained at the
police station after an unconstitutional warrantless arrest in the
home, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), was not
related to the underlying illegality and should not have been
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suppressed. The Court held that Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), was distinguishable because in that case the incriminating
statements were taken after an arrest without probable cause. As a
result, the defendant was not properly in custody and therefore any
statements he made while illegally detained were viewed as
derivative of the illegality. In contrast, the defendant in Harris did
not make his statements during the course of the illegal warrantless
entry and was not being held illegally at the time he made the
damaging statements to the police. Accordingly, the majority
concluded that the statements bore an insufficient relation to the
underlying infraction to warrant exclusion.
Harris demonstrates that for testimony or evidence to be
considered the fruit of an illegal search, it must be directly or
indirectly attributable to the constitutional violation. In Harris, even
though the illegal entry arrest was a “but for” cause of the later
statements in that without the illegal arrest no statements would
have been made, it was not the proximate cause of the statements
because the statements were not obtained during the
unconstitutional entry into the home.
United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 395 (8th Cir. 1991).
Rejecting this premise resolves only part of the issue. The question still
arises whether Herrera should be excused from filing a compliant answer to
protect an independent assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. There is
some authority in support of Herrera’s contention. In Wohlstrom v. Buchanan,
884 P.2d 687, 689 (Ariz. 1994), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that striking
the petitioner’s claim to property violated the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution and the parallel provision of the Arizona Constitution where the
petition failed to comply with a similar statutory provision. The court reasoned
that “by invoking his right against self-incrimination, petitioner lost the ability to
intervene in the proceedings, virtually assuring a forfeiture.” Wohlstrom, 884
P.2d at 689. The court reasoned this was an unconstitutional penalty for
invoking the right to silence. See id.
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There is also contrary authority. The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected
a similar claim:
While it is true that the answers to such questions could be self-
incriminating or lead to prosecution for perjury or false-swearing,
the statute does not violate any constitutional guarantees. If one
does not wish to incriminate himself or subject himself to
prosecution for perjury or false swearing, he simply does not file a
claim . . . as the filing of such a claim is not required. However, if a
claim is filed under the statute, it must conform to the statute’s
requirements.
State v. $8,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 827 So. 2d 634, 639 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
The Georgia Court of Appeals also rejected a similar claim. We quote from that
case at length:
Under [the Georgia analogue to section 809A.13(4)], the
answer filed by an owner of property which asserts a claim against
the property “must set forth: . . . [t]he date, identity of transferor,
and circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the
property. . . .” Loveless did not include in his Answer the date of the
transfer of the cash, the identity of the transferor, or the
circumstances of his acquiring the cash. He thus failed to satisfy
the specific statutory pleading requirements regarding factual
information that must be included in claims or answers filed by
those claiming interests in seized property. Accordingly, the court
did not err by striking Loveless’s Answer as legally insufficient and
by entering a default judgment of forfeiture.
We find unconvincing Loveless’s argument that the privilege
set out in the Fifth Amendment and in [a Georgia statute providing
for the right against self-incrimination] overrides the clear and well-
settled requirement that, to be sufficient, an answer in a civil
forfeiture proceeding must include the information requested in [the
809A.13(4) analogue]. Loveless cites no Georgia cases on point
that support his argument. We point out that
there is no blanket Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
answer questions in noncriminal proceedings. The
privilege must be specifically claimed on a particular
question and the matter submitted to the court for its
determination as to the validity of the claim . . . . The
questions must at the very least be considered on an
individual basis and answered accordingly.
....
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Loveless also complains that the trial court erred by striking
his Answer when he had raised therein a sufficient defense, namely
that the search and seizure occurred in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. However, the Answer did not include those factual
disclosures that the statute required. In the absence of a legally
sufficient answer, the trial court was without authority to consider
the suppression issue.
The Answer filed was insufficient, and the court did not err
by striking it. Upon striking the answer, the court was authorized to
order the disposition of the seized property.
Loveless v. State, 786 S.E.2d 899, 901–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (citations
omitted).
We think the latter cases reach a better resolution of the issue, and we
adopt the reasoning as our own. In addition to the reasons set forth above, we
also conclude the result is dictated by the text of the controlling statute. Section
809A.13 is a special pleading statute, and it provides the answer to an in rem
forfeiture complaint “shall” contain the required information. The use of the word
“shall” denotes these requirements are mandatory. See Iowa Code § 4.1
(providing the word “shall” imposes a duty); State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515,
522 (Iowa 2000) (“Additionally, we have interpreted the term “shall” in a statute to
create a mandatory duty, not discretion.”). There is no exception identified in the
statute, and our court has previously said the statutory requirements are a
“special statutory limitation” that “we are not at liberty to overlook.” In re Prop.
Seized for Forfeiture from Foley, No. 16-1676, 2017 WL 3525221, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Aug. 16, 2017).
We also note the most relevant Iowa authority dictates the conclusion that
Herrera is not entitled to any relief. In Aronson, 440 N.W.2d at 395, the supreme
court addressed a very similar issue. That case concerned the forfeiture of
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personal property seized at a cockfight. See Aronson, 440 N.W.2d at 395. Fifty-
seven persons sought return of the property, but they each exercised their Fifth
Amendment right not to testify at the forfeiture hearing and identify any interest in
the seized property. See id. at 396. The district court forfeited the property, and
the supreme court affirmed the district court. See id. at 398.
Two separate aspects of the Aronson decision are relevant here. The first
aspect resolves the issue of whether forfeiture of the property is a penalty for the
exercise of constitutional rights. The Aronson court relied on and quoted Baker
v. United States, 722 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1983), in reaching its holding. The
Aronson court quoted with approval the language in Baker specifically rejecting
the argument that noncompliance with the forfeiture statute should be allowed
because forcing litigants “to choose between their privilege and their lawsuit
makes assertion of the privilege ‘costly.’” Aronson, 440 N.W.2d at 398 (quoting
Baker, 722 F.2d at 518). The Aronson court’s rejection of the penalty argument
undermines the central premise of the Wohlstrom decision.
In addition to rejecting the penalty argument, the Aronson court held the
claimants lacked standing to contest the forfeiture:
Defendants have failed to prove their interest in the property to be
forfeited as required by section 809.9. We hold that in this civil
proceeding various claims by defendants of violation of their
constitutional rights are moot in the face of their failure to have
standing to contest the forfeiture. The district court’s order on
forfeiture is affirmed.
Id. at 398. Similarly, Herrera failed to comply with section 809A.13(4) and cannot
contest the forfeiture.
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Herrera attempts to distinguish Aronson on the ground that he does have
standing to contest the forfeiture proceeding. The distinction is unavailing
because it fails to account for the difference between prudential standing and
statutory standing. The former requires a “specific personal or legal interest in
the litigation” and an injury. See Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 417–18
(Iowa 2008). The latter requires an assertion of a cognizable interest in accord
with the statute. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014) (distinguishing between statutory standing and
prudential standing); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2
(1998) (discussing distinction between constitutional standing and statutory
standing).
Herrera is undoubtedly correct that he has prudential standing to
challenge the forfeiture. The litigants in Aronson invoked their Fifth Amendment
rights and refused to make any statement regarding the property at issue. In
contrast, Herrera asserted under the penalty of perjury that he was “in lawful
possession of the 1999 Ford Expedition, soft serve ice cream machine, pelican
case, cordless drill and battery, vacuum pump and U.S. Currency identified in the
complaint as being subject to forfeiture and ha[s] a legal ownership and
possessory interest in those items.” Because Herrera asserted a specific legal
interest in the property at issue and an injury from its forfeiture, he has prudential
standing.
But Herrera does not have statutory standing to contest the forfeiture.
Statutory standing addresses the question of whether a particular plaintiff—or, in
this case, claimant—can assert a cause of action or claim under the statute at
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issue. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 n.2 (defining statutory standing). Aronson,
although admittedly ambiguous, involves a question of statutory standing. The
court noted the litigants failed to prove an interest in the property “as required by
section 809.9.” Aronson, 440 N.W.2d at 394. Herrera, like the litigants in
Aronson, failed to comply with the statutory provisions to contest the in rem
forfeiture proceeding. He is thus not a particular litigant authorized by statute to
contest this in rem forfeiture proceeding.
We reach this conclusion with a caveat. Although we have interpreted
Aronson’s use of the term “standing” to mean “statutory standing,” it appears the
real issue in Aronson and in this case is not so much statutory standing but
rather statutory compliance. In other words, the real question presented is not
whether Herrera has standing or statutory standing to contest this forfeiture
proceeding, the real question is whether Herrera should be excused from
meeting the statutory pleading requirement for constitutional reasons. We thus
read Aronson’s use of the term “standing” to mean the claimant failed to establish
a threshold interest in the property in compliance with the statutory pleading
requirements and the failure to meet the statutory pleading requirements was not
excused by the assertion of constitutional challenges to pleading.
Because we conclude Herrera failed to file a proper answer, the district
court did not err in declining to address the merits of Herrera’s constitutional
challenge to the traffic stop and subsequent searches.
The district court did err, however, in ordering the property forfeited. The
district court dismissed Herrera’s challenge to the property and ordered it
15
forfeited due solely to Herrera’s noncompliance with the statute. This is not the
remedy allowed by chapter 809A. The statute provides:
[I]f a proper claim is not timely filed in an action in rem, or if a
proper answer is not timely filed in response to a complaint, the
prosecuting attorney may apply for an order of forfeiture and an
allocation of forfeited property pursuant to section 809A.17. Under
such circumstance and upon a determination by the court that the
State’s written application established the court’s jurisdiction, the
giving of proper notice, and facts sufficient to show probable cause
for forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the State.
Iowa Code § 809A.16(3). While the district court found no proper answer had
been filed, the district court failed to determine the State’s application established
facts sufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture. Absent such a
determination, the order of forfeiture was improper. We thus remand this matter
to allow the district court to make a probable cause determination in accord with
section 809A.16(3).
B.
We next address Rodriguez’s claim for attorney’s fees. We review awards
of attorney’s fees following forfeiture determinations for correction of errors at
law. See In re Prop. Seized from McIntyre, 550 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Iowa 1996).
We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law.
State v. Allen, 708 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Iowa 2006).
Rodriguez contends he was entitled to attorney fees under section
809A.12(7). That section provides:
In any proceeding under this chapter, if a claim is based on
an exemption provided for in this chapter, the burden of proving the
existence of the exemption is on the claimant. However, once the
claimant comes forward with some evidence supporting the
existence of the exemption, the State must provide some evidence
to negate the assertion of the exemption. The State’s evidence
16
must be substantial, though not necessarily rising to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence, and more than a simple assertion
of the claimant’s interest in the property. The agency or political
subdivision bringing the forfeiture action shall pay the reasonable
attorney fees and costs, as determined by the court, incurred by a
claimant who prevails on a claim for exemption in a proceeding
under this chapter.
The statute requires an exemption claim. See In re Prop. Seized from Williams,
676 N.W.2d 607, 613–14 (Iowa 2004). An innocent-owner claim is one of
exemption. See Iowa Code § 809A.5(1). We have previously read the legislative
intent behind this section to allow fee-shifting “whenever a claimant successfully
establishes a section 809A.5 exemption.” In re Mirzai, No. 11-0540, 2011 WL
6672598, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
The State argues Rodriguez did not “prevail” on any claim; the State
“merely made a discretionary decision that, given the low value of the vehicle, it
did not wish to expend the resources to pursue the forfeiture.” Rodriguez argues
a party prevails “when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a
way that directly benefits the plaintiff,” Dutcher v. Randall Foods, 546 N.W.2d
889, 895 (Iowa 1996), or when a party succeeds “on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,”
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992). Even without a “final determination
on the merits,” a party may be a “prevailing party.” In re Marriage of Roerig, 503
N.W.2d 620, 622 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (“It is well-established that statutory or
contractual provisions providing for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party in litigation encompass defendants in suits which have been voluntarily
dismissed.”).
17
Even if we were to conclude the district court erred in concluding
Rodriguez was not a prevailing party, we need not remand this matter for further
proceedings. In addition to finding Rodriguez’s claim legally invalid, the district
court also found Rodriguez had not incurred any attorney’s fees:
In addition to the finding by this Court that Rodriguez is not a
prevailing party, this Court finds that every cent of attorney’s fees
requested by Mr. Stowers is attributable to his representation of
Herrera. At best, Rodriguez was a tag-along gaining the benefit of
Mr. Stower’s vigorous representation of Herrera.
Our review of the district court’s determination of the amount of attorney’s
fees is for an abuse of discretion. See Schaffer v. Frank Moyer Constr., Inc., 628
N.W.2d 11, 24 (Iowa 2001). An applicant for attorney’s fees has the burden to
prove the services were reasonably necessary and the charges were reasonable
in amount. See id. at 23. The district court is in the “‘ideal position to judge the
necessity of time and effort spent by counsel and the rationality of the
relationship between the services rendered’ and the causes of action and other
matters involved in this case.” Id. (citation omitted).
In our review of the file, we cannot say the district court abused its
discretion in finding counsel’s time spent on this matter related to Herrera’s claim
and not Rodriguez’s claim. Rodriguez’s counsel made no effort to present an
itemization of his time establishing what time was spent on Herrera’s case and
what time was spent on Rodriguez’s case. Instead, counsel submitted an
affidavit setting forth the total fees for the matter, including work on Herrera’s
case. Rodriguez did not meet his burden of proving his fee claim. Under the
circumstances, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in finding
the fees requested and presented to the district court in the fee motion and
18
affidavit were solely attributable to the representation of Herrera where counsel
made no effort to itemize the fees. We decline Rodriguez’s request for appellate
attorney fees.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.